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1854

NARRATIVE
OF THE
SECOND SEIKH WAR,
IN 1848—49.

WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF
THE BATTLES OF RAMNUGGER,
THE PASSAGE OF THE CHENAB, CHILLIANWALLAH,
GOOJERAT, &c.

BY
EDWARD JOSEPH THACKWELL, Esq.,
LATE AIDE-DE-CAMP TO GENERAL THACKWELL.

FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT CÆLUM.

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To whom can these unpretending pages be more appropriately inscribed than to the friends of those noble men who fell in the actions of Ramnugger, the Passage of the Chenab, Chillianwallah, and Goojerat,—

BRIGADIERS CURETON AND PENNYCUICK;

COLONELS HAVELOCK AND BROOKES;

MAJORS BAMFIELD, CHRISTIE, HARRIS

EKINS;

CAPTAIN FITZGERALD; &c., &c.

E. J. T.

LONDON, JAN. 4, 1851.

PREFACE.

THE writer had no intention of arrogating to himself the task of writing the History of the Second Seikh War, until it was suggested to him by a well-known senator, for whom he entertains the highest respect, that a narrative of the events of that Campaign, with most of which his position had made him acquainted, would be acceptable to the public.

His chief motive, however, for undertaking this important and somewhat dangerous office, was to disabuse the public mind of certain

erroneous impressions, to which report and public documents had given rise. No detailed accounts of these memorable Battles have yet been given to the public, except those supplied by the newspapers at the date of their occurrence; the "Journal of a Subaltern" being only a personal narrative chiefly confined to the doings of the author and the regiment to which he was attached.

It has been the writer's endeavour to represent in faithful colours the deeds of every regiment. Whatever personal anecdotes have become known to him, have been embodied in this Volume.

Acknowledgments are due to the author of the "Journal of a Subaltern," and the public journals, for some important *data* which had escaped his memory.

The reader may perhaps recognize in these descriptions of Ramnugger, Chillianwallah, and Goojerat, papers on the same engage-

ments, which have lately appeared in a monthly periodical. They have, however, undergone so many important additions and corrections, that no one can dispute the claim of this Volume to the recommendation of novelty.

It is right to state, that Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, G.C.B., has no knowledge of this publication. The opinions of the writer must not be considered as an index to those of Sir Joseph, for he never passed a criticism on any act of his superiors in the hearing of the writer of this narrative.

E. J. T.

LONDON, JAN. 4, 1851.

NARRATIVE

OF THE

SECOND SEIKH WAR.

ORIGIN OF THE WAR.

WHEN Moolraj and his crafty confederates, assembled in conference within the walls of Mool-tan, were concocting the plot for the destruction of the British officers, little did they foresee the disastrous consequences that would result from that diabolical scheme to themselves and to their country. Had Cassandra stepped forth from the midst of that crowd from which the murderers emerged to strike the blow, and

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whilst the assassin's sword was uplifted, proclaimed aloud that a day of fearful retribution would speedily follow; that Mooltan would soon present a scene of hideous desolation, its nullahs overflowing with blood; that the arch-traitor and his accomplices, stripped of their possessions, denuded of everything possessing value in their eyes, would be immured in the Company *Bahadoor's* dark prisons; and that the territories of the boastful Khalsa would be transformed into a British dependency, in consequence of that deed, it may well be doubted whether those lamented officers would have fallen victims to a base conspiracy.

It is an incontestable fact, that the blood of those gallant men was purchased at the price of that fertile champain country which derives its name from the circumstance of its being traversed by five rivers*—at the price of the most brilliant and superb diamond in the

* *Punj*, five, and *ab*, water or river.

world, the "Mountain of Light." Had any one predicted such a series of remarkable events as those which followed the death of Vans Agnew and Anderson, little credit would have been attached to his prognostication.

It was not within the range of human probabilities that the siege of Mooltan would have inspired one of our warmest allies with the desire and determination of raising the standard of revolt. Who could have foretold that the gentle Shere Sing, the "*good fellow*," who was in the habit of accompanying British officers on shooting excursions near Lahore with his admirable *Manton*, the zealous ally who marched out of Lahore at the head of his trusty troops, with the avowed intention of bringing back Moolraj's head, would have fraternized with the blood-stained assassins of Mooltan? Nor could it be deemed probable that Shere Sing with his handful of soldiers, and his scanty resources, would ever have attained such strength, as to be in a position

to hold in check the grand army of the Company, completely organized, and enjoying the advantage of the vast resources of India. But granting still further that there was a probability of such a result from the defection of Shere Sing, it may be asked how many would have regarded the annexation of the Punjaub to our Indian Empire as a probable contingency ?

Even after the decisive battle of Goojerat, many able, experienced men held the opinion that the British Government, unwilling to add to its weighty responsibilities, would avoid the bold stroke of annexation. Till the last moment preceding the promulgation of the official announcement of the annexation of the Punjaub, many were of opinion that it would be repugnant to the feelings and principles of a British nobleman to punish a youth of tender age for the misconduct of some of his subjects.

But it was obvious that it was consistent

with sound policy, and perfectly compatible with honour, to supersede the authority of a Government which violated its most solemn engagements, and failed to fulfil compacts, on the observance of which the continuance of the Seikh rule depended. For the British authorities abstained from annexing the Punjab in 1845, only on condition of the Seikhs fulfilling certain stipulations, the chief of which was the payment of an annual subsidy.

The minor Dhuleep Sing was represented by the Lahore Durbar and his guardians. The functions and responsibilities of a regency are analogous to those of a reigning sovereign, and there would be endless interruptions of tranquillity, if the proposition were admitted that the guardians or council of regency of a minor might perpetrate any aggressive acts on their neighbours, or commit any breach of political faith, with perfect impunity and without prejudice to their own country.

From what was known of Lord Dalhousie, it was thought unlikely that he would be deterred from taking the steps necessary for the prevention of a recurrence of such expensive catastrophes as Seikh rebellions, by any groundless fears. There were some, however, who expressed apprehensions that the proclamation of the annexation would be the signal for such a general rising of the natives, as would endanger the existence of the troops in the Punjaub.

When the Indian papers were teeming with descriptions of the encounters of the heroic Herbert Edwardes with the rebel forces of Moolraj, little probably did the modern Clive know that he was destined to contribute so materially towards the consummation of that important result, the annexation of the Punjaub. The reader will be anxious to learn how Major Edwardes influenced such a mighty event. After his troops had captured the guns attached to the undisciplined forces of

Moolraj,* he sent despatches to the Resident of Lahore, Sir Frederick Currie, urging upon him the necessity of the immediate advance of some troops from Lahore, and anticipating success if that were done. To the appointment of a force inadequate to the occasion all the events which followed have been attributed by some. The assemblage of an efficient army suitably and expeditiously equipped, under the walls of Mooltan, might probably have averted the action of Ramnugger and the subsequent battles. It was not politic to entrust such important duties as the avenging of the massacre of the British officers and the reduction of the citadel of Mooltan to a detachment of Sikh troops. The detachment of British troops sent with Major-General Whish was so small, indeed, that the fidelity of the Khalsa contingent

* Moolraj had only two regular regiments at the outset of the disturbances, both of which he retained in the fort.

under Sirdar Shere Sing became a matter of vast importance.

Had not Shere Sing marched out of Lahore for the ostensible purpose of inflicting punishment on Moolraj, the great focus on which the Seikh insurgents concentrated would have been wanting.

The Bunnoo troops might have remained in allegiance to the Anglo-Seikh Durbar, had not Shere Sing called on them to swell his force. Had the British troops, however, been present in Lahore, they would have prevented any outbreak in that city. The British army dispatched to Mooltan should have been organized at Ferozepore without any aid from the Lahore garrison. That Major Edwardes deserves the praise he has received for the success attending his efforts to form a disciplined army out of the rude elements at his disposal, and for the admirable skill he manifested in his brilliant engagements with the enemy, no one ever ventured to deny. It was to be regretted that no more accurate

information could be obtained by him respecting the strength of Mooltan. The force which the Resident first contemplated sending was so small, that that gallant soldier, Brigadier Colin Campbell, remonstrated against committing the execution of such a momentous enterprise to so inadequate a force.

During the prosecution of the siege of Mooltan the public service was much impeded by the existence of two clashing authorities in the Punjaub, arising out of the difference of opinion between the chief military power, Lord Gough, and the Resident of Lahore, Sir Frederick Currie. The former advocated warfare on a grand scale, and recommended the postponement of offensive operations till a more favourable season ; the latter was in favour of the immediate dispatch of a small force. That the formation of a large army would be requisite to overcome this widely ramified conspiracy became apparent on the desertion of Shere Sing and the revolt of the

Bunnoo troops. Notwithstanding these events, many officers, including Sir John Littler, thought, even to the period of the action of Ramnugger, that Shere Sing would not present a hostile front to the British troops.

When Shere Sing found it impossible to maintain amicable relations with Moolraj, and deserted the fortress, wending his way northward, General Whish concerted arrangements for attacking him on his march. But when the cavalry and horse artillery available for this purpose were passed in review (it must be remembered that the British infantry could not have overtaken the retiring enemy, who had stolen a march), the General arrived at the conclusion that the force was not sufficient to meet the emergency. He was deficient in infantry; therefore in the event of this detachment sustaining any disaster, his small army would have been exposed to great danger. Moreover, he was surrounded by large bodies of Seikh auxiliaries, the forces of

General Van Cortland, Major Herbert Edwards, and the Bohawulpore Rajah, on whose steady adhesion to the British cause he could not rely.

Under these circumstances Major-General Whish exercised a sound discretion in leaving Shere Sing to pursue his march unmolested. The Indian newspapers, indulging their habitual spirit of dissatisfaction (the *Bombay Times* excepted), raised an outcry against him, for losing this splendid opportunity of annihilating the incipient rebellion in the bud. Indeed there was ground for apprehending that his reputation would be seriously damaged, by the torrent of abuse poured on him, for his abandonment of the siege and neglect to capture the retiring Sirdar.

The defection of the Bunnoo troops created much sensation. These, constituting several regiments, were raised out of the remnants of the old Khalsa army; and it is believed that the greater part of these men had been arrayed

against the British flag in the battles of the Sutlege. They were stern, discontented veterans, brooding over the humbled condition of their beloved Khalsa or Commonwealth.

It was to be expected that they would eagerly avail themselves of the first opportunity of once more trying the chance of war. The revolt of a chieftain, of high rank and family influence, whose father, Chutter Sing, held the important position of Governor of the Peshewur District, opened to them an alluring prospect. That chief ingredient of success, self-confidence, they possessed in a most remarkable degree. They were disciplined and equipped after the European manner, and mustered several pieces of ordnance, and the regular horse attached to this force possessed a slight knowledge of cavalry tactics. The Bunnoo regiments formed a most important augmentation to the rebel army, and enabled Shere Sing to offer such successful resistance at Ramnugger. During the

whole campaign, indeed, these soldiers were conspicuous for their gallantry and unswerving fidelity. Rhotas also sent its quota.

It was the general belief that Shere Sing would make an attack on Lahore, and the Resident did not fail to adopt all the preparations rendered imperative by the urgency of the occasion. Every available soldier was posted at Lahore to strengthen the garrison. A party of the Sikh cavalry, reported to be the advanced guard of the Sirdar's army, made an effort to destroy the bridge of boats erected over the Ravee on the northern side of Lahore by the Anglo-Lahore Durbar, and although this bridge was not distant more than a mile and a half from Lahore, the insurgents succeeded in burning some boats. They were thwarted, however, in their intention of effecting the complete destruction of this bridge, by the prompt appearance of that gallant warrior, William Havelock, at the head of the 14th King's Light Dragoons. The startling prox-

imity of the enemy and the undisguised disaffection of the inhabitants of Lahore, however, surrounded the Resident's position with some difficulty.

It may be worthy of remark, that even to the period of the victory of Goojerat, the natives of Lahore, when passing any British ladies on the course or roads, openly remarked that they should soon be shutting them up in their *Zenanas*. Indeed their effrontery does not admit of description.

Before the general orders had been issued for the assembly of the Grand Army, small detachments had moved in the direction of the river Ravee. A brigade of cavalry (consisting of the 9th Lancers, 3rd Dragoons, 5th and 8th Light Cavalry) had assembled at Ferozepore; and Colonel Charles Cureton, who was attached to Lord Gough's staff, as Adjutant-general of Her Majesty's forces in India, was dispatched from head-quarters to take command of this force. A force under Briga-

dier Wheeler, including the 61st Foot, was already in advance. Colonel Cureton received orders to move against Shere Sing, who was on the other side of the Ravee. Brigadier Godby was also detached northward with a small force, including the 2nd European Regiment and 70th Native Infantry. These troops moved forward about the 3rd November.

It was reported that the enemy would make a stand at Goojranwallah, a fort about three days' march from Lahore; but when Brigadier Cureton approached it, he found it deserted. Brigadier Colin Campbell, with some regiments also, was dispatched from Lahore, to take command of the cavalry and infantry assembled under Cureton,* and Colonel Eckford had joined this force with the 31st, 56th, and 73rd regiments of Native Infantry.

Many officers, eager to distinguish themselves, entertained apprehension lest Campbell

* He joined Cureton on the 16th November.

and Cureton should overwhelm the rebel forces at a blow, and thus render the concentration of a grand army unnecessary.* The force under these officers consisted of the 3rd Dragoons, 9th Lancers, 14th Dragoons, 5th and 8th Light Cavalry, three troops of Horse Artillery, two batteries, 12th Irregulars, the 2nd European Regiment, the 31st, 36th, 46th, 56th, 70th, and 73rd regiments of Native Infantry. An impression was very generally entertained that the Commander-in-chief, averse to fighting on a small scale, had prohibited these commanders from courting collision with the enemy.

The army of India was at length aroused from its state of uncertainty, by the publication of the General Orders announcing the formation of a force, to be designated "The Army of the Punjaub." These orders were promulgated in the early part of October, and

* They occupied Allipore, a village eight miles from Ramnugger, on the 17th.

that month witnessed the gradual assemblage of the troops.

The army, of which Lord Gough was to assume the command in person, was divided into three infantry divisions. The first of these divisions, consisting of the brigades of Markham (the 32nd, or Cornwall regiment, 49th and 51st Native Infantry), and of Harvey (the 10th, or North Lincoln regiment, the 8th and 72nd Native Infantry), was assigned to Major-General Whish. His son, Captain Whish, was appointed assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Need, of the 14th Dragoons, attached as aide-de-camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Becher filled the responsible situation of quartermaster-general to this division. Major-General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert was nominated to the command of the second infantry division. This division comprised the brigades of Mountain (the 29th, or Worcestershire Foot, the 30th and 52nd Native Infantry), and of Godby (the

2nd Europeans, 31st and 70th Native Infantry). Major Chester was attached in the capacity of adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Charles Colt, of the 3rd Dragoons, was appointed aide-de-camp. Lieutenant Galloway received the appointment of quartermaster to this division.

To the old *sabreur*, Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, was assigned the command of the 3rd division of infantry, constituted by the brigades of Pennycuik (the 24th or 2nd Warwickshire Foot, the 25th and 45th Native Infantry), and of Penny (the 15th, 20th, and 69th Native Infantry). Another brigade was afterwards allotted to this division, consisting of the 61st Foot, the 36th and 46th Native Infantry, under the command of Brigadier Hoggan. Major Ponsonby was appointed adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Edward Thackwell, 3rd Light Dragoons, was continued in his situation of aide-de-camp. Ensign Garden, nephew of the quartermaster-general of the army, obtained the post of

quartermaster to this division. The artillery command was given to Colonel Tennant, who was gazetted a brigadier-general.

The cavalry division was committed to the charge of that distinguished soldier, Colonel Cureton,* who was promoted to the grade of brigadier-general. Captain Pratt, of the 9th Lancers, was appointed to the post of deputy assistant-adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Cureton, son of the gallant commandant, gazetted aide-de-camp. Lieutenant Tucker, of the 8th Cavalry, filled the office of quartermaster to this division.

The first brigade of cavalry, commanded by Brigadier Michael White, consisted of the 3rd Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Light Cavalry. The second cavalry brigade, consisting of the 9th Royal Lancers, the 1st and 6th Light Cavalry, was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, of the latter regiment. A brigade of

* Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's Forces.

irregular cavalry was formed, and Brigadier Hearsey was selected for the command of it; Colonel Salter was appointed to another brigade, consisting of his corps, the 11th Light Cavalry, and of two irregular cavalry corps. The 14th King's Dragoons was afterwards attached to the first brigade.

From this it will be seen, that, though there were three dragoon regiments in the field, three cavalry brigades out of the four were apportioned to Company's officers. Brigadier Cheape, a most scientific officer, received the appointment of chief engineer ; the commissariat department was entrusted to the management of Captain Ramsay, an officer related by family ties to the Marquis of Dalhousie. The appointment of Dr. Renny to be superintending surgeon was hailed with much satisfaction by the army. Dr. Macleod, a very skilful medical officer, was also appointed to the hospital. Staff Captain Lang was ordered to superintend the post-office department. The adjutant-

general of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, and the quartermaster-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, with their respective departments, accompanied his Excellency. The acting adjutant-general of Her Majesty's forces, Major Lugard; the quartermaster-general, Lieutenant-Colonel Gough; and the inspector-general of hospitals, Dr. Franklin, also joined the army.

The nomination of Colonel Cureton to the command of the cavalry division, formed the subject of much comment in military circles. It is not customary to take the heads of the adjutant-general's and quartermaster-general's departments from their official duties, and to invest them with brigade commands. Such a system might be fraught with serious inconvenience, not to say injury, to the public service. At the time when those departments are most needed, when the talent of experienced men is most indispensable, it is unwise to commit the charge of those offices to sub-

ordinates. That there was a precedent to justify the appointment of Colonel Cureton is true, but whether it was entitled to much respect may be left to the reader to decide. Major-General Sir Harry Smith held the post of adjutant-general at the commencement of the Sutlege campaign. In a great emergency, when there was an absence of general officers, and when immediate conflict seemed inevitable, Lord Hardinge offered the command of the first infantry division to Sir Harry Smith, who was a soldier of great reputation, and remarkable for his personal activity. The necessity for the removal of Colonel Cureton from his proper sphere of duties can, however, scarcely be recognized; for there were several distinguished cavalry officers on the line of frontier who enjoyed seniority over Cureton. The 9th Lancers, which was to be employed, boasted two lieutenant-colonels, whose commissions were of earlier date than that of Cureton.

Colonel John Scott had acquired signal dis-

tion on several occasions : he commanded the Bombay brigade of cavalry in the army of the Indus, and was conspicuous for his energy and knowledge of his peculiar duties, on the march to Cabool. In the Gwalior campaign he was again entrusted with the command of a brigade of cavalry, and at the battle of Marahajpore displayed the greatest skill in the handling of his men : he was indeed personally engaged in conflict with the enemy at the head of the brigade, and set a noble example. The Sutlege campaign saw John Scott once more at the head of a brigade; and it cannot be obliterated from the memory of the public that it was he who so gallantly supported Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, on that officer's escalade of the Seikh intrenchments at the battle of Sobraon. But it was not in battle that the value of this distinguished officer was chiefly felt; it was by reason of his intimate acquaintance with the duties of picquets, outposts, patrols, &c., that his presence in camp

was so invaluable. The writer can bear testimony to the mortification and disappointment experienced by Colonel Scott, on his being ordered to stand fast at Cawnpore. Although exercising the command of the brigade, he applied for permission to assume the command of his regiment.

The authorities urged, in extenuation of the palpable injustice of their conduct on this occasion, that it was contrary to custom, and might be attended with inconvenience, to suffer officers to abandon their permanent brigade commands in cantonments. This was a novel expedient to escape the stigma of favouritism. In all the previous campaigns, brigadiers were often called from their cantonments to render assistance in the field; indeed Sir Joseph Thackwell was frequently ordered to vacate his brigade in cantonments, and to assume the command of the cavalry in the field.

Colonel Alexander Campbell, of the same

regiment, was also overlooked, or rather *shelved*, by the same expedient. He was also informed that, as he held the Meerut brigade, he must not vacate it; and the command of the 9th Lancers devolved on the junior Major, Grant. It appeared unaccountable, that the cavalry command was not given to General Thackwell. That officer had held the important post of General of cavalry in the armies of the Indus, Gwalior, and the Sutlege. If he had again received that appointment, Colonels Cureton, Scott, and Alexander Campbell, might have occupied their *ci-devant* post of brigadier.

In the Sutlege campaign, the cavalry were divided into four brigades, of which Colonels Alexander Campbell, Scott, Cureton, and Harriott, were the chiefs. The reason assigned for the appointment of Thackwell to an infantry division, instead of the cavalry, was the desire at head-quarters to receive Cureton's valuable aid; and as he was not eligible for any other command than that of cavalry, they saw no

reason why they should not give General Thackwell an equally important command of infantry, seeing that he possessed experience in both branches of duty, and thus make room for the other distinguished officer.

That the authorities should be desirous of profiting by the experience of so old a soldier as Colonel Cureton is natural, but if he had retained his proper duties of adjutant-general, he would still have been at hand. It was asserted by some of the Calcutta papers, that Colonel Cureton had taken an unfair advantage of his position near the Commander-in-chief, and urged his own claims to the appointment. Honourable men acquit the gallant officer of such conduct, under the firm conviction that he would not have dropped at any time the vaguest hint respecting his appointment to the cavalry command, unless led by Lord Gough to entertain such an expectation. It is not unlikely that his Excellency might have asked him, in the course of conversation, whether

his wishes pointed to such an enviable position. Of course, Colonel Cureton could not have rejected the proffered honour. Such delicacy would have been absurd, and incompatible with the character of a soldier's career. Even if he had mustered up sufficient courage to make application for this command, surely ambition is excusable in a soldier. Merit of the highest order, unless supported by self-confidence, is often exposed to neglect. It must be remarked, that Colonel Cureton was actually employed in the field before the general order was promulgated for the formation of a grand army; and this fact may be urged in excuse of his appointment. It might have been said that when he was once in the field, the authorities could not but allow him to continue there, or that as he had once obtained the cavalry command, it was only fair that he should retain it. However, if there had been any desire to employ Colonels Scott and Campbell, Cureton might have reverted to his

old post of brigadier, on his junction with the grand army.

In the early part of November 1848, Lord Gough arrived at the general rendezvous of the army. Ferozepore had presented a very animated appearance for several days previous to his lordship's arrival. There were daily arrivals of fresh regiments and troops of artillery. The plain for miles around was diversified by sheets of canvass swelling to the wind, white as snow, and here and there adorned with flags fluttering in the breeze. These tents, in the mid-day glare, were perfectly dazzling. Wherever the eye rested, bayonets and swords were seen glittering in the sun, as the sentries paced their rounds at the tents; and here and there a long string of camels winding through the spaces between the tents, under their burdens of corn, rum, tents, furniture, medical apparatus, &c., gave evidence of the proximity of a large army.

THE ACTION OF RAMNUGGER.

AT the commencement of the second week in November* 1848, Lord Gough moved across the Sutlege at the head of Gilbert's division. Sir Joseph Thackwell with the third division formed the advanced guard, and preserved a distance of one or two days' march in front of his Excellency.

It was a matter of much surprise to many that his Excellency should have left Ferozepore without his heavy guns. These and the Engineers' park had not yet arrived from Delhi; but Sir Frederick Currie was so importunate in

* Lord Gough left Lahore on the 16th, after having declined a formal interview with the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing. The King and Sir Frederick Currie went out to Mean Meer to pay their respects to his lordship, who, mounted on his elephant, gave them a courteous reception.

his entreaties to his lordship to advance without delay on the capital, with all his available force, that the latter deemed it advisable to place himself between Lahore and the enemy as soon as possible. The grand convoy did not leave Ferozepore till the 13th November.

The army did not make a halt of more than two days at Lahore, in consequence of the reports that the enemy were daily receiving large reinforcements, and were constructing a most formidable intrenchment. Doubtless it appeared to his Excellency the wisest policy to strike an effective blow before the Seikhs' army swelled to too large a size, and before the intrenchments were rendered too impracticable for an assault.

The army advanced in the same order from Lahore towards the enemy. When Sir Joseph Thackwell had performed a distance of four marches, he received orders to halt at Noewallah, to await the junction of the Commander-in-chief. Ramnugger, where the enemy were said to be erecting field-works, was about

ten miles distant. Brigadiers Colin Campbell and Cureton were encamped about three miles on our right front, at a place called Saharan.

On the morning of the 22nd November, about 3 A.M., his lordship placed himself at the head of the advanced troops, and moved towards the Seikh forces. The Brigadiers Campbell and Cureton had been engaged in consultation with the Commander-in-chief the day previous. Cureton was in excellent spirits, and his youthful appearance belied the advanced age at which he had arrived.

The force which accompanied his Excellency consisted of the 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Light Cavalry, the Horse Artillery troops of Lane and Warner, 12th Irregular Cavalry, and the Infantry Brigade of Godby, including the 2nd European regiment, the 61st Foot, the 30th, 46th, and 70th Native Infantry, with Austen's and Dawe's batteries.

This project was so carefully concealed from all those who were not destined to par-

ticipate in its execution, that the chief officers in his lordship's camp were not cognizant of his departure till many hours afterwards. Let the reader only conceive the Quartermaster-General of the army going hastily into the Chaplain's tent to make inquiries respecting his Commander-in-chief to know whither he had vanished, and what he was doing! The Adjutant-General of India was admitted to his confidence merely because he was closely allied to him by matrimonial connection. The dashing activity of Lord Gough was fully exemplified in this notable instance.

Though the professed object of this movement was only to reconnoitre, it was the firm conviction and earnest hope of many, that an engagement would be precipitated. It was rumoured that the enemy were encamped on the open plain near Ramnugger, and it was afterwards demonstrated that this rumour had some foundation, for although a large portion of the enemy remained within their intrenched position on the right bank of the Chenab,

many thousands formed an advanced guard near Ramnugger.

As the British force advanced, the Seikh army fell back, retiring to the river. The bones of dead camels and horses, and embers of recent fires strewing the road for many a mile, verified the report that the enemy had been in great force on the left bank of the river. Our troops reached their destination about 7 A.M.

The ground adjacent to the river was intersected by two or three nullahs, or dry water-courses, running parallel to the river and to each other. Beyond these nullahs was the high bank of the river, or the natural boundary of the river when the waters of the Chenab gain their hyemal force. Beyond this high bank a wide extent of heavy sand disclosed itself to the view, at one season the bed of the overflowing waters. In the middle of this sand might have been seen what once had been a large green island, but which now pre-

sented the anomalous appearance of an island surrounded by *no* water. Here and there small banks or insular prominences were scattered about. The river took a tortuous course, and the ground was dotted with pools of water.

Whilst the enemy were retreating towards the river, the guns of Lane and Warner played with great effect on them, till they had withdrawn out of range. The British, advancing into the dry bed of heavy sand, moving over a considerable space, inflicted serious damage on the enemy, who were in large swarms endeavouring to recross the ford which was on our right front.

In a short time the Seikhs opened a well-directed fire from high ground in our front. Their guns must have been of heavy calibre, for Lane and Warner soon felt the necessity of a retreat. In this sandy position it was almost impossible to alter position with effect, and when Lane and Warner gave the order to limber up and retire, it was discovered that one of the guns attached to the troop of the

former was firmly fixed in the sand, in spite of every attempt to extricate it. The enemy, on perceiving this and the disposition of the British to retire, redoubled their fire, and began to crowd the left bank. All attention was concentrated on this gun, which became the object of contention, our gunners putting to the test every expedient to remove it, and the enemy's artillery relaxing no effort to prevent such a consummation, by one continued round of shot and shell. At length the impracticability of removing the gun became so apparent, that orders were given for its abandonment. The men of Lane's troop obeyed these orders with great reluctance. They would rather have lost their lives than desert this gun, but they were falling fast, and there was a probability of the reconnoitre being converted into a bloody battle.

To cover the retreat of our artillery, a squadron of the 3rd King's Own Light Dragoons, under the command of Captain Ouvry, was ordered to charge a large body of the

enemy near the island. This squadron swept the sandy plain with such extraordinary rapidity, and cleared aside all obstacles with such irresistible impetuosity, that the enemy neither opened fire on them, nor offered any formidable opposition. Ouvry actually encircled the island, on and near which were posted some of the enemy's batteries ; and he reached the high bank on the other side of the island, without having sustained the loss of a man.

The general supposition was that the enemy were paralyzed. But the writer is more inclined to believe that the guns were not on or near the island when Captain Ouvry charged round it. The enemy in all probability placed the guns in that advanced position subsequently to the charge. But that Ouvry moved for a considerable distance within an easy range of some of the enemy's batteries appears to be an undeniable fact.

The 3rd Dragoons and 8th Light Cavalry made some other charges on the enemy, near the gun in the sandy plain, headed by that

gallant old soldier, Brigadier Michael White, but the musketry fire from the nullahs, lined with Seikh matchlock-men, became so galling, and the futility of any further attacks becoming obvious, the gallant Brigadier wisely resolved to withdraw his men from such a useless exposure. It was impossible to reach the enemy, the sides of the water-course being precipitous, and the beds broad. Many of the troopers, moreover, were falling under the enemy's fire. This forbearance, the result of the exercise of a sound discretion, gave rise to a rumour that the 3rd Dragoons had not evinced so hearty a desire to close with the enemy as might have been expected from them. With whom this rumour originated is not known ; but that it was a most infamous libel on the character of as brave a body of men as ever lived, will be easily credited.

The error of the retreat, if error it can be called, could not by any possible means have reflected discredit on the regiment. It must have affected the reputation of Brigadier

White alone, who ordered it. That this brave veteran was never before backward in action, and offered the most gallant example in leading on his men at the battle of Moodkee, should suffice to show the necessity of the retreat. If every one else had exhibited equal caution with Brigadier White, all would have been well.

The author of "The Journal of a Subaltern," in portraying this scene has instituted a most invidious and unjust comparison between the conduct of the two Dragoon regiments, the 3rd and 14th. It is, therefore, the more necessary for persons better acquainted with the facts of the case than the above-mentioned writer, to give to the public the benefit of their knowledge, and thus to counteract the effects of an impression erroneous and injurious to the character of heroic men.

It should be observed that there was a clique in the Anglo-Indian camp, who employed much of their time in propagating rumours reflecting upon the character of British soldiers, but which were, in fact, merely the creations of

their own disordered imaginations. Those who were influenced by the unworthy feeling of jealousy loved to lessen the reputation of the most distinguished regiments.

Immediately on the discovery of the fact that the gun was irretrievably lost, prudence dictated that the British force should postpone offensive measures till reinforced by the infantry which had been left behind. The mere probability of the enemy's indulging in vaunting exultation, and of arrogating to themselves the credit due to conquerors, ought not to have had weight in the minds of prudent officers. The capture of the gun no doubt infused confidence into the enemy; but this confidence might have been productive of more good than harm to us. It probably would have emboldened them to meet us on the open plain, and thus have secured their easy destruction.

It appears, indeed, that his Excellency was averse to any further hostilities, and inclined to leave the field in the possession of the enemy; but that some officers of rank, bent

heart and soul on improving their own reputation, overruled his lordship's wishes. The evil effects of a too easy submission on the part of a General to the interested opinions of his subordinates, were soon illustrated.

The British forces having retired far beyond the high bank of the river, the enemy, elate at their apparent success, boldly advanced towards the abandoned gun. Not content with this they ascended the high bank in large numbers, and presenting a bold front to the British troops, continued firing long shots, which, however, were not the cause of much loss.

It was whilst the enemy were thus apparently setting us at defiance, that Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, of the 14th Dragoons, requested permission to charge, and drive them from the bank. No sooner had the equivocal assent been accorded, than the flaxen-haired boy of the Peninsula, on whose deed of valour the military historian has proudly dwelt, entering into a hand-gallop, at the head of his

men, soon threw himself on the crowd of Sikhs who lined the high bank.

The 5th Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, ably supported the gallant 14th. So impetuous was the onset of these determined warriors, and so energetically and effectually did Havelock and his troopers ply their swords, that the bank was swept in a few minutes of all its swarthy occupants, who, running hastily down the bank, across the sand, threw away their standards in their flight. Not contented with having driven the enemy from this position, Havelock, animated by that fiery spirit which glowed within him, instantly resolved to exceed the limits of his mission, and renew the offensive, contrary to the real wishes of the Commander-in-chief, by continuing the charge on the discomfited enemy, and driving them back across the river. Yielding to his insatiable love of glory, he brandished his sword above his head, and calling on the squadron of the 14th, in reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel King, to come and

support him, dashed furiously down the steep declivity into the tract of sand in which, it will be remembered, the gun had been immoveably fixed, and over which Captain Ouvry had charged. The British cavalry becoming now fully exposed to view, the Seikh batteries opened a rapid and destructive fire upon them. The Khalsa infantry, also, summoning fresh courage, began to stand and open a matchlock fire on their pursuers. The horses of the dragoons soon became exhausted in this difficult ground, their feet every moment sinking into deep sand or mud.

Our cavalry were not only exposed to the fire of the batteries across the river, but some guns which had been dragged to the left bank, had taken up a position near the green island above alluded to, and the presence of this artillery inspired the enemy with fresh courage. The deportment of Havelock was more that of a mortal confiding in the protection of the *Ægis* of some divinity than that of an ordinary human being. In the last charge, always

in advance, he suddenly disappeared, and the latest glimpse of that daring soldier, disclosed him in the midst of the savage enemy, his left arm half severed from his body, and dealing frantic blows with his sword, so soon doomed to drop from his trusty right hand. His last words were "*Follow me!*" Some days after the action, a mutilated corpse was discovered, which the chaplain of the army, Mr. Whiting, recognised by the hair on the body to be that of this gallant but ill-fated *sabreur*.

Such a death was worthy of William Havelock! If the doctrine that the souls of men continue on earth and inhabit our bodies after death be based on truth, surely the spirit of the son of Priam may have chosen the body of this noble man for an earthly receptacle! If the necessity of erecting a public monument to him be not acknowledged, surely the country will not altogether lose sight of his widow and children! Common justice dictates this.

Colonel Cureton, who rendered such important service to his country at the battle of Aliwal, and the disastrous affair of Buddwall, whilst in command of the cavalry, where he acquired such high distinction, met with his death in the most unfortunate manner. He was hastening towards the 14th for the purpose of checking them, and preventing any further exhibition of rash valour, when a ball, fired by some matchlockmen concealed in a nullah, struck him to the heart. Where were his adjutant and quartermaster-generals? where was his aide-de-camp, that this distinguished officer was obliged to convey his own orders?

Some time after the action, Captain Holmes, the commandant of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, made an attempt to rescue the body of his gallant leader, and was in the act of removing it from the field, when he received some severe injuries, and was only saved from destruction by the resolute bravery of his men.

The body of Cureton was eventually removed, and interred with military honours.

This distinguished *sabreur* was the only officer in the army who carried to the scene of war air-cushions, articles of great comfort, and the alleviators of pain to wounded men. Did this savour of a presentiment that he would be wounded? We were present at the sale of the lamented officer's effects, therefore can vouch for the truth of this story.

Lord Gough, in his general order to the army, took occasion to bestow an appropriate eulogium on the departed hero, and to give expression to his personal regret at the loss. The order ran thus:—"Aware of the general esteem and respect in which Brigadier-general Cureton was held by officers of all ranks who have enjoyed an opportunity of serving under his command, or been associated with him either on duty or in private life, the Commander-in-chief invites all so disposed to be in attendance to pay the last honours to this excellent

officer, whose decease no officer in the army can more deeply lament than Lord Gough himself." Thus Cureton fell near the regiment in which he had commenced his eminent military career—the 14th Light Dragoons.

The 14th were exposed to overwhelming numbers, and the demand on the muscular powers of the troops was urgent and incessant. Never was the advantage of a thorough knowledge of the use of the sword better tested; and many a man felt an inward conviction that the constant practice of the art of swordsmanship to which his old Colonel had subjected him, and of which he had often grievously complained, had preserved him from becoming food for the ravenous jackall.

There were many cases of individual heroism on this occasion worthy of notice. Captain Gall, who has distinguished himself by his literary acquirements, made an attempt to capture a standard, which he descried in his front. It seemed an easy prey, but, alas! its gallant

defender would not relinquish the precious burden without a struggle. He dealt some strong and rapid blows, and finally succeeded in nearly severing the gallant officer's arm from his body. Captain Fitzgerald, son of the general officer of that name, received a wound, from the effects of which he died a few days subsequently. A Seikh cut at him from behind; the *tulwar* cleft the integuments of the skull, and left little hope of his recovery. He possessed the love and esteem of all his brother officers. Indeed, his death cast a gloom over the camp of the 14th. Captain MacMahon also sustained a severe injury. Cornet the Honourable R. W. Chetwynd was slightly wounded. Upwards of fifty men were killed and wounded. Many of the dragoons were afterwards found decapitated.

The 5th Light Cavalry did not escape without much loss. Whilst the gallant commanding officer, Alexander, was animating and encouraging his men, his sword being upraised

in the air, a round shot hit his arm, struck the quartermaster-sergeant in the body, and continuing its deadly course, inflicted a wound on Adjutant Ryley's foot. The Colonel dropped from his horse, and would have fallen a sacrifice to the sanguinary spirit of the enemy, who were almost over his body, had not the brave sergeant-major, an Englishman, stepped forward, and kept the foe at bay, till some troopers had removed their respected Colonel from his imminent danger. The quartermaster-sergeant, an Englishman, fell dead. The Adjutant, Ryley, was compelled to quit the field, but the stirrup-iron had in a great measure mitigated the violence of the shock. It may not be out of place to mention here, that the sergeant-major above alluded to has been raised to the rank of officer. His name, if our memory does not fail us, is Mallet. It is said that one of the troopers of this corps achieved the capture of a standard. Lieut.-Col. Alexander's arm underwent amputation; and

we regret to have to record that he has experienced the most intense suffering ever since, pieces of the bone continually coming away. Lieutenant Hardinge, attached to the Commander-in-chief's personal staff, and a nephew of Viscount Hardinge, a most intrepid and enterprising officer, sought personal distinction, in return for which he received a troublesome wound.

I have enumerated the officers who were destined to adorn the casualty return for the action of Ramnugger. The name of Captain Fitz Edward Barnes, of the 3rd Dragoons, was inserted in the list of killed and wounded; but the newspaper announcement was the first intimation which the gallant officer received of such an occurrence.

As soon as the death of Colonel Cureton became known, and the 14th Dragoons had re-appeared, in what order it is not said, after their gallant charges, his Excellency resolved to prohibit any further fighting for that day.

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Campbell's Infantry had remained inactive, out of the range of the enemy's fire: some round shots, however, found their way into the 61st Foot.

It will be remembered that a large part of the army was left behind. Lord Gough had left no definite orders for General Thackwell; but that officer, hearing the distant cannonade, and imagining that his assistance might be requisite, struck his tents early on the morning of the 22nd, and marched towards Ramnugger, General Gilbert's division moving on his right, and Brigadier Pope's cavalry on his left. As they approached their destination, the cannonade became fiercer and better maintained. When Sir Joseph reached the scene of action, Lord Gough had ordered Sir Richmond Shakespeare to hasten to the front with his elephant battery.

The enemy were playing at long balls, but as their fire was harmless, his Excellency resolved to take up his ground, and orders were accord-

ingly given. In fact, he felt himself under the necessity of postponing offensive measures, till the heavy guns and engineer's department had arrived from Lahore. He was compelled also to make a new disposition of his chief officers, owing to the death of Cureton and Havelock. Indeed the interval between this action and the passage of the Chenaub, was not devoid of occupation for his Excellency.

In consequence of the death of Colonel Cureton, his Excellency having summoned General Thackwell to his tent, expressed an earnest hope that he would assume the command of the cavalry division, now vacant by the fall of the gallant Cureton. His lordship represented the difficulty he should otherwise experience in finding an officer competent to discharge that onerous and important duty. At the same time he tendered a full explanation of the reasons which prompted him to allot the part of cavalry commandant to Cureton, on the first distribution of the commands. We have

stated these reasons in an early part of this narrative.

He was also desirous of appointing Brigadier Colin Campbell to a command commensurate with his eminent abilities. His lordship therefore allotted the 3rd Infantry division, vacated by Sir Joseph Thackwell, to that officer, and conferred on him the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. Campbell, now Sir Colin, appointed Captain Haythorne of the 98th Foot, to be his aide-de-camp.

Had Lord Gough not felt an eager desire to promote Campbell to the higher grade, he might have invested Brigadier Michael White with the cavalry command. This gallant veteran was, in point of knowledge of his duties, fully equal to the command. If Colonel John Scott had been at an accessible distance, doubtless he would have been ordered to join the army in this altered state of affairs.

A general order was now published to the army, appointing the second in command,

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, to a general superintendence of the camp. The duties of daily visiting the advanced picquets, and conducting the operations of the daily patrols, consequently devolved on that officer. The Brigadiers of the day received orders to submit their reports to his Excellency through his lieutenant. The maintenance of order and cleanliness also formed a part of General Thackwell's various duties, from which he was not released till the termination of the campaign. In the despatch of Goojerat, Lord Gough bears testimony to this officer's "untiring exertions."

The army was now occupied in erecting batteries on the bank of the river, which would cover the passage of our troops, and sweep the Seikh camp; the workmen being occasionally annoyed by a shot from the enemy. The Seikh cavalry hovered round our camp, and occasionally surprised some unfortunate soldiers who wandered beyond their lines, farther than prudence dictated. The cavalry picquets were

much harassed by continual alarms, and in too many instances the alarm was not given until the enemy were well in retreat. Colonel Mountain, whilst Brigadier of the day, distinguished himself by his alacrity on one of these occasions. He had a sharp encounter with the Seikh foragers near the ford of Ghurree kee Puttun, who, on effecting their passage across the river, assailed him with small pieces of artillery.*

Colonel Penny, who had charge of the heavy train, was delayed two or three days by an unforeseen circumstance. The fortress of Jubbur, which was situated almost between Lahore and Ramnugger, was discovered to be garrisoned by a large body of the enemy. This place the British army had passed within a few miles of, without being cognizant of the existence

* Some English soldiers having wandered too far beyond the picquets fell into the hands of the enemy. They were hospitably entertained, and released. Shere Sing took these opportunities of making overtures of peace to Lord Gough.

of such a force. Colonel Penny received directions to level this fort with the ground. He had fired, however, only a few rounds, when the garrison surrendered at discretion. Had not this detachment of Seikhs been discovered, they might have interrupted our communications, and been the source of considerable annoyance.

It was incontrovertibly proved at this and other subsequent actions, that the troopers of the Light Cavalry have no confidence in their swords as effective weapons of defence. It would have been difficult to point out half a dozen men who had made use of their swords. On approaching the enemy they have immediate recourse to their pistols, the loading and firing of which form their sole occupation. That such want of confidence must very seriously impair the efficiency of regular cavalry, may be easily imagined. The chief duty of cavalry is to penetrate and put into disorder masses of infantry; and when cavalry once come into close collision with an enemy, the

sword, and the sword *only*, must come into play. The trooper cannot in a *mêlée* obtain opportunities of loading and re-loading his pistols. The instances where the Light Cavalry have ever entered squares or masses of infantry, are rare—rare, indeed.

Very few natives ever become really reconciled to the long seat and powerless bit of the European Dragoons. The usual seat of the native is short, and his bit so severe that it will almost break the horse's jaw. The native horses are so vicious and intractable, that a strong bit is absolutely requisite to enable the rider to control them. It frequently happened during this campaign, that some dragoons in a charge lost all control over their horses, whilst the Seikh horsemen were turning their spirited steeds in all directions. Picture to yourself a British, or Anglo-Indian trooper, dashing onwards with a most uncontrollable horse, and a Goorchurra, or Seikh horseman, after allowing his enemy to

pass, turning quickly round to deal him an ugly wound on the back of the head. It is a matter of great labour to convert a native trooper to the belief that the long new-fashioned sword of the British Dragoon is as effective as the *tulwar*, or broad-backed curved weapon of India.

Before the battle of Goojerat it was thought advisable to restore the *tulwar* to the Light Cavalry; but we believe this was only a temporary arrangement. If the Court of Directors were to consult their real interest, they would convert all the Light Cavalry corps into Irregulars. This change might be effected without any curtailment of their patronage. Let them retain the system of direct Cavalry appointments, and distribute the Cavalry Cadets indiscriminately amongst *all* the irregular Cavalry regiments. The Irregulars are a most efficient body of men, armed with the *tulwar*, which they use with wonderful dexterity; and are experienced in the use of the lance. They use the native stirrup, saddle, and bridle; are per-

fectly at ease on horseback, and although skirmishing is their forte, they never shrink from single combat.

Captain Holmes, of the 12th Irregulars, was the admiration of the whole army on several occasions. In his skirmishes with the enemy, the mettle of his men was strikingly displayed. The Irregular Cavalry were conspicuous in the pursuit at Goojerat, always seeking opportunities of conflict. Having witnessed the charge of the Scinde horse at the battle of Goojerat, against the Affghan force of Akram, I am convinced that no cavalry could have achieved the overthrow of the enemy in a more spirited or effectual manner. They had confidence in their weapons and accoutrements, and possessed stout hearts.

The 9th Irregulars, under Crawford Chamberlaine, earned the thanks of the Commander-in-chief, by some gallant skirmishes with the Seikh Goorchurras, who were constantly prowling about in quest of unprotected camels.

Supported by brave and skilful men, the officers of Irregulars are encouraged to gratify their noble thirst for distinction. The 3rd Irregulars frequently signalized themselves. The young heroes of the Irregulars, Holmes, Crawford, and Neville Chamberlayne, Malcolm, Tait and Christie, would rather take into action 150 of their own men, than 300 troopers of any Light Cavalry regiment. Let the East India Company devote their attention to this matter. The exigencies of the times demand the reform of such an expensive and useless establishment.

The propensity of the Seikhs to aim their cuts at the back of the head, was so unequivocally manifested on the 22nd of November, that it became an object of consideration to the officers of the army to provide some defence, however slight, for the precious *caput*. Some officers wrapped rolls of linen cloth round the back of the shako, the folds of which hung down over their backs, affording some protec-

tion. The officers of the Head-Quarter staff imitated the example of the noble Commander-in-chief, who carried a head-piece made of leather, partly resembling a helmet, partly like a jockey-cap. The leather edge hanging down behind from many of these fantastic caps, gave them the appearance of those hats so peculiar to the fraternity of coal-heavers. The cap was surmounted by a white linen cover, forming a defence against the solar rays. The Generals of Divisions and their staff, adopted the prevailing fashion.

The Earl of Gifford joined Lord Gough on his march from Lahore to Ramnugger. He offered his services in the capacity of an aide-de-camp. Cheyt Sing, a Colonel of cavalry, and brother of Uttur Sing, delivered himself to Lord Gough on the 28th.

THE
PASSAGE OF THE CHENAUB,
BY GENERAL THACKWELL.

THE exclamations of joy which burst forth in the British camp when a thick cloud of dust on the Lahore road betrayed the approach of a large force on the 30th of November, were loud and heartfelt. The heavy guns and Engineers' park, which had quitted the Seikh capital some days previously, under the command of Colonel Penny, of the immediate arrival of which the army had indulged the most sanguine expectations, was now known to

be near at hand. The ardent soul of many a good soldier had grown impatient of the irksome inactivity which had followed the bloody skirmish of Ramnügger, and burned to inflict vengeance on the savage warriors, who, enjoying a fancied security in their partly water-girded intrenchments across the river, took every opportunity of mocking our beards.

When the thoughts wandered to Cureton and Havelock, and the host of intrepid men to whom no quarter had been shown, a tear trickled down the face of many a stern dragoon, and the sword of righteous retribution was more firmly grasped. The erection of the numerous batteries, designed to command the Khalsa camp, formed a wholesome occupation to a small portion of the army; whilst the sole excitement reserved for the remainder was the occasional pursuit of a daring band of Goorchurras, who had been making a *chupão*, or attack on our camels.

The two days preceding the arrival of the grand convoy were occupied in frequent debates on the system of attack which should be put in execution by the Commander-in-chief, as it was bruited about that he intended to resume offensive measures immediately on the appearance of the heavy train. The most venturesome persons urged the expediency of a bold assault in front, maintaining that the crossing of our infantry over the fords, and in boats, would be attended with little difficulty under the cover of our guns; for they felt confident that a well-directed fire from our recently-constructed batteries would soon sweep the hostile bank of its boastful defenders. It was of no trifling importance, they contended, that this plan would enable them to derive full advantage from a concentrated force, unweakened by any detachments; and that when Lord Gough could not muster more than four regiments of European infantry, the

detachment of any number, however small, was full of danger.

Others were of opinion that the assault in front would entail a vast sacrifice of human life; that boats were difficult to be obtained; and that the services and assistance of the three splendid Dragoon regiments, which formed the flower and chief strength of the army, would be lost. Moreover, that the enemy would assuredly enjoy the advantage of an unmolested flight, and the probability be materially strengthened, therefore, of their being in a position to offer further resistance in the mountain-passes, if the British army stormed the river in the enemy's front. These disputants recommended that a strong detachment should move up the river Chenaub, cross at the nearest practicable ford, and attack the enemy on their left flank, whilst his Excellency should effect a passage in the Seikh front. They took it for granted that

the enemy would be so engrossed by this flank movement, that the assault in front would be attended with every facility. Many were of opinion, that our batteries would not only facilitate the passage of the British infantry, but also divert attention from the detachment employed in the flank manœuvre, till it was engaged with the enemy, while the roar of the contending cannon would be the signal for a general assault. These various opinions had the charm of novelty, and were a great relief from the much-hackneyed subject of the late action.

For days after the ever-memorable cavalry affair, which was commenced so precipitately, and which had its close in equal precipitation—(for most assuredly the gallant 14th, finding themselves unsupported in the middle of thousands, precipitately retreated, glad to extricate themselves in any way out of the dangerous trap into which they had been so gallantly led)—for days afterwards, I repeat,

the various incidents of that celebrated skirmish formed the all-absorbing topic of conversation. Soon, however, conversation was directed into a new channel.

The arrival of the heavy guns on the 30th November was immediately followed by an important consultation, which took place in the Commander-in-chief's tent. It may not be out of place to remark that the tent of his Excellency was most superb, adorned with glass windows, and the most unlike the domicile which Sir Charles Napier has indicated as the best suited for a soldier on taking the field. No one was more anxious than the noble Baron himself to strike a decisive blow in the least possible time. The batteries had been completed, and were now ready for the heavy guns. The feelings of his Excellency were in favour of an attack on the enemy's left flank by a British detachment, which would effectually intercept the retreat of the Seikhs, whilst he made an assault in front.

It is said that he was at first inclined to order a grand attack by the whole army in front, but that certain members of his staff convinced him of the inexpediency, if not danger, of such a proceeding.

The council was chiefly engaged in an examination of the reports on the different fords near Ramnugger which had been submitted by the Quartermaster-general. The selection of a ford which would offer no formidable obstacle to the passage of the detachment became a matter of the greatest importance. The success or failure of the enterprise depended on the feasibility of the ford chosen. Lord Gough was *to time* his own movements from the hour on which the detachment might be enabled to cross the river. From the nature of the reports presented, many maintained that his lordship arrived at a too hasty decision. The Quartermaster-general himself being in a most infirm state of health, had been utterly unable to

make an inspection of the fords in person. He had therefore confided that most important duty to subordinates, who, in conjunction with the chief Engineer, were supposed to have made the survey. But they having been prevented, by the nature of the stream, and the proximity of the enemy, from acquiring a minute knowledge of the capabilities of the fords in question, accompanied their report with the expression of much doubt, though the bias of it was decidedly in favour of the practicability of Runnee Khan kee Puttun.

The three fords between the British camp and Wuzerabad were, Ghuree kee Puttun, about eight miles distant; Runnee Khan kee Puttun, and Allee Shere kee Chuck, about thirteen miles from Ramnugger. There was also a ford at Wuzerabad, which was about twenty-four miles from Ramnugger. The officers of the Quartermaster's department employed in the work of inspection directed their chief attention to Runnee Khan kee

Puttun and Allee Shere kee Chuck. But, as we have before said, circumstances conspired against their making a very accurate report. On this report, however, so deficient in detail, his lordship determined to act. That the fords were not subjected to a more minute scrutiny, in which the highest authorities should have actively participated, was afterwards deeply lamented.

In the nomination of an officer to command the detachment, the choice fell on the second in command, Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, who had taken a prominent part in all the previous campaigns, and was supposed to be thoroughly conversant with the tactics of native armies. Lord Gough designates him, in his ever-memorable despatch, as "an officer of much experience in India." It may not be generally known that this officer was engaged in the stirring scenes of the Peninsula, and lost his left arm, which was amputated close to the shoulder, at the battle of Waterloo.

The force appointed to make this diversion on the enemy's left flank consisted of three troops of Horse Artillery (those of Christie, Huish, and Warner), two native light field-batteries (those of Austin and Kindleside), two 18-pounders, under Captain Robinson; 3rd Light Dragoons, 5th and 8th Light (Native) Cavalry, 3rd and 12th Irregular Cavalry, Her Majesty's 24th and 61st Regiments of Foot; the 25th, 31st, 36th, 46th, and 56th Regiments of Native Infantry, and four companies of 22nd Native Infantry. The Pontoon Train was also to accompany the force. The instructions of his Excellency were explicit. He directed Sir Joseph to leave camp that night at one o'clock, for Runnee Khan kee Puttun, to cross the ford at that place if practicable (for there was a doubt on the subject), and to march down without delay on the Seikh intrenchments. He suggested the advisableness of the detachment proceeding to the Wuzeerabad ford, in the event of that

of Runnee Khan kee Puttun being impracticable. To provide still further security against the miscarriage of this scheme, the chief of those intelligent officers (on whose statements his Excellency placed reliance when considering the capabilities of the different fords), was to be dispatched with this force.

It may be asked by some persons, why did not his lordship avail himself of the contiguity of Ghurree kee Puttun. The objection urged to the crossing of the troops at that place was the probability of the enemy being in force there to dispute the passage. This ford offered a great advantage in one respect—the shortness of the distance from Ramnugger. So favourable for the transit of an army did this ford appear to some, that a Calcutta writer has insisted that it was his Excellency's intention that the detachment should have crossed there. The writer is in a position to state, however, that such an idea never entered his lordship's mind. The proximity of

the enemy had terrors which could not be overcome.

Orders were given to the Commissariat to issue provisions for two days to the troops. The detachment was ordered to move in light marching order, and no camels or baggage not absolutely necessary were to accompany the force. But alas! the camels which had escaped the ban of proscription, their aid being absolutely necessary, formed an apparently interminable line.

In order that the march of this force should be enveloped in secrecy, and that the ford chosen for its passage should be reached early in the day, orders were issued to the troops above named to assemble on the right flank of the encampment of the 3rd Dragoons at 1 o'clock A.M., on the 1st of December. This point of assembly was on the road to Wuzeerabad. The cavalry and horse artillery were at the place of rendezvous at the appointed hour; but the infantry division of Brigadier-

General Colin Campbell did not effect a junction till after three o'clock. It was reported that they became entangled and confused in the intricacies of the encampment. This delay, however, was very serious, and endangered the success of the expedition. It would appear to have been a great dereliction of duty, that arrangements were not made for the prevention of a similar mistake, by the appointment of an experienced man to conduct this division through the labyrinth of canvass. The Quartermaster-General of the division was a young ensign, who had to thank the closeness of his connexion by family ties with the Quartermaster-General of the Indian army, Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, for his good fortune.

When the detachment was once in motion, the progress was as rapid as the broken nature of the ground, destitute of a good road, would admit. The creeping, snail-like pace, however, which characterized the movement of the Pontoon train, considerably impeded the rapid advance of the column by the occasional

long halts necessary to enable them to close up.

The reader will believe that as the road lay near the bank of the river, the absence of all unnecessary noise was a most desirable object. But if the hostile camp was not made fully cognizant of the movement which was taking place on our bank, it was not the fault of our camp followers, who created the greatest imaginable uproar. One writer describing this march observes,—“We commenced our march amid the most distracting sounds.” It is known that the Major-general made frequent efforts to suppress the tumult of voices, but in vain; and a summary chastisement to the noisy villains would have been well deserved. The bellowing of the camels was a sufficient offence to the sense of hearing, without the additional uproar of human voices.

The force did not reach its destination till after 11 A.M. The head of the column being out of sight of the river, Sir Joseph with his Staff rode down to the river's edge to make a re-

connoissance. The Chenab here consists of four branches or channels, one beyond the other. The sand-banks bordering and dividing these streams are insecure; moreover the river here is notorious for its numerous quicksands, the danger of which is proverbial. A large party of the enemy were now despatched posted for the protection of the ford. Lieutenant Paton, the officer of the Quartermaster-general's department, ordered by his Excellency to accompany the force, immediately proceeded to make another attempt to ascertain its capabilities. He had not been absent three hours when he presented his report to the General, in which he declared one of the branches to be very deep, with a shifting bottom. This was bad, for guns cannot be dragged through a ford containing water to the depth of four feet with safety, much less through such a stream as that at Runnee Khan Kee Puttun. Our artillery would not have been able to cover the passage of the British infantry, for the bank on the other side of the river was out of range of sight

and shot. "That cumbrous appendage" of an army, the Pontoon train, could not be converted into use, as it was too short; the sands, moreover, were too loose and varying, to admit of the train being securely fixed in them.

Sir Joseph hereupon consulted the officers around him, as to what steps they deemed it expedient for him to take. Brigadier-General Campbell, second in command, and an officer of Peninsula experience, represented the expediency of an immediate return to camp. His arguments, that all the plans of the Chief were now frustrated by the impracticability of the ford, and that new arrangements were rendered necessary, were not without reason. If the troops should proceed onwards to Wuzeerabad, their absence from head-quarters would be protracted so long, as to leave ground for apprehension that their provisions would be exhausted before they could rejoin the main army. Besides, there was a probability of the troops being seriously distressed by the

long march. A doubt also existed as to the feasibility of crossing the Wuzeerabad ford.

After weighing all the arguments *pro et con*, the General determined to avail himself of the alternative left him of testing the Wuzeerabad passage. Lieutenant Nicholson, an assistant to the President of Lahore, who was attached as chief civil authority to the detachment, informed Sir Joseph that a large body of his irregular horse, *Patthans*, held seventeen boats in their possession on the river near the above-named town, which might prove serviceable in the passage of the troops. It would have been hazardous for those boats to undertake a journey down the river to Runnee-Khan Kee Puttun, as the banks were infested with the enemy.

The troops had taken advantage of the time devoted to the examination of the fords to enjoy a meal, rendered more welcome by the fact that they had not tasted any food since the preceding night. Unless the troops had embraced this opportunity of recruiting ex-

hausted nature, the results of the march would have been more alarmingly discernible at the close of the day.

Evening had cast its sombre mantle around us before the troops reached the sands adjacent to the ferry and ford. It fell to our lot to witness the fall of many an apparently robust man to the ground in a fainting state. Their physical powers were not proof against the fatigue of so unusually long a march under an Eastern sun. These poor men were consigned to *doolies*, which offered a most grateful asylum.

In the mazes of the various small channels and pools of water scattered through the sands many a regiment lost its way. These never-ending pieces of water, and the increasing darkness of the evening, interposed a serious difficulty in the way of our finding the ford and ferry. We extricated ourselves with the greatest difficulty from the general confusion, after having waded through many pools. The knowledge of the fact that quicksands were

frequently to be met with in this spot did not allay the general uneasiness.

The boats were capacious and well adapted for the transportation of guns ; and the 6th Brigade of Infantry and some guns were conveyed across the ferry without delay. The Patthan cavalry assured us of the exemption of the right bank, even from the signs of an enemy. Major Tait, 3rd Irregulars, a most excellent officer, lost no time in guiding his corps across the ford. The stakes with which the passage was indicated formed a security against danger ; but, in spite of that precautionary step, two or three suwars, or troopers, found a watery grave. Imprudence forced many a man outside the stakes ; and, before long, many of these were unintentionally displaced by the horsemen struggling between their confines.

Brigadier Eckford, with the 3rd Infantry Brigade, had waded through the river previously to the passage of the 3rd Irregulars. He halted between the second and third

branches of the stream for the night, being deterred possibly by the prevailing haziness from completing the passage. The disappearance of many of the stakes rendered it advisable, that the rest of the force should bivouac on the left bank, and defer their crossing till the morrow.

The 3rd Dragoons picqueted their horses along the river bank.

The night was bitterly cold. The cold was so intense, indeed, that it prevented many a wearied soldier from obtaining a snatch of repose. The Major-General partook of a meal offered him by the officers of the 3rd Dragoons, of which he had been Senior Lieutenant-colonel, and passed the chilly night in their company. Fires blazing here and there mitigated the severity of the weather. During the night an alarm was raised on the other side of the river, and several shots proclaimed the vigilance of the sentinels; but these fears were groundless.

The 6th Brigade laboured under severer privations than the troops on the left bank, for

they were destitute of their provisions and cooking utensils. When their baggage-camels reached the river side, the darkness was too great to admit of their crossing that night. If those who were so unfortunate were able to kindle fires, it was as much as they could do.

The morning of the 2nd of December was marked by the most energetic exertions. The guns were embarked in the seventeen boats, together with the rest of the infantry.

Lieutenant Colonel Grant, of the Horse Artillery, and Captain Baird Smith, engineers, distinguished themselves by their unremitting efforts to transport the guns across the ferry in the least possible space of time. The guns were rolled into the boats on planks. This process proved tedious. The cavalry and the horses of the artillery then moved across the ford, the stakes having been re-arranged. The horses often got out of their depth, and the waters reached above the knees of the riders, who had been ordered to divest themselves of their overalls. From this it will be seen that there would

have been no chance of the guns finding a safe passage across this ford. The Major-general, in his despatch rather understates the real quantity of water, for he estimates the depth of this ford at three feet ten inches. The pontoon train could not have answered any useful purpose here. It was a dead weight on our hands. This machine, the 12th Irregular Cavalry, two guns of No. 10, light field battery, two companies of the 22nd Native Troops, and the two eighteen-pounders which had been sent to cover our passage in the event of any opposition, returned to head-quarters in pursuance of his Excellency's instructions. Captain Gabbett, the aide-de-camp sent by Lord Gough to bring him back information as to the exact time of Thackwell's completing the passage, on witnessing the safe transit of the whole detachment, also returned to head-quarters.

At the earnest request of the gallant second in command, the Major-general kindly permitted the sepoy to take their dinner before their march. It is a well-known fact in Indian

warfare that the sepoy always fights and marches best on a full stomach. Therefore, the advisableness of this pabular preparation was unquestionable. But it caused considerable delay.

The sun had passed the meridian two hours before the British troops were in progress. They were compelled to keep up a communication with the river, for despatches from his Excellency were expected to arrive. Order of battle was now formed. The three brigades marched in brigade columns of companies, half distance left in front, at deploying intervals. White's brigade of cavalry moved on our right flank with strong flanking parties and rear guards ; the 3rd Irregulars flanked our left, carrying their patrols down to the river. The detachment reached Doorewal at nightfall, a distance of twelve miles from the Wuzeerabad ferry.

Before evening a *Shootoor Suwar*, or camel rider, bearing a letter from the Commander-in-chief, made his *salaam*. The communication

was in his lordship's handwriting. He desired Sir Joseph to attack the left of the enemy's position early on the following day ; stating that he was in anxious expectation of being enabled to afford him assistance by a simultaneous attack on the front of the enemy's position. He added, that the opening of Sir Joseph's fire would be the signal for his own attack ; and that he was in secret treaty with some Seikh boatmen for some boats, at present moored under the hostile guns, but which he fully expected would be in his possession before many hours had passed. Amongst other matters, he remarked that he had been led to entertain every expectation that certain of the Seikh regiments, the *Poorbeas*, corrupted by the influence of British gold, would come over to us immediately on the opening of our artillery. The Major-general submitted this important communication to the consideration of the numerous staff-officers around him.

The repose of the troops was unmolested, and the next morning, Sunday, the 3rd of De-

ember, witnessed the march of the British detachment towards the Seikh intrenchments in the same order of battle as on the preceding day. A general wish pervaded the force that the issue of the expedition would be soon decided ; for the troops experienced much annoyance from the want of their tents and provisions. The defeat of the enemy would, they imagined, place them nearer the desired objects, shelter and food. It was hoped that the sudden assault of this detachment, though numerically very weak, aided by the simultaneous attack of Lord Gough, would be attended with complete success.

Everything was in favour of an immediate engagement, when another communication from his Excellency interrupted our advance, before the troops had progressed a distance of six miles. He prohibited the Major-general from courting collision with the enemy till reinforced by the infantry brigade of Godby, which was to cross, without delay, the ford at Ghurreekee Puttun. The letter betrayed the existence of

much anxiety in his lordship's mind about the fate of the detachment. It represented his own inability to render any aid ; but he promised to send the 9th Lancers and the 14th Dragoons across this ford, if the passage was feasible.

The Major-general now moved up the force to some villages almost on a line with the ford, where the reinforcements were expected to cross. Immediately on the receipt of the despatch he had instructed a wing of the 56th Native Infantry, and two *ressalahs* of the 3rd Irregulars, under Major Tait, to secure the ford, towards which a large body of the Seikh cavalry were seen advancing. The securing of this ford became now a matter of overwhelming importance. Patrols and scouts were sent towards the Seikh intrenchments, the exact distance of which from us was not known.

The troops now fell out ; some partook of a scanty repast, whilst others surrendered themselves to sleep. There were three villages in our front, almost in a line, which were occu-

pied by our advanced guards. They were named, Tarwalla, Ruttee, and Kamookhail. The village of Sadoolapore, from which the ensuing action derived its name, was in our rear. The general himself proceeded a short distance in the direction of the ford, to obtain early intelligence of the progress of Godby.

An ignorant writer, in a Calcutta publication, has declared that Thackwell went down to the river, in order to inform Godby that a large body of the enemy had appeared in sight. Such a statement has absurdity stamped on the very face of it. About this time I passed near a worthy brigadier, who, seated under a tree in front of his brigade was partaking of a substantial breakfast. On my suggesting the probability of an engagement taking place before the evening, he shook his head, declaring that it was a pity that the sanctity of the Sabbath should be so grievously violated. 'He had always been remarkable for his marked deference to religious obligations. We were reclining on

the grass, enjoying a biscuit and a weak glass of brandy-and-water (no other beverage being procurable, and the brackish water taken alone proving more than injurious), when a cannon-ball fell near us. We were between the British line and the villages above named. It was difficult to believe that this shot was fired by the enemy, for the scouts and patrols had raised no alarm of their approach. The Patthan irregular horse, headed by the indefatigable Nicholson himself, were immediately out in all directions in quest of information. The shots rapidly increased, and no doubt could any longer exist that it was the enemy who were showering on us such rough tokens of their attention. The first impression of many was that these shots proceeded from the other side of the river, hurled forth from British guns.

We must not omit to state that in the course of the morning a Seikh horseman had tendered submission to us, and informed Nicholson that it was the design of the foe to attack our flanks with his cavalry. Orders had been accordingly

given to Brigadier White to send out strong patrols to the front to provide against surprise. On the first intimation of the proximity of the enemy, the troops stood to arms. Sir Joseph, warned of the close vicinity of the Seikhs by the firing, was soon with his detachment. The troops were deployed into line. The advanced guards being too much a-head to receive support, fell back. There was so much sugar-cane of a considerable height immediately in front of the British line, and contiguous to the villages, that it was calculated to shield the enemy against our fire, while it furnished them with advantageous positions for successfully assailing us.

In order to gain a respectable distance from this dangerous covert, the general ordered the line to fall back about two hundred yards. The advantage of a clear front, which was secured in some measure by this movement may be easily conceived. But the enemy, who were rapidly advancing, interpreted this retrograde manœuvre into a retreat, the result of

cowardice. Their shouts of "*Feringhee bagh-jaten*," or 'the English are running,' were distinctly heard. The day was now on the wane, it being about half past two, P.M. The Seikh array became gradually developed, and before long the plantations of sugar-cane seemed to swarm with human beings. The tomtoms, discordant cow-horns, and wild yells of defiance, heard at intervals during an occasional lull of the loud thunder of artillery imparted a strange novelty to the scene. The numerous batteries of the enemy, and even the gunners manning them, were full in view.

Sir Joseph ordered the infantry to throw themselves down on the ground, a precaution which saved the life of many a man. When a ball occasionally fell into the line, it scarcely ever destroyed more than one life. In the Peninsula it was the custom, we believe, to direct the men to lie down in columns of companies. Now, though regiments do not thus present such a long front to the enemy as in a line after deployment ; yet when a ball enters

the depth of a column of companies, it creates great havoc, mowing down one man after another.

In exact accordance with the information previously received, the Seikhs precipitated large bodies of Goorchurras on our flanks, with the view of penetrating to the rear and cutting off the baggage. The 3rd Dragoons, 8th Cavalry, and Major Christie's troop of Horse Artillery, checked the advance of the enemy on our right flank, while Captain Warner's troop of Horse Artillery, and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, supported by the 5th Light Cavalry thwarted their efforts on our left. The enemy were in such numbers, that the brigades of Eckford and Hoggan were extended in order to prevent our being out-flanked. Captain Huish's Artillery troop and the battery of Austin took up positions near our right brigade of infantry, whilst the battery of Kindleside stationed between the brigades of Eckford and Hoggan on our left, inflicted great damage on the enemy. The skirmishers of the 3rd Dra-

goons sought opportunities of useful conflict with the enemy, and so overpowering was the fear they inspired that the Goorchurras declined any further encounters. The practice of Christie's troop was excellent, and never was it more clearly demonstrated that shrapnell, when directed with precision, is one of the most formidable and effectual inventions of recent times. The large number of Seikhs stretched lifeless near the spots on which their guns had been posted, with arms and legs completely torn from their bodies, testified to the deadly effect of the shrapnell.

The high bank of the river Chenab, and a *nullah*, or dry watercourse, afforded some advantage to the enemy on our left. A plantation of sugar-cane, occupied by the enemy in thick clusters, moreover, was more contiguous to Eckford's front than could have been agreeable to that officer.

The fire of the British artillery was very accurate, as might have been perceived from the occasional confusion near the Khalsa guns,

caused by the upset of a gun or waggon, and the destruction of several gunners at a time, so that in two hours the fire of the enemy slackened, and symptoms of wavering appeared. Our gunners had the greatest possible inducement to ply their guns with rapidity, for the enemy directed their chief fire against them; the infantry being protected by their recumbent posture.

As the Seikh fire began to slacken, another letter from his Excellency was received. His Lordship left Sir Joseph free to act as his judgment might dictate. It was now left to his option, whether he should advance against the enemy or not, without the reinforcements of Godby. Owing to unforeseen difficulties, Godby had, as yet, been unable to effect a crossing.

Sir Joseph consulted his chief officers as to the expediency of an advance on Shere Sing's position. The only officer who was at all disposed in favour of an advance was the gallant but ill-fated Pennycuik, than whom a more

ardent and generous soldier never lived. *Requiescat in pace!* But the reasons which prompted Thackwell to defer the advance till next morning were obvious. Night was rapidly approaching ; the enemy were still to be seen in front ; the three villages formed a strong position, and the nature of the ground in their rear was unknown to us. There was a report that a deep *nullah* was on our left front. It had also been asserted, that the ground between the Seikh entrenchments and the villages in question was only a continuation of the sugar-cane. With what they might be now occupied was a mystery. If the Seikh entrenchments had been close to the villages, we should, in all probability, have been brought under the fire of the enemy's batteries, which at that late hour of the day would have been anything but pleasant. Shere Sing was able to bring his whole resources to bear against us, his Excellency being unable, according to his own letter, to lend a helping hand ; and the troops were far from being in that fresh

condition in which they marched out of our head-quarters camp at Ramnugger. The disproportion between the two armies was another matter for consideration. The Major-general had only two regiments of English infantry to oppose to the Bunnoo troops, the flower of the Seikh army.

Four regiments of British foot, and three of English cavalry, effected very little a few days afterwards against the same chieftain. Besides the detachment sent to the ford to cover the passage of Godby's Brigade, a large body also was detached to protect the baggage in the rear. The force sent with Thackwell was not half of the grand army, and thoroughly inadequate to the task afterwards imposed on it. Sir Joseph, never apprehending that the enemy would commit themselves to precipitate flight, indulged the hope that he should be enabled to resume hostilities on the morrow. The troops were not unwilling to obtain the refreshing rest now secured them ; those who had been deprived of their morning meal now

sought to satisfy the cravings of hunger ; and picquets were thrown out and every vigilance was exercised.

Early in the night a loud barking of dogs was heard, no doubt caused by the sudden flight of the foe, who, having entirely deserted their entrenchments, proceeded to occupy a new position on the River Thelum, in the middle of a dense jungle.

The casualties were not so many as might have been expected. Twenty-one men and thirty-three horses were killed ; fifty-one men and thirty-three horses wounded. The artillery sustained considerable loss.

The horse of the commanding officer of the 24th Foot, Major Harris, who afterwards lost his life at the battle of Chillianwallah, was killed under him. An orderly *suwar* had his brains blown out close to the general, whilst the horse of an infantry officer, Nicholson, who was also in attendance on Thackwell, was killed under him. Another infantry officer attached to the general was dismounted from his pony

by a round shot. The ball grazed the pony's nose; and the startled animal gave such a violent shake that the gallant officer fell off. Lieutenants Watson, Garstin, and Gibbings received wounds; and Captain Austin was badly cut in an arm.

It would have been difficult to obtain an accurate statement of the loss of the enemy; but the plots of sugar-cane were filled with Sikh corpses. The wells had also been polluted by the carcasses of defunct Sikhs, much to the disgust of the poor villagers; and many of the dead and wounded had been carried away by the fugitives.

The enemy had employed their heavy guns against us; for several eighteen-pound shots were discovered on the field. The perseverance and rapidity with which the Sikh gunners fired for nearly two hours, in spite of our terrific cannonade, reflected the greatest credit on them.

Christie and Kindleside entitled themselves to the particular commendation of the Major-

General. The gunners of the latter officer, the Native, proved themselves equal, if not superior, in the accuracy and steadiness of their fire, to their European comrades.

I have omitted to mention an incident which is not destitute of interest. Towards the close of the cannonade, Sir Joseph, being on the left flank of the force, instructed a staff officer to inform Brigadier White, an old veteran, whose hair had long before grown grey in the service, that he might charge the enemy's guns if any opportunity offered; but this gallant officer had no opportunity afforded him.

It appears that Godby encountered the greatest difficulties in his attempts to cross the ford. The water was found too deep to admit of the troops wading through it. That insufferable nuisance and impediment, the pontoon train, could not be fixed; and boats formed the last resource. About 5 P.M. the work of embarkation commenced. The 2nd Bengal Europeans were the first to enter the boats. By eight o'clock on the night of the 3rd, the whole

corps reached the right bank of the river, where they bivouacked during the night. The rest of the brigade, the 70th and 45th Native Infantry, were transported on the 4th. At nine o'clock A.M. the brigade proceeded to join Thackwell. The 14th Dragoons had gone down to the ford, but finding that the passage was full of danger, returned to the Chief's camp. The annoyance of Godby's brigade at having been precluded from the glory of participating in the action by culpable mismanagement, may be readily imagined.

The proceedings of his Excellency on the other side should now be detailed. On the 1st, working parties from the 2nd Europeans threw up a new battery for two 24-pounders, three mortars, and four 8-inch howitzers. This new battery was in the immediate front of another raised some days previously. Immediately on receiving intelligence that Sir Joseph Thackwell had crossed the river, his Excellency opened a heavy fire on the enemy's

batteries and encampment. The Seikh guns offered a faint resistance. The width of the river was so considerable that Sir Richmond Shakespeare and Major Mowatt found it difficult to silence the enemy. The British fire, however, created some confusion in the nearest portion of the Khalsa camp ; for the tents adjacent to the river's bank were soon struck, and the enemy withdrew to the distance of two miles.

On the night of the 2nd, the batteries and breastwork were pushed to the bank of the river, the principal ford of which was now commanded. On the 3rd, the 2nd Europeans were again employed in erecting two batteries and a breastwork of three hundred yards. This breastwork was within one hundred and fifty yards of the river. On this day a profound silence pervaded the Seikh camp opposite to our batteries, and nothing was to be seen! It was surmised that the whole Seikh army under Shere Sing in person had proceeded against Thackwell. There were apparently no

guns left behind to cope with Lord Gough and his batteries. His Lordship continued the cannonade and demonstration on the 2nd and 3rd, with the view of diverting the attention of the enemy from the flank movement. But, alas! he was expending powder and shot on deserted mud walls. It appeared that the batteries were constructed at a much greater distance from the enemy's camp than was necessary.

On the night of the 3rd, Captain Robbins, one of the most enterprising men in the British camp, subjected the fords and opposite bank to a minute inspection, and concluded that the enemy had decamped. This excellent officer, attached to the 15th Regiment Native Infantry, but more qualified to discharge the duties of a Quartermaster-General than most men, immediately communicated his impressions to his Excellency, who dispatched the chief engineer, Major Tremenheere, Quartermasters, and a party, to ascertain the truth of this statement. All doubt having been removed, Major-General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert was sent across the river on the morn-

ing of the 4th with the 9th Lancers, 14th Light Dragoons, and horse artillery, to co-operate with Sir Joseph Thackwell in the pursuit of the retreating foe.

On the morning following the action of Sadoolapore, Sir Joseph pursued the enemy with the 3rd Dragoons and other cavalry. The infantry, who received permission to take their morning repast, followed as soon as possible. The necessity of the sepoy's eating whatever little they could collect in the shape of food, as I have previously observed, was always acknowledged, although the delay was often annoying. General Thackwell made a march to a small village on the Jullalpoore road, about twelve miles from the Ramnugger ford where he was joined by Gilbert's cavalry and horse artillery. Some of the troops engaged in this pursuit passed the whole day marching without food. One writer states, (but with what truth we cannot say,) that several sepoy's remained without food for two days. The troops did not catch a glimpse of the flying Seikhs that day. From the statement of villagers it was gleaned that

the enemy had retreated to the Jhelum and by the Jullalpoore and Pind Dadun Khan roads. Several wounded Seikhs were found hopelessly stretched on the ground, abandoned to their fate. It was reported that Sirdar Shere Sing was severely wounded, and Lall Sing killed.

Surgeon Wirgman of the 14th Dragoons was conspicuous for his humanity on this occasion. Whatever wounded Seikhs he found, he conveyed to his own hospital, where their wants were supplied, and their comforts attended to. This conduct should be placed on record, because mercy was a rare quality in those times.

On the morning of the 5th, Sir Joseph arrived at Heylah, whence he despatched the 9th Lancers, 5th Cavalry, and Huish troop of Horse Artillery along the Jullalpoore road, under the command of Major Hope Grant of the former corps. They entered the jungle, and had not proceeded eight miles when two large bodies of Seikhs appeared in their front.

The gallant Major taking it for granted that these parties formed the rear guard of the Seikh army, returned to Heylah after making a reconnoissance.

The 14th Dragoons and 8th Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel King, also proceeded at a rapid pace to the small town of Dinghee, whence they could not obtain a view of the enemy, and where they did not gain much intelligence respecting their movements. It was manifest, however, from the foot and gun marks on the road, that a large division of the enemy had taken that direction; and wounded men were also found, whose condition was of such a nature, that they could not have reached that distance from Ram-mugger without assistance. The cavalry remained at Dinghee till late in the day. Occasionally horsemen were seen afar off in the jungle, who were doubtless watching our movements. An unequivocal Seikh, with a long pointed beard nearly reaching to his middle, was captured in Dinghee. He had

been collecting money in the neighbourhood for Shere Sing, and was of considerable importance in the Seikh camp ; but no money was discovered in his possession. He was a tall, powerfully-built man, but was seized with involuntary trembling on being subjected to a searching cross-examination. Nothing, however, was elicited from him.

The cavalry remained encamped at Heylah for a long time. Campbell's infantry took up their ground two miles in rear of Thackwell. Lord Gough had an interview with Sir Joseph at Heylah, from whence he dated his first magniloquent bulletin, announcing "the defeat and dispersion of the Seikh force." It may be worthy of notice, that his Excellency desired the Major-General to prepare his despatch with all expedition, and to be as brief as possible.

The despatch of his Excellency, dated the 5th December, was couched in such language as was calculated to create an impression amongst the people of England that the war was brought to a successful termination ;

and that nothing now remained but a negotiation favourable to British interests or an annexation. Did it accord with that noblest impulse of the heart, generosity, to state, that the ford at Runnee-khan-kee-Puttun was practicable, when it had been proved by those who had explored it to be most dangerous? Was not such a statement calculated seriously to injure the reputation of an old experienced soldier? Did not the British public inveigh against Thackwell as the cause of the failure, till it was disabused of its erroneous impression by the publication of Sir Joseph's despatch?

If Lord Gough held proof that Thackwell had been deterred from crossing the first ford by groundless fears, how came it that he did not give expression to his disapprobation in his letters to him? Why did he not give utterance to his real feelings in his first interview with that officer? In the despatch it is stated, that Godby's brigade had got into communication with the Major-General before the action of Sadoolapore. Now this

was a most unfair misrepresentation. It not only tends to engender a belief that his Excellency had given the General a force adequate to the occasion, but leaves Thackwell less excuse for not having thrown himself on the Seikh army on the evening of the 3rd. The despatch runs thus:—"I expressed a wish that when he covered the crossing of Brigadier Godby's brigade, he should await their junction, except the enemy attempted to retreat."

Now it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that no such reservation about the enemy's retreating was in the instructions conveyed to Thackwell, and that a positive prohibition to engage the enemy till reinforced by Godby existed, (as may be gathered from the correspondence,) till very late on the day of the action. Every one endowed with the slightest power of observation, must remark, that epithets of honour are applied to some favoured officers, whilst others equally deserving are overlooked. Lieutenant-Colonel Grant of the Artillery is designated that

“excellent officer ;” Sir Walter Gilbert is “that most energetic officer,” though he had had as yet no opportunity of doing any thing. Lieutenant Nicholson is “most energetic ;” the practice of Sir Richmond Shakespeare and Mowatt was “admirable.” But not many terms of commendation for General Thackwell ! His Excellency may be acquitted of the chief blame in the concoction of this unfortunate despatch. He was dependant for his information on those whose interest it was to mislead him. The chief engineer and quartermaster had led his Lordship to believe, that the ford was easy of passage before the light detachment left headquarters’ camp. They were therefore deeply interested in maintaining the delusion.

It is much to be lamented that Lord Gough did not inspect it in person. The best letter which appeared on the subject of the ford in the daily papers, was inserted in the “Times” newspaper. The communication had the signature of the writer appended to it, Captain Rose, late of the 15th Hussars. If he had participated in the proceedings, he could not have

given a more accurate or clever statement of the real facts of the case.

The unmolested flight of the enemy was the source of much regret to the whole army. As his Excellency commanded the chief ford in his front, on the evening of the 2nd, and there were no signs of the enemy on the 3rd, it was a matter of surprise to many that he should not have pushed his army across that day, and attacked the Seikhs in their rear. As has been said, Shere Sing hurled his whole force on Sir Joseph, therefore there was nothing left to oppose Lord Gough. It was imagined that if this step had been taken, all the Khalsa guns might have been captured, the equivocal success of Chillianwallah rendered unnecessary, and that the two armies, Lord Gough's and Sir Joseph Thackwell's, pressing on the fugitives, would have completely destroyed the Sikh forces. What was afterwards effected at Goojerat, they added, would have been achieved here.

The chief object, however, had been attained.

The British army had effected the passage of the Chenab in perfect safety. If his Lordship had confined himself to the declaration of this result, without announcing "the most successful issue to his extensive combinations," the expectations of the public would not have been raised only to be suddenly dashed to the ground. Some pronounced this to be rather a ludicrous specimen of unmeaning *bravado*, almost worthy of Bombastes Furioso himself. *

Lord Gough now removed his camp from the left to the right bank of the river, near which he remained for some time, occasionally paying a visit to Sir Joseph's camp at Heylah.

It appears that he had been restricted to the ground Cis-Chenab by the orders of the Governor-General, and that his movement across the river had caused much annoyance at the seat of Government. The papers were filled with expressions of surprise, that his Excellency had not struck a blow immediately at the wily enemy, who was daily strengthen-

ing the formidable position he had taken up in the jungle at Russoul. For what reason the Governor-General fettered his Excellency with these restrictions, it is difficult to say. That he was negotiating terms with the insurgents can scarcely be believed.

The officer in command of an army in the field ought to be exempted from the control of any civil authority; if not, his reputation ought to be protected against the consequences of any failure or error.

Is it compatible with common sense, that a civil authority distant some hundred miles from the scene of operations, should regulate every movement of a force, seeing that new exigencies, new events, arise every moment? Is a young officer, boasting the rank of Major or Captain, who owes his appointment to family interest, a suitable person to represent the Governor-General, and to exercise a power superior to that of an old experienced Commander-in-chief?

Would Lord Lake, of distinguished memory,

have submitted to such a cruel thralldom ? Was not Arthur Wellesley invested with full political power, independent of any agent, when he marched against the Mahrattas ? Will General Officers, who value their reputation, such as Sir Charles Napier, &c., accept a command subject to such humiliating control ? Let this anomalous absurdity, among many others, be rectified.

Lieutenant Young, of the Engineers, constructed an excellent bridge of boats at Ramnugger, which admitted of the transit of the heavy guns.

Cricket formed the chief amusement of the army at Heylah. The votaries of this manly recreation were engaged in it from morning till night, their sole interruption being regimental duties. Quoits were also in request.

Heylah was distant less than ten miles from the Seikh camp, therefore the cavalry picquets and patrols were always on the alert. Thackwell daily sent out several patrols in all directions ; and on receiving the reports of

the officers in command, despatched them to the Commander-in-chief.

A dense belt of jungle intervened between the Seikhs and Heylah, which, however, gradually yielded to the repeated efforts of the wood-cutters. Lord Gough crossed the river Chenab on the 18th, and moved up to within three miles of Heylah on the 1st of January, 1849. Brigadier White, with a brigade of cavalry, was now sent to intercept a Sikh chieftain, Narain Sing, reported to be on his way from Mooltan with some guns, to join Shere Sing; but the expedition was not accompanied by any important result. Skirmishes between the patrols and Goorchurras tended to dissipate the dull monotony of camp life; and one day a body of two hundred Seikhs attacked a small convoy, which was compelled to take to flight.

Whilst the British troops were encamped at Heylah, the Sikh guns were often heard booming in the distance; and a salute of from forty to fifty guns was fired by the enemy on the 19th of December. Some said it was to

celebrate the fall of Attock, whilst others thought it was in honour of Dost Mahomed, the Affghan chief, who, according to some accounts, had declared against us.

On the 18th of December Shere Sing advanced a body of 10,000 men to Dinghee, which seemed to threaten a movement on the Wuzeerabad ford. Lord Gough, therefore, purposed marching to Goojerat, to take up an intermediate position, and orders were despatched to Sir Joseph to move in the direction of the above-mentioned town on the 19th, but these orders were countermanded. Brigadier Pope occupied Wuzeerabad, with three guns of Captain Miles's battery, the 1st and 6th Regiments of Light Cavalry, with a view to prevent any insurgents from Lahore crossing that ferry *en route* to join Shere Sing.

It was now reported that there was a great scarcity of food and money in Shere Sing's camp, and that large reinforcements from Peshawur refused to cross the Jhelum, until they had received a certain amount of pay.

The most important augmentation of strength the enemy received from Peshawur, whilst encamped at Chillianwallah, were two troops of horse artillery, with which Chuttur Sing had been supplied by the Resident at Lahore. They were disciplined by a British officer, Lieutenant Bowie, who was sent to Peshawur for the purpose of affording military instruction to our trusty allies, the Durbar troops, in order to enable them to repel the Affghans. The guns were of British manufacture, furnished from the Company's stores, with the requisite wagons, ammunition, &c. These pieces did great execution on the British line at Chillianwallah. Some persons who had seen these troops go through their regular evolutions at Peshawur, declared that the precision of their movements utterly astonished them.

The devotion of the Seikhs to their guns, which they regard as demi-divinities, is proverbial. Great numbers of the soldiers arrayed against us had eaten the Company's salt. On the termination of the first Seikh

war, Lord Hardinge, in pursuance of orders from the Court of Directors, effected a considerable reduction in the Bengal infantry regiments; and many of these disbanded men, made soldiers, now flocked to the Seikh standard, with a hope of bettering their condition. The high pay promised by Shere Sing held out a great inducement to them to enlist. It was said that Goolab Sing, the ruler of Cashmere, accommodated the insurgent chieftains with large sums of money. Whence they obtained the means of supporting such a vast army, supposing them to be unaided by some great chiefs, is difficult of solution.

Lord Gough marched to Lussooree on the 10th, and ordered Sir Joseph to effect a junction with him there. Brigadier Penny joined the army at that place; he had been left behind with his regiments at Ramnugger. A grand review of the army now took place at Lussooree, when the troops being drawn up in line, heavy guns in the centre, and the brigades of cavalry on the flanks, a sham charge by the infantry was ordered. They proceeded to the

front at a fast pace, rending the air with repeated cheers ; and the Sepoys took up the tune from their European comrades.

It was a matter of great astonishment to the public, that General Thackwell's despatch, descriptive of his action, was not published till after the battle of Chillianwallah. The document was transmitted to Lord Gough three or four days after the fight ; it contained, however, (so the authorities declared), a serious informality. Amongst those attached to himself, whom he deemed worthy of honourable mention in his despatch, was Mr. John Angels, a volunteer. It was objected, that it was incorrect for the Major-General to designate as an extra aide-de-camp an individual who did not possess the rank of officer. Now, no one can hold the post of aide-de-camp who is not an officer, and approved by the Commander-in-chief. Here was the hitch ; but, instead of withholding the despatch, why did not the authorities expunge the objectionable passage, and give the bulletin to the world ? This

young volunteer, who was present at the various engagements, was seeking to establish a claim for a cadetcy in the Company's service. His wishes have since been realized. The immediate publication of Thackwell's despatch was necessary to remove the unfavourable impressions about the ford, to which Lord Gough's ever-memorable despatch, dated "Flying Camp, Heylah," gave rise.

A strange accident occurred at Heylah. A gallant captain belonging to a very distinguished regiment, was in the habit of sticking dogs with a spear, having sharp points at both ends. One day when he was pursuing a fugitive dog, he made a blow at it with his spear as usual, but unfortunately, when drawing it back, the nearest point entered his side, inflicting a bad wound. He was confined to his bed for weeks after, and only enabled by a desperate effort to take part in the bloody engagement of the 13th of January.

Thackwell and Major Mackeson, in accordance with instructions from the Commander-

in-chief, examined, whilst at Heylah, the jungle between that place and the Seikh camp, and arrived at the conclusion, that it was impracticable for the troops of *all arms*; and that infantry could not have debouched or preserved a formation of any kind. They did not report on the ground between Dinghee and Chillianwallah as a morning paper erroneously stated. The presence of a large body of Cashmere troops at Meerpore, on the right bank of the Jhelum, under the command of Colonel Steinbach, was the source of uneasiness to many. It was said that Goolab Sing directed that they should operate against Shere Sing, but that Lord Gough and Major Mackeson protested against their approaching the scene of operations, for fear that they might fraternize with the insurgents. It was also reported after the battle of Chillianwallah, that Colonel Steinbach had fallen a victim to the jealousy of his troops. It may be remembered, that Colonel Canara, another European officer in the service of the Durbar, was sacrificed by his men at Peshawur, at the commencement of the insurrection.

THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLAH.

ELATE indeed were the spirits of the soldiers who composed the grand army of Hugh Baron Gough, when they encamped at Dinghee on the evening of the 12th of January, 1849. Dinghee, a small town, was situated at a distance of eight or nine miles from the heights of Russoul, where the Seikh forces under the personal command of Shere Sing were posted. Their right rested on Moong, their left flank being protected by the natural strength and field-works of Russoul. The Jhelum flowed behind their camp, whilst its front was covered by the jungle. On the evening of the 12th, it was bruited about, and

was the firm conviction of every one, that a general action would take place on the morrow, and few indeed were the men who did not indulge in the most sanguine expectations of a brilliant crowning victory. Late in the evening the Generals of Division, Thackwell, Gilbert, and Colin Campbell, the Brigadiers White, Pope, Tennant, Brooke, Huthwaite, Mountain, Hoggan, Pennycuick, Godby, and Penny, and the Commanding Officers of regiments, were summoned to the tent of the Commander-in-chief, to deliberate on and concoct the preparatory arrangements for the active operations of the morrow.

Whilst the council of war was engaged in deliberation, hosts of soldiers might have been heard discussing the prospects of the morrow. Here were men of the 24th, or 2nd Warwickshire Foot; there the 14th, or King's Light Dragoons, reiterating prognostications in a tone of vaunting superiority, that the sun would not set twice more on the concentrated forces of the proud Khalsa.

In consequence of the general expectation that the results would be decisive, the dream of a speedy return to the tranquillity of cantonments loomed before the heated imagination; and visions of home fireside and familiar faces were everywhere conjured up.

The Sikh position was amidst precipitous and frightful ravines, strengthened by rude field-works, distant about a mile from the river Jhelum. The village of Russoul was in the middle of the Khalsa camp, separated from the front chain of Sikh batteries by one ravine of extraordinary depth of several hundred feet. The only means of communication with this village was by a narrow wooden bridge, which would not admit of the transit of a horse. Had our army directed its attacks against this naturally formidable intrenchment, the enemy, in the event of their being driven from their front batteries, would have retreated across this ravine and destroyed the bridge. A broad dense belt of jungle or brushwood filled the interval between Dinghee and Russoul. It

was arranged that the British troops should turn the Seikh left at Russoul, and, intercepting their retreat across the river, capture all their magazines, &c.

On the morning of the eventful 13th of January, 1849, the army advanced in the following order:—Brigadier Pope's brigade of Cavalry, consisting of the 9th Royal Lancers, 1st and 6th Regiment of Light (Native) Cavalry, with troops of Horse Artillery, Huish's, Christie's, and Lane's, moved on the extreme right. Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert's division of Infantry, consisting of Mountain's brigade (the 29th, or Worcestershire Foot, the 30th, and 56th Native Infantry) and of Godby's brigade (the 2nd Bengal European Regiment, the 31st and 70th Native Infantry) formed the right column of advance. Near it were posted the heavy guns. On the left of the heavy ordnance might have been seen Brigadier-General Colin Campbell's Infantry division, comprising the brigades of Pennycuik (the 24th Foot, the 25th and 45th Native Infantry) and of

Hoggan, (the 61st or South Gloucestershire Foot, the 36th and 46th Regiments of Native Infantry,) White's brigade of Cavalry (the 3rd King's Own, and 14th Light Dragoons, the 5th and 8th Regiments of Light Cavalry), with three troops of Horse Artillery, those of Warner, Fordyce, and Duncan, which, under the immediate command of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, moved on the extreme left. All guards were called in to join their regiments.

It ought to be stated, that the 14th Dragoons were removed to the right flank to co-operate with Pope's brigade. The reason for this change of their position is shrouded in mystery. Could intelligence have come to hand that the enemy's Goorchurras, or Irregular Cavalry, were strongly posted on the Seikh left?

As we were advancing, several deserters from the Seikh camp made their appearance, and spontaneously offered to furnish information to Lord Gough; and the further we ad-

vanced, the more visible their encampment became on the heights of Russoul.

After a march of some miles a halt was sounded, and an extra allowance of grog was distributed to the troops. The line of march was now suddenly changed in the direction of Moong by bringing up the right. The army had almost reached Chillianwallah—a village in our front, when his Excellency determined to postpone the attack till the morrow. As there was a scarcity of water, however, no wells being at hand on the Dinghee side of Chillian, his lordship found himself placed under the necessity of pitching his camp in rear of that town, or rather on a line with it, where there was abundance of water. Orders were accordingly issued to the Quartermaster-General to mark out the ground for the encampment. A Seikh outpost on a low bare hill in front of Chillian had been driven in by us.

The men of the different regiments were in the act of falling out, when suddenly large bodies of the enemy were descried in the jungle close in

our front, and it soon became evident that mischief was brewing. Scarcely had the lines been delineated by Colonel Garden's department, when a sudden blaze was seen, followed by a loud report, and some shot fell near his Excellency.

It is said that Lord Gough had been under the influence of unusual excitement all that morning, for he hastily embraced the resolution of visiting such unwarrantable audacity with immediate punishment. Many impartial eye-witnesses, however, incline to the opinion, that an engagement could not have been avoided; therefore that it was advisable for his lordship to assume the initiative. It was contended, that if his Excellency had been desirous of deferring the action till the 14th, the wisest course would have been to halt at Chowta Omrah, and thus to avert a collision with the Seikh outpost near Chillianwallah. The Khalsa troops had vacated their intrenchments, and, presenting a bold extended front, were drawn up in the jungle, their right

resting on Moong, the Jhelum being in their rear.

Magnificent, indeed, was the spectacle now afforded by the gradual development of the fire of the Seikh guns. The balls came whizzing amongst us, and afforded proof positive that the enemy had commenced the work of destruction in real earnestness. Our heavy guns having been brought well to the front, vigorously responded to the challenge, and a never-ceasing roar of artillery resounded through the jungle. The only marks presented to the British artillery were the lurid flash and smoke of the enemy's guns. Often no other object was visible. It was sometimes possible to descry a man mounted in a tree taking observations ; but he offered a poor mark.

The troops were soon under arms, and maintained the original battle array, with the exception of one or two trifling changes.

It has been said that the Seikhs indulged the expectation of being able to keep the site of their batteries concealed till the British

infantry should advance, but that our heavy guns playing with prodigious effect compelled them to relinquish their stratagem and disclose themselves. So far from this being the fact, it appeared to us, that as soon as they could bring their guns into action they used every available piece against us.

The cannonade had scarcely lasted half an hour, when a staff officer in breathless haste rode up to Brigadier-General Campbell, and ordered him to carry the guns in his front without delay at the point of the bayonet. This order was given about half-past three P.M., without any new consultation and arrangement of combinations on the altered aspect of affairs. Major-General Gilbert received orders simultaneously to advance, whilst Pope was directed to make a corresponding movement on the flank. Sir Joseph Thackwell was left to act on his own responsibility. Some of the leading Indian newspapers argued, that since the success of a battle depends mainly on the previously well-concerted plan of opera-

tions, and his Excellency had held no communication with his generals and brigadiers since the last evening, (though the original plan of attack had become impracticable,) little surprise should be expressed at the melancholy results.

Here a well deliberated scheme of operations and effective concentration of energies, they added, was rendered the more absolutely indispensable by the difficult nature of the ground, which was everywhere covered with thick, high brushwood; and there was every likelihood that the most carefully concocted combinations would miscarry—that regiments would lose their distance, take a wrong direction, and even mistake friends for foes. That this probability was much strengthened when Sir Walter Gilbert and General Colin Campbell impetuously advanced into the jungle, may be easily imagined. The British army was small when compared with the forces of Sirdar Shere Sing, and the inestimable advantage of a superior discipline enjoyed by our troops was rendered of no avail by the imper-

vious brushwood, in which regiments could not debouch nor preserve a formation of any kind. The veriest rabble of the enemy, as long as their hearts were firm, was equal to the best disciplined troops in this wilderness of bush; and the knowledge of the ground possessed by the enemy gave them an immeasurable advantage. They posted their guns in a declivity, which served the purpose of concealment.

Many persons impute error of judgment to Lord Gough in having advanced against the enemy's guns at that late hour of the day. They say that he should have contented himself with silencing the enemy's fire, and have postponed the advance till the morrow. They hazard the opinion, that General Thackwell pursued the wisest policy, when he determined at the action of Sadoolapore, on the 3rd of December, 1848, to defer the advance of his small force on the Seikh batteries till the next morning. It will be remembered that he was under a peremptory prohibition to engage the

enemy till reinforced by Brigadier Godby. This reinforcement did not make its appearance, and the prohibitory injunction was not removed till past four P.M. in the day.

Several able officers were of opinion, that the wisest course open to the Commander-in-chief would have been to give the guns play for upwards of two or three hours, and as soon as they had committed great havoc, and created a wavering, to order the infantry to carry the guns. They would have recommended this plan, in the event of its being held absolutely necessary to decide the matter before evening; Lord Gough was apprehensive of a night of confusion.

It was certainly a hazardous policy, they said, at that hour of the day to hurl a few weak brigades against the fresh and active batteries of the enemy, supported by innumerable infantry, in such a dense jungle.

Before entering into the description of this battle, it may be well to preface it with the observation, that the Anglo-Indian line occu-

pied almost as great an extent of ground as the British army at the battle of Waterloo ; yet Lord Gough found himself considerably outflanked. The officer commanding the cavalry of the right, Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, was an officer of Native Cavalry. He had earned a high reputation for personal courage in his younger days, but possessed no great knowledge of the art of war. He knew little about handling large bodies of cavalry ; and was suffering from such bodily infirmity as to be incapable of mounting his horse without assistance. That this unfortunate officer (we say unfortunate, because he was in bad health,) should have been selected to command a brigade of cavalry, consisting of four regiments, two of which were British Dragoons, reflects some discredit on Lord Gough and his advisers. This ill-fated man, who was only a Lieutenant-Colonel, found himself most unexpectedly in the important position of Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade ; whilst his seniors, such active, experienced, and distinguished officers as

Colonel John Scott, of the 9th Lancers, were left unemployed, to fade away in the solitude of a deserted cantonment in the rear. It should be borne in mind that the 9th Royal Lancers formed one of the regiments in Pope's brigade.

The appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Pope was not only a reflection on Colonel Scott, but also on the cavalry of Her Majesty's army. When this officer of Native Cavalry received orders to advance, he actually moved the four cavalry regiments in line without any support. These four regiments were, however, minus four squadrons, which had been detached to the right, to thwart all attempts of the enemy to turn our flank and penetrate to the rear.

Amidst the perplexing intricacies of the jungle, Lieutenant-Colonel Pope not only overlapped the troops of Horse Artillery posted between him and Sir Walter Gilbert's division, but even got in front of Gilbert himself. When the Horse Artillery became desirous of opening fire on the Seikhs, they found in the cavalry an unexpected obstruction ;

but Major Christie had scarcely expressed astonishment at this untoward and provoking event, when he observed that the British horse were in retreat, and coming down on his guns with ungovernable impetuosity. It appears that whilst advancing, Brigadier Pope was severely wounded, having sustained a sword cut on the head. The loss of their leader, the absence of any order to charge (it must be remembered that they were moving at a walk), the disorder created by the trees and bushes, and the appearance of several Goorchurras in the front, must account for what followed.

Somehow or other a halt took place, originating most probably in Pope's own regiment, the 6th Light Cavalry, in consequence of their Colonel being wounded. The Seikh cavalry skirmished in front, being emboldened by the hesitation of the British line. About this time, the order "Threes about," was distinctly heard by some men of the 14th Dragoons. They turned with the rest, the Goorchurras in

hot pursuit. It may be worthy of remark, that the turning of two troopers was sufficient in the jungle to occasion the retrograde movement of the whole brigade.

When a body of cavalry advances in line, it should be regulated by its centre—the right of the 14th. If the two men, above alluded to, accompanied their backward movement with the corresponding word of command, the mischief would be more certain. When the back is once turned to a pursuing enemy, it is not customary to loiter on the road. In the impetuosity of the rush, the 14th were pushed by the other regiments against the troops of Horse Artillery. Guns, gunners, and wagons, were everywhere upset. To crown the mishap, the Goorchurras following close in the rear of the Dragoons, entered the ranks of the Artillery along with them.

Our vocabulary will not allow of our giving an adequate description of the confusion—regiment pressing against regiment, trooper hastening trooper, officer vying with soldier

in speed. The horses, become unmanageable, often carried their riders to the rear of the baggage escort. When once this brigade was in retreat, its movements might be comprehended under the designation of a panic. The few Goorchurras in pursuit were magnified by the disordered imaginations of the fugitives into thousands, and the cry of *saue qui peut* suggested itself to all. If the officer on whom the command of the brigade devolved, on Pope's being wounded, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford of the 1st Light Cavalry, had exerted himself to restore order, his efforts would have been unavailing.

In justice to the 9th Lancers it must be stated, that a squadron or two rallied some distance behind the guns, and checked the further progress of the enemy. Some of the Seikhs in the wake of the panic-stricken Dragoons, penetrated within a short distance of Lord Gough, and occasioned much uneasiness to the head-quarters' staff. The personal escort, consisting of a troop of the

5th Light Cavalry under Lieutenant Stannus, was held ready to charge, and many urged his Excellency to withdraw. But the enemy kept at a respectful distance, and thus removed the rational apprehensions of the alarmed suite. This disaster caused the loss of all the guns in Christie's troop, and two of those in Huish's. Two of the guns of the former were afterwards recovered.

Major Christie, with many of his gunners, was cut down on horseback. The approach of the Goorchurras was so sudden that this lamented officer had not drawn his sword from its scabbard when he received the first wound. Huish would have shared the same fate had not Major Stewart of the 14th Dragoons dispatched with his pistol the Seikh bent on sabring him. Many an officer and man, overturned by the cavalry, were trampled on the ground. Many hid themselves under bushes, and thus escaped the sharp tulwars or swords of the enemy. Young Cureton, a Lieutenant in the 14th Dragoons, son of the distinguished *sabreur* of that name, was killed

in this affair. His horse, it is said, ran away with him, and carried him into the hostile ranks. It will be remembered that Brigadier-General Cureton sustained a mortal wound some few days before, at the cavalry skirmish of Ramnugger—the opening scene of the second Seikh war.

As we shall hereafter demonstrate, this was not the only instance in the campaign where father and son met with a soldier's death. Major Ekins, Deputy Adjutant-general of the Indian army, was wounded whilst seeking to deliver an order to the brigade. His friend, Major Chester, ran to his aid; the British cavalry were in retreat; the danger was imminent; the enemy was approaching; Ekins begged him to leave him to his fate, and the former was most reluctantly compelled to do so. The enemy came up, and hacked him to pieces.

For the first few days after this action, the sense of the whole British army was strong against the 14th Dragoons. Even Lord Gough himself did not scruple to express his disappro-

bation. It has been asked: Why did Lord Gough place at the head of British dragoons a man whose military education did not qualify him to handle such a large force? The signal gallantry of Colonel Pope, as displayed on several occasions in the early part of his career, could scarcely, when his state of health is considered, justify the appointment.

As for the courage of the 14th Dragoons, individually and collectively, no further proof of it need be given than was afforded at the action of Ramnugger, where their valour was almost supernatural. Men who exhibited such dauntless heroism at Ramnugger could not have been cowards *at heart* at Chillianwallah. Those laurel-entwined colours which carry the words "Douro, Talavera, Fuentes d'Onor, Salamanca, Vittoria, Orthes, Peninsula," emblazoned on them in golden characters, may flutter in the wind as proudly as ever—they will remain, we predict, unsullied to the end of time. Had that hero, the flaxen-haired boy of the Peninsula, William Have-

lock, been reserved for that day, in spite of the jungle, Brigadier, and Goorchurras, the 14th might probably have found themselves going to the farther extremity of the Seikh encampment. It has been said, but on what foundation we know not, that Lieutenant-Colonel King requested permission to charge from the Brigadier in an early period of the advance, but that the request was refused. This speaks volumes!

That Colonel King was in front of his regiment before the retreat, and using every endeavour to keep his men together, the subjoined letter from one of the 14th, fully testifies. He was also forward in the pursuit at Goojerat. This letter is addressed to Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Kerrison, K.C.B., Colonel of the 14th.

“SIR EDWARD,

“As it is to vindicate the cause of a good man, as well as my humble endeavours will allow me, from the malicious design of three worthless men, I hope you will both ex-

cuse and forgive the liberty I have taken, as being only from the pen of a private soldier in her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, in which regiment I have had the honour of serving ever since its embarkation from England, and from which I have always received the greatest kindness, both from my late and much lamented commanding officer (Colonel King), officers, and non-commissioned officers, which I am happy to say has always been experienced by deserving soldiers.

“It is owing to the melancholy death of Colonel King that I have taken this liberty. It is with pleasure I have to state that the reports concerning Chillianwallah had nothing to do with it. My humble opinion is, that the words made use of by three worthless men preyed upon his mind,—words that were as false as the men that made use of them were worthless; they were uttered by Private Maclean, with the view of obtaining his freedom by being trumpeted out of the regiment, which, if he had obtained, would have been too good for him.

This man (a soldier I should be ashamed to own him as) has been the whole instigation of the two others, Privates Doogleby and Springate, both as worthless as himself, to utter the same words, which words I should be ashamed to mention, even for your information, words which myself and comrades are willing at any time or place to contradict.

“Sir Edward, after the fall of the brave Colonel Havelock at Ramnugger, while leading the first and second squadrons, the third and fourth were commanded by the late Colonel King, who gallantly led the charge under a heavy fire from the enemy’s cannon. At Chillianwallah he was again where every soldier hopes to find his commanding officer, in front of his regiment, encouraging his men to keep together, which they did as well as the thickness of the jungle would allow them. When the regiment retired (not without an order, as reported), he, Colonel King, still maintained his position, still remaining at our proper front, with the Trumpet Major Lee,

who has stated in the presence of Sir Walter Gilbert, that Colonel King gave him the order to sound halt, which, when heard by the regiment, was soon obeyed. Again, Sir Edward, hear from the pen of a private soldier where Colonel King was at the battle of Goojerat, still in front of his regiment. Even when his horse was shot from under him, he immediately mounted his Orderly's horse, when, if it had been as stated by these worthless men, he would immediately have gone to the rear and given command to the senior officer; but no, he gallantly led the young 14th in pursuit of the flying fugitives, under the command of Brigadier Lockwood.

“Sir Edward, it is with pleasure that myself and comrades have seen a letter printed in the *Bombay Times*, addressed from you to Colonel King, stating, that it gives you great pleasure to find that the young 14th still retains the character of the old 14th, which character, I am proud to say, they have, and always will retain. This foul and shameful untruth has

been raised by the three worthless men I have mentioned, with the view of casting a stain upon the honour of a gentleman—but whose honour I shall be proud to declare, in the presence of these men, and the world at large, was, and is still unsullied.

“All that I can say is, that Colonel King behaved to them too kindly—more so than they ever deserved, as they are men who are continually either in the hospital or guard-room, which can be verified by a reference to the Regimental Courts-Martial Book. I am sorry to say that I have known Privates Maclean and Doogleby ever since they joined the regiment, and two worse men, at present, do not stand in it, and I hope never will, or their equals.

“Sir Edward, I cannot imagine what motive they had, only what I have stated; for Colonel King had always a kind heart and good word for those deserving it; myself, for one, have had every opportunity of witnessing Colonel King’s gallantry in the field, and experiencing his kindness in quarters.

"Sir Edward, I hope you will excuse this long epistle, likewise my not signing my name to it, as it might be thought I did it with a view of self-interest. But I can proudly answer 'No,' but out of deep and sincere respect to the memory of the late and much-lamented Colonel King; but, if required, I shall ever be ready to come forward and vouch for the authenticity of its contents.

"ONE OF THE YOUNG 14TH.

"LAHORE, 18th *Sept.*, 1850."

Some have cast censure on Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, because the command fell to him on Brigadier Pope being put *hors de combat*. But in all probability the brigade was irretrievably committed to the retreat, before he was cognizant of the important casualty which had taken place. It was rumoured in camp, that the order to go "Threes about" originated in a young officer of Light Cavalry, who gave it as emanating from authority. Indeed, some of the dragoons so-

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lemnly declared, that the word of command proceeded from the mouth of a Light Cavalry officer, and went so far as to attribute it to the particular individual above alluded to. It may be reasonably supposed, that no officer would acknowledge having been the cause of such an alarming disaster. Another report stated that the retreat was solely attributable to the Serjeant-Armourer of the 14th, who shouted "Threes about."

The statement that the chaplain of the army, Mr. Whiting, ever presented loaded pistols at the head of any of the dragoons, in order to arrest their flight, is an atrocious, unmitigated falsehood. That he did remonstrate with some native troopers who shewed greater alarm than was consistent with propriety I firmly believe. The day after the action a court of inquiry into the conduct of the 14th Dragoons was held by General Thackwell with closed doors; and from what transpired, the result was most satisfactory to that much abused but brave body of men.

Whilst these untoward events were happening, in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief we may say, Colonel Lane, of the Horse Artillery, with the four squadrons of Cavalry before mentioned (two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, and two of the 6th Light Cavalry, under the command of the Honourable Charles Powys and Major Yule), was occupied in repelling the attack of a large body of the enemy on the extreme right. His efforts were attended with most complete success, yet, marvellous to relate, no mention was made of the conduct of this detachment in the despatches; indeed, instead of receiving any commendation, they were mixed up in the censure pronounced on the whole brigade. The Chillianwallah despatch is not certainly entitled to any particular credit for perspicuity or correctness of detail.

The right Brigade of Infantry, Godby's, advanced towards the Seikh guns, but had not penetrated far into the jungle before it was assailed on all sides: indeed, the 2nd Bengal

European regiment was compelled to have recourse to several formations to repel the enemy, and at last charged rear rank in front. This brigade, by dint of the severest fighting, succeeded in securing four guns. It was ably seconded in its attempts to disperse the enemy by the well-directed fire of Dawe's battery, which cleared the front in the most splendid style. It is my duty to record that never did any British regiment establish a greater claim to renown than the 2nd Europeans on that memorable day. Their conduct was beyond all praise. They were ably supported by the 31st and 70th Native Infantry. The gallant Sir Walter Gilbert put himself at the head of this brigade, and directed its movements during the charge.

To convey a faithful notion of the conduct of the 2nd Europeans, we cannot do better than transcribe the account of it furnished by an officer of that distinguished regiment.*

“The word came for the infantry to ad-

* “The Journal of a Subaltern.”

vance. 'Fix bayonets! Load! Deploy into line! Quick march!' And just then came a roll of musketry that drove us almost to madness. 'Quick march!' And into the jungle we plunged in line, with a deafening cheer, the roll of musketry increasing every moment. On we went at a rapid double, dashing through the bushes and bounding over every impediment; faster rolled the musketry—crash upon crash the cannon poured forth its deadly contents. On swept our brigade, and, gaining an open space in the jungle, the whole of the enemy's line burst on our view. 'Charge!' ran the word through our ranks, and the men bounded forward like angry bull-dogs, pouring in a murderous fire. The enemy's bullets whizzed above our heads; the very air seemed teeming with them; man after man was struck down and rolled in the dust. But a passing glance was all we could give them. And onward we went, bearing on their line with a steadiness which nothing could resist. They fired a last volley, wavered, and then

turned and fled, leaving the ground covered with dead and wounded. Pursuit in a jungle like that was useless, where we could not see twenty yards before us ; so we halted, and began to collect our wounded—when all of a sudden a fire was opened upon us in our rear. A large body of the enemy had turned our flank in the jungle, and got between us and the rest of the troops ; another party was on our left ; and we found ourselves, with our light field-battery, completely surrounded and alone in the field. The word was given,—‘ Right about face,’ and we advanced steadily, loading and firing as we went. Captain Dawe’s battery was the saving of us :—as the cavalry were bearing down, the Brigadier shouted, ‘ A shower of grape in there,’—and every gun was turned on them, the men working as coolly as on parade ; and a salvo was poured in that sent horse and man head over heels in heaps. If it had not been for that battery, we should have been cut up to a man. The fire was fearful ; the atmosphere seemed alive with balls.

I can only compare it to a storm of hail. They rang above my head and ears so thick that I felt that if I put out my hand it would be taken off. A man was knocked over on either side of me, and I expected every moment to be hit, so incessant was the storm of balls. I thought about you all, and breathed a short prayer—it was all I had time for, for we were obliged to be almost everywhere at once, keeping the men in line, which, from the jungle, was extremely difficult. Our firing was beautiful; every man was as steady as a rock, and fired low and well; while the sepoys on our right were blazing away into the air, and taking no aim whatever. All this time the enemy were dodging about the bushes, banging away at us and then disappearing. At last General Gilbert rode up and said to Steel,— ‘Well, Major, how are you? Do you think you are near enough to charge?’ ‘By all means,’ said Steel. ‘Well, then, let’s see how you can do it.’ ‘Men of the 2nd Europeans, prepare to charge—Charge!’ And on we

went with a stunning cheer. Poor Nightingale was shot in the head, and fell at my feet. The Seikhs fought like devils, singly, sword in hand, and strove to break through our line. But it was no go ; and, after a short struggle, we swept them before us and remained masters of the field. This is only what happened in our part of the field. We were on the extreme right, and the thickness of the jungle prevented our seeing what was going on elsewhere. We took three of their guns in our second charge, and spiked them on the ground. Numbers of the Seikhs were bayoneted by our men in the act of rearing themselves up and taking aim at the officers. Several of our wounded were cut to pieces in the rear, where we had been obliged to leave them in the charge. Surrounded as we were, it couldn't be avoided, and fearful was the retaliation the Europeans took for it—not a man was spared. The battle lasted for three hours ; and so, maddening was the excitement, that it seemed scarcely half-an-hour. The colours were car-

ried gallantly by De Mole and Toogood, the two senior ensigns, and are shot through and through. Our own loss is about seventy killed and wounded; and our not having lost more may be attributed to the beautiful order we kept, and the admirable way in which we were supported by Captain Dawes' battery. I had two or three very narrow escapes; a man's arm was taken away with a round shot touching me. I had one shoulder-knot shot off; and a fellow who was lying with a leg smashed, about ten yards in front, was taking a steady aim at me, when I rushed forward to disarm him. He fired, and the ball whizzed past my ear; I tried to save him, but before I could interpose he was riddled with bayonets; and so, I am sorry to say, were almost all the wounded. There is no holding in the men when their blood is up."

From this it will be seen what a vast disproportion there was between the contending armies. When this, and the density of the intervening jungle, are remembered, it redounds much to the credit of our troops that they con-

trived to maintain their ground so successfully as they did.

It fell to the lot of Mountain's brigade, on the left column of Gilbert's division, to attack a most formidable position. The brigade, headed by its gallant leader, who, to employ the words of the despatches, offered a gallant example in leading on his men, reached the rear of a part of the Seikh intrenchment. Here it encountered the most spirited opposition. The 29th Foot, whose conspicuous colours blazon forth its glory, added considerably to its well-earned laurels on this occasion. It spiked several guns, only five of which, however, were secured, owing to the want of draught horses. The rest were conveyed away by the enemy during the night. This brigade was received with an incessant shower of grape and ball. Nothing could exceed the rapidity with which the Seikhs dealt forth these lurid messengers of death. Their file-firing was excellent, and poured in with fatal precision. The 56th Native Infantry, which boldly advanced up to the hostile bat-

teries, sustained enormous loss. Its leader—the gallant Bamfield, a man as remarkable for his Christian demeanour in the different relations of life, as for his heroic valour in the field—here kissed the dust. Young Bamfield, of the same regiment, clasped his bleeding father in his arms; what an exciting embrace was that! Eight officers and 322 men were here killed or wounded. The confusion which this loss engendered was so great that the corps gave way. It lost its colours, but not its reputation. For truly the resistance it met with was hardly less, than that to which the 24th Foot were opposed. The most precious loss sustained by the 56th, a loss before which colours and everything else dwindle into insignificance, was the removal of the gallant Bamfield from his sphere of usefulness. May the heart of his widow be cheered by the memory of his deeds! The other regiment, the 30th Native Infantry, went well to the front. Its loss was 11 officers and 285 men killed and wounded. It also had the misfortune to drop its colours. Amidst the jungle, it was tanta-

mount to an impossibility for many men of a regiment to keep their eyes on the colours at the same time. The colours and bearers were all levelled with the earth, and their falling often escaped notice. Whenever the Seikhs obtained a glimpse of these silken memorials of glory, they directed their chief fire against them. This brigade was unable to maintain its ground against such unequal numbers.

At some distance from this brigade, on a line with it, moved the ill-fated column of the impetuous Pennycuik. This failure will stand to the close of English history as a salutary warning against overweening confidence and contempt of one's enemy. Brigadier Alexander Pennycuik was as brave and ardent a soldier as ever lived. In war, wherever he set foot, the welkin rang with applause of him. But it must be confessed, that in this memorable battle, his contempt of the enemy, expressed openly on several occasions, led him to neglect the ordinary precautions of war. His brigade, as well as Hoggan's, advanced without any artillery to cover it, but *why* the

batteries attached to it were left in the background is a question which must be addressed to Sir Colin Campbell and Lord Gough. In this matter for reprehension Pennycuick was not prominently implicated. One party declared the Chief ordered that the batteries should be immediately stormed with the bayonet, thereby implying the absence of all necessity for the use of the guns. The other retorts, that the only order given was to advance, and that no General of Division furnished with artillery ever went into action without it. We do not undertake to state what the exact nature of the orders was; but it is very manifest that neither the Brigadier-General nor his Brigadiers regarded the artillery as necessary; in other words, the contempt of the enemy was not confined to poor Pennycuick.

The 24th Foot was composed of young men, and went into action with higher spirits, and numerically stronger than any other corps of the army. It had not gone far before the

gesture of Lieutenant-Colonel Brookes, who was waving his sword over his head, attracted the notice of the men. They understood it to be a signal to double, and consequently increased their speed. Their distance from the Khalsa guns at that moment was upwards of six hundred yards. They soon outran their native comrades, who at the best but shuffle along in the English leather shoes with which they are supplied. The Seikhs redoubled their fire; and it fell to the lot of this gallant regiment to experience an atmosphere solely compounded of fire, grape, and round shot. To counteract all this there was no artillery, and no fire of musketry, for the men were *unloaded*. So extraordinary indeed was the infatuation of the gallant Pennycuick and Brookes, that they sent out skirmishers without ordering them to load! These unfortunate men, dispersed through the jungle, helpless, fell an easy prey to hidden Seikhs. The regiment arrived breathless at the guns, and had commenced the work of spiking

them, when suddenly some regiments of the Bunnoo force, which were concealed in the brushwood, opened a musketry fire with such rapidity and precision, that those ill-fated men, already disordered by the brushwood and their hasty advance, were seized with panic and fled. Now a fearful massacre was enacted. The Seikh cavalry pressed closely on the terror-stricken fugitives, hacking to pieces all the wounded. Small parties occasionally rallied, and corpses lying together in small divisions might be seen on the morrow ; but all endeavours to present a formidable front to the enemy were unavailing. There were no officers.

Pennycuick and his son, both officers of the 24th, fell just as they reached the guns. A stalwart Seikh was leaning over the hapless father prostrated by a shot, and inflicting gashes on his body, when the boy of seventeen, the worthy son of such a noble father, stepped forward and dealt an avenging blow. The heroic boy strided across his parent's corpse,

and bade defiance to the savage multitude. But soon numbers overpowered him, and he fell dead—but to live in glory's brightest chronicles. The Horatian text—*Fortes creantur fortibus*—was fully verified in this soul-stirring incident. May immortality enshrine their memory! Brookes dropped amongst the guns. Colonel Brookes assumed the command of the regiment only a few days prior to the action. He had been absent on furlough, and was proceeding leisurely to rejoin his corps when intelligence of the Seikh outbreak reached him. Though he had snatched but a short-lived bliss from his recent matrimonial alliance, he travelled day and night till he reached the army. In England he was often known to express a wish that he might one day participate in "the *glorious battles*" of India; and his aspirations were fully realized. May such noble examples always be found, to inspire our young soldiers! Thirteen officers were sent to their last account; ten sustained wounds.

Nothing could exceed the ferocity of the enemy: they showed no quarter, and were so determined on inflicting death, that they often gave twenty blows with their sharp tulwars to one man. The senior Major Paynter was shot through the lungs, but his horse carried him out of danger. Major Harris also fell. His horse was killed under him at the action of Sadoolapore on the 3rd December. A young officer (Thelwall) received a severe wound in his leg, and would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, had he not seized a loose horse, which soon placed a distance between him and his pursuers. Captain Williams, a young man of robust constitution, fell wounded by a musket shot. The enemy came up and inflicted eighteen wounds on him, hacked his arms, head, and legs, and were only prevented from absolutely killing him by the circumstance of his having feigned death. Some of our troops traversing the field discovered signs of life, and carried him to the hospital. He has since recovered, to the sur-

prise of every one, and is now in England. One of his hands was lopped off.

It may be here observed, that that flimsy, diminutive piece of steel called the infantry regulation sword, proved useless to the gallant officer. The powerful tulwar of the Seikh shivered it to atoms with a blow. It may answer the purpose of saluting, but it is insufficient as a means of protection. The cook's spit is far preferable to this infantry spit.

The scene of the retreat of this regiment presented a melancholy spectacle on the morrow. The pallid, ghastly colour of the corpses of the English soldiers formed a strange contrast to the dark hue of the natives. They appeared bleached. The attitudes of death were various—an arm might be seen lying at a considerable distance from its body, severed by the sword or round shot. Many men arrested attention who, with their arms directed upwards, appeared to have been in the act of warding off the blows of the ene-

my with their muskets when the vital spark deserted them. Prince Albert hats and military shoes might be seen in all directions, strewing the ground in great abundance ; they afforded splendid booty to the needy camp followers. The 24th lost its colours and much ammunition. The camp next day was overspread with funereal gloom. Funeral parties were bringing into camp the bodies of the different officers as they were discovered.

The bodies of the gallant Pennycuicks—father and son—were conveyed in one dooly (a kind of litter). They were sadly disfigured. The remains of all the officers were recovered. Camels were sent out to convey the bodies of the private soldiers to the regimental hospital. Dead men, one after another, were piled on a camel and fastened with ropes. Here death was presented to the spectator in its most appalling features. It is said that one of the colours of this corps was recovered, being found wrapped round the body of one of the ensigns. If the 24th had

poured in some volleys near the guns before they commenced their charge, the result would have been more favourable. It was rumoured that an Englishman was seen directing and animating the movements of the Seikh gunners. Brigadier Pennycuick assaulted the strongest point of the Seikh position, as afterwards appeared. The other regiments—the 25th and 45th Native Infantry—advanced on the right and left of the 24th. They suffered immense loss.

The interval between the brigade of Pennycuick and that of Hoggan, the left Infantry Brigade of the army, was considerable. Sir Colin Campbell placed himself at the head of the later brigade, and overcame all opposition. The 61st Foot was frequently surrounded, but it gloriously repelled several attacks by wheeling companies in all directions. After spiking the guns opposed to it, it brought its left shoulders forward, and retook the guns from which the 24th had been so summarily expelled. Whilst this brigade was moving to

the right, a Khalsa chief rode up to the front of the 61st, reconnoitred, and rode away. So cool and unconcerned was the deportment of this man, that he was regarded as a friend, one of our irregular horse. On perceiving the mistake, the 61st Foot opened fire on him, but he escaped.

The personal daring of Sir Colin was as remarkable as his imperturbable coolness. He was wounded in the act of cutting down a Khalsa gunner. This feat was ascribed to Lord Gough, who was near the heavy guns, and not amongst the charging regiments. The brilliant success achieved by this brigade was owing in a great measure to the execution caused by its rapid and well-directed file-firing. Campbell poured in volleys of musketry on nearing the guns. So resolute were the Seikhs, that they turned against the 61st some of those guns which had been but badly spiked some minutes before. No sooner had the 61st abandoned any of the guns they spiked than the enemy retook them.

The fighting was sharp and incessant. Only four captured guns graced the victors in this part of the battle. The 36th and 46th Native Infantry signalized themselves by the steadiness and courage with which they supported the 61st. The former sustained heavy loss. The contest here was more equal and better maintained than in any other quarter. It may be said with truth that this brigade performed double work. Conolly, the junior ensign of the 46th, is described as having encountered great dangers. One ball grazed his ankle, another would have entered his head had not a sepoy interposed his musket, which was broken by the shot ; whilst another fired at him by a Seikh supposed to be dead, missed him. Brigadier Godby's gallant son, an ensign in the 36th, was cut down in the jungle by a Goorchurra, but not killed. Penny's reserve brigade, consisting of two native regiments, 15th and 69th, was ordered to retrieve the disaster of the 24th Foot. It inclined too far to the right : it encountered some sharp

fighting, however, before it reached Godby's brigade, with which it co-operated during the remainder of the day.

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, the second in command of the army, on the extreme left with White's Cavalry Brigade, and three troops of horse artillery, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, advanced some distance and opened fire on the enemy. Outar Sing stood opposite, with several regiments of infantry, cavalry, and twenty guns. Some accounts said that Shere Sing himself was on this flank. He was watching an opportunity of turning our left flank, but was held in check by this brigade. He did not come in contact with Campbell. The cannonade had not been of long duration when a body of Seikh horsemen moved to Thackwell's left flank, as if to get into his rear. Sir Joseph ordered the 5th Light Cavalry (three squadrons) and the Gray squadron of the 3rd Dragoons, Unett's, to charge and disperse them. The gallant General had a lively recollection of what a few

squadrons of British dragoons effected in the Peninsula against the French, and reasonably entertained the expectation that this force would prove sufficient to drive back the Seikh irregulars. It was his intention to have advanced the few men left at his disposal, namely, the remaining squadrons of the 3rd Dragoons and 8th Light Cavalry, on Outar's force, as soon as the success of the other charge became manifest. The charge was sounded, and Unett's squadron in line with the 5th Cavalry approached the enemy. The Seikhs commenced a desultory matchlock fire. Unett steadily advanced, but the 5th, put into confusion by this reception, went about and fled in the greatest precipitation, in spite of the most earnest entreaties of their officers, of whom several received wounds. The 3rd, forcing their way through the hostile ranks, never pulled rein till they had gone some distance beyond the enemy. Unett, who was severely wounded, found his men sadly dispersed. With the few men at hand he re-

solved to cut his way back. The Seikhs opened out, and giving the dragoons a passage through them, abused, spat, and cut at them. The other parties, under their officers, the gallant Stisted and Macqueen, re-passed the enemy as they could. The casualties in this squadron were not less than forty-six. The suspense of every one was great; Thackwell himself became apprehensive that the squadron was annihilated.

To convey an idea of the proceedings on this flank, I cannot do better than quote the words of an eloquent writer on the occasion* :—
“Brigadier White protected the left of the infantry; Colonel Brind’s guns being posted between White and Campbell’s Division. Bodies of Seikh cavalry made demonstrations on our left. General Thackwell directed a squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons and 5th Cavalry to charge them. The dragoons willingly obeyed the order, and under their gallant leader, Captain Unett, dashed through the Seikh wedge.

* In the *Times*.

The 5th Cavalry, in spite of their officers, came back in confusion, and intense was our anxiety about the fate of the 3rd Light Dragoons. At length they emerged, covered with glory! Two officers were wounded—the gallant Unett and Stisted—and the loss among the men amounted to forty-six killed and wounded. Such gallantry deserves to be handed down to posterity.” Lord Gough visited Unett some days after the action, and, after condoling with him on his wounds, and expressing admiration of his fearless bravery, told him that he was recommended for promotion to the rank of Major. No mention, however, was made of this officer’s noble charge in the body of the despatch, which was a strange omission.

The enemy’s fire had somewhat relaxed, but it would have been madness to have attacked the battery, supported as it was by such a large force, with such few men. Moreover, the effect of the defeat of the 5th Cavalry rendered it hazardous to repose too much confidence in the 8th.

It has been asked, Why did not the General employ a few guns to shake the body of Goorchurras? What! Are not British cavalry capable of contending with irregular horse without having recourse to guns?

Whilst Thackwell was revolving the chances of success, a staff officer from Lord Gough rode up and ordered Brind to move his guns to the right flank; and shortly after White's brigade was ordered to proceed in the same direction. A temporary lull had taken place in Outar Sing's fire, and Brind flattered himself that he had effectually silenced it. But no sooner had the 3rd Dragoons commenced the flank movement, than the enemy renewed their fire with greater intensity than ever. The balls soon found a billet in many a man and horse. It is an undeniable fact, that the enemy ended the ball on the left. Brind fired the last shot on our right flank.

The precision of the Seikh fire on the whole was admirable; they disabled some of our guns and wagons. Loose horses, both British and

Seikh, abounded in all parts of the field. It was now five o'clock. The enemy were fast retaking the guns which had been spiked on the left. Several points of our attack had failed, and it was uncertain whether the Seikhs would make a bold assault on us or not. At several periods, in several places, the enemy had almost reached the rear of our army. It was Lord Gough's wish to hold the ground occupied by the successful brigades, in order to secure any guns which might be deserted, and to protect the wounded. When Brigadier-General Campbell suggested that we should withdraw to the village of Chillian for the sake of obtaining water, and of preventing any molestation of our baggage, his Lordship exclaimed,—“What! and leave my wounded to be massacred? Never!”

But night was approaching, and the sepoys were parched with thirst; the baggage was scattered and endangered; and water procurable only at the line of villages. Under these circumstances his Lordship relaxed, and

determined to concentrate his troops round and about Chillian. He addressed several words of consolation to the different regiments, and expressed grief at their loss; and was loud in his commendations of the 61st Foot. Confusion pervaded the whole army. Fears were generally entertained that the enemy would attempt a night attack. If they had been enterprising, and could have perceived the extent of their advantage, they would assuredly have thrown themselves on us; but the jungle which had befriended them in the commencement of the action, now formed a protection to us. They employed the night in massacring our wounded, carrying away their own, and in securing their guns.

This night was one of incessant labour to the surgeons of the army. Amputations, surgical operations of all kinds, were in the course of performance during the night. How appalling it is to the young soldier of tender nerves to witness a poor fellow wincing as the operator thrusts a knife into the shoulder to extract a

ball! How his blood freezes when he sees a fellow-being writhing in agony on the ground with his legs mangled and lacerated by a cannon-shot! Iron nerves are requisite for such a scene. An English gunner underwent the painful operation of amputation of the leg with a cigar in his mouth, which was given him by Mr. Whiting.

The shades of evening were now falling. Huish's troop of Horse Artillery, which had lost two guns during the retreat of Pope's Cavalry, and many of the detached parties of the different regiments, were near the field hospital, when suddenly the tramp of horses was heard, and a cry raised that the Khalsa cavalry were coming down on us! Huish hastily directed his gunners to unlimber and to prepare to fire. The torch was on the point of being applied, when it was discovered that the strangers were that illustrious band of men, the 3rd King's Own Light Dragoons. What a strange return the fire of Huish's troop would have been for the devoted gallantry of that splendid regi-

ment! The officers were wandering about in search of food, the men in quest of water. The second Cavalry Brigade, Pope's, placed its outlying pickets with their rear to the enemy. The Dragoons understood the royal salute, fired that evening by Shere Sing, to proceed from the English camp. They were questioning their own claims to be considered victors when General Thackwell rode up, and ordered them to rectify their serious mistake. Watch-fires were lighted, but it was difficult to distinguish between those of friends and foes. Many regiments sent out pickets—many had none.

During the night Chillian and the other villages were filled with sepoys, who snugly ensconced themselves in the different huts. If the enemy had made a resolute attack on us in the depth of the night, they must have effected the complete disorganization of the army. There were no régiments to offer any opposition. The artillery must have fired indiscriminately into friends and foes. About

eight o'clock rain fell in torrents, which completed the discomfort and confusion of the scene. It appears that the enemy had incurred great loss, especially amongst their gunners; therefore they were not desirous of offering us any further molestation.

On the morrow his Excellency and the political agent, Major Mackeson, ascended an eminence to reconnoitre the enemy. His lordship was in great expectation that the enemy would retreat across the Jhelum, and thus enable him to concoct a sonorous bulletin, announcing a glorious victory, and the expulsion of the arrogant enemy across the river, thanks to "Almighty God." But alas! "it did not please Almighty God to vouchsafe to the British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations rendered necessary for the purpose of vanquishing the Seikhs!" The enemy were discernible with the naked eye, encamped on an eminence about three miles from our camp. Large fires blazed at the distance, the lurid cinders of defunct Seikhs. It

is customary with the believers of the Hindoo faith to burn their dead. On the morning of the 14th the cavalry brigade of Brigadier White scoured the field of battle to secure any of the spiked guns which might remain. But alas! the result of all this slaughter and labour was manifested in the display of only twelve small pieces of ordnance. The chaplain of the army, Mr. Whiting, who has attracted such notoriety by his letter in part vindicating the character of the 14th Dragoons, interred with Christian rites as many bodies as could be collected. The bodies of the officers were placed in one trench; those of the private soldiers in another. The men of the horse artillery approached the chaplain, humbly representing that there was a favour which they had to demand at his hands. It was that Major Christie's corpse might be buried in the same grave with their fallen comrades. Mr. Whiting readily complied with this affecting petition. Perhaps nothing could have more effectually demonstrated the respect and affection

they entertained for that lamented officer. It may not be out of place to remark, that the excellent chaplain did not confine his exertions to the mere interment of the dead. We have seen him remonstrating with fugitive troopers at a most critical season, and he applied plaister to the wounds of more than one soldier unable to procure medical aid by reason of the great demand for it.

It was a busy time for the first few days subsequent to this bloody battle. The engineers were engaged in arrangements for the fortification of the camp; commanding officers of regiments were busy in preparing an accurate list of casualties, and generals of divisions in drawing up official reports; burying-parties of the different regiments were out in all directions; the chaplain was incessantly performing the funeral rites; the surgical department had no rest; in short, there was occupation for every one. Under such circumstances it was fortunate that there was mental and corporeal employment, for there was a decided tendency

to gloominess in the camp. Within the space of two hours and a half, eighty-nine officers and two thousand three hundred and fifty-seven fighting men either lost their lives or dropped blood, whilst six British guns were numbered with the Seikh ordnance !

Few battles of ancient or modern times have presented such a roll of casualties—such an enormous sacrifice of life, within such a short space of time as this. None, certainly, where the results to both parties were less marked. If either party derived any advantage from this action it was the Seikhs, whose prestige was considerably raised by it. They added to their ammunition (the ammunition of several of our corps accompanying them into action fell into the hands of the enemy), accoutrements, courage, and experience. They tested the fact that English regiments are not invincible, and that they even are sometimes seized with panic. Instances of heroic courage on the part of individual Seikhs were frequent, but that the excitement of spirit and bung

(the essence of hemp, *Cannabis sativa*) was often the source of their valour, cannot be denied. Many of the men who followed in the wake of the 14th, were under the influence of drink ; their eyes glared and rolled wildly, they were stupified, and often stood stock still, regardless of the British soldier who might be under their feet. Then at times recovering themselves, they would dash headlong amongst our cavalry.

Single combats were not of rare occurrence—their issue was always doubtful. The tulwar or sword of the enemy has a broader back, thicker blade, and keener edge than ours ; and the enemy are in the habit of delivering *the drawing cut*, a most cutting kind of blow. To convey a good idea of the desperate courage of the Seikhs, it may be advisable to relate a scene which fell under my own observation. When the enemy hastily retreated from their outpost, the 'low bare hill' in front of Chillian, one wounded Seikh was left behind. He was clothed in the in-

fantry uniform, red jacket with white stripes across the breast, and blue trowsers. He sported the usual quantity of black beard, whiskers, and moustaches. A cannon ball had shattered his thigh bone, and he could not stir. On my first approaching him, he was stuffing bung into his mouth as fast as possible. The outside pockets of his jacket were filled with this intoxicating drug. He was seeking relief from the excruciating agony of his wound. On my arriving close to him he made a desperate effort to collect his almost dormant energies, and, worked up into a convulsive paroxysm, grasped at a tulwar lying within reach of his arm. His strength, however, failed him. The countenance of this dusky demon, distorted by rage, would have been well adapted for the pencil of the tragic painter. He was a thick, well-proportioned man.

Whilst Unett was charging on our left flank, a Seikh cut at him from behind. A private dragoon, close behind his gallant leader, interposed his sword ; the Seikh's tulwar not only

shivered it to pieces, but penetrating Unett's pouch, entered his back. On several occasions, the English steel was found inferior. Moreover, the enemy were almost impervious, from the shields, armour, and wadded clothes they wore. The men of the 9th Lancers often failed to pierce them.

The Native Cavalry place no reliance on their swords; instead of having recourse to them, they trust to their pistols. Several commanders have taken away their small fire-arms, in order to teach them more confidence in the use of the sword. Instead of the native soldier being a part of his horse, the horse is the principal part of him, for he never fails to make use of its speed when there is any danger.

The attempt to make dragoons out of natives of Hindoostan is absurd: let them use their own tulwar, bit, and stirrup, and they are useful irregular Cavalry. The only use derived from the Light Cavalry of India by the East India Company, is the splendid source of pa-

tronage it presents. If the good of the service was alone consulted, the regular cavalry would be converted into irregulars as has been before said.

In describing the operations of the left, I have been compelled to place on record the dastardly behaviour of the 5th Light Cavalry; but in justice to them I must state that they behaved with more firmness at Ramnugger. There they approached the enemy, and opened fire with their pistols. The 5th had always been regarded as the finest cavalry regiment in Bengal. This corps has, however, established a claim to a more enviable notice. Lord Gough, for what reason Heaven knows, presented a donation of rupees to the privates of this regiment. This they magnanimously determined to give to the 14th Dragoons, in token of their admiration of the superhuman courage displayed by the latter. On being told that this was impossible, they expressed a wish to expend it in a convivial entertainment to them. This proposition being also overruled,

they purchased a piece of plate, which was duly presented to the heroes of Ramnugger. We feel disposed to sink the memory of their ill-conduct at Chillian, in admiration of the noble spirit that actuated them to make this present.

During the action, natives, our camp-followers, in the rear, might have been frequently heard exclaiming, that the English were beaten, and that the enemy were coming down on them. Some days after this action the Peshawur artillery officer, Elihu Bux, came in and delivered himself up to Lord Gough. Till the middle of the following month, the cavalry were harassed by constant picquets, patrols, and escort parties. The 9th Lancers, just facing the Seikh camp, were disturbed by daily false alarms; and the men of some troops of Horse Artillery slept in their boots and breeches. Our patrolling parties exchanged blows occasionally with the Goorchurras, who were prowling about everywhere in quest of food and plunder. On the 30th January, Lieut. Chamberlayne, with a party of the 9th Irregulars, intercepted a large

body of Goorchurras, who were watching an opportunity of seizing our camels, sent out to graze. Sixteen were slain, and the rest took to flight. The brave leader sustained a wound, but this was no novelty to him, as he is said to have been wounded more than twelve times since 1840.

One day a patrol of the 3rd Dragoons suddenly found himself in the company of two ferocious foes, prowling about the jungle. This gallant dragoon succeeded in despatching them, after a well-maintained fight; in which his carbine proved useful to him. Men were employed in clearing away the brushwood in front of the camp—a very prudent proceeding. The camp was concentrated into a small square. This was, however, a doubtful policy; for the shot of the enemy, in the event of a battle, must have swept the whole camp. The camels, elephants, baggage, and camp-followers, were crowded in the centre. The stench which arose from the dead camels scattered about, was sufficient to have engendered a pestilence. The camels died in large numbers, owing to

want of forage, severe labour, and exposure. If any of the camels sent to graze strayed far beyond the outposts, they fell into the hands of the enemy.

It may not be out of place here, to describe a system of roguery practised by the chief native subordinates of our Commissariat establishment. These rogues employed men to purloin the Government camels; then afterwards furnished the different departments with fresh ones at a high price. In many cases, the identical camels which had been stolen, were introduced to supply the place of the lost animals.* The chief Gomasteh, or agent employed by the Company, amassed a fortune during this campaign.

The leniency with which native offenders against the articles of war are punished, is most inexcusable. A native writer attached to the Commander-in-chief's staff, was detected in the act of despatching important information at a serious crisis to Shere Sing. It was also

* I perceive that the Indian Government have preferred a charge of extortion against Jootee Persad.

revealed that he had been long in the habit of communicating our designs to the enemy. The reader will imagine that the punishment of death, or imprisonment for life, was awarded to him—at least that the cat-of-nine-tails was applied energetically to his back—No! his back wages were paid up, and he was discharged! If an English soldier had been convicted of a similar transgression, little mercy would have been shown him.

Soon after this battle, the Commander-in-chief had it in contemplation to retreat to Dinghee, for the purpose of keeping open his communication with Ramnugger, where there was a *tête du pont* constructed on the right bank of the Chenab, occupied by two of our regiments and some guns. Whilst the British army was encamped at Chillian, the Seikhs in large bodies penetrated to Dinghee at different times. There was, however, another channel of communication open, that by Heylah; where General Thackwell's force encamped after the action of Sudoolapore. After much

deliberation, his Lordship determined to remain in his intrenchments till reinforced. The arrival of General Whish's army from Mooltan was soon expected. Some timid persons regarded Goolab Sing with suspicion, and were apprehensive that he would take advantage of the weakness of the British army to make an attack on Lahore : they were not aware that that wily fox entertained more fear of the Seikhs than of the British. He had made a display of his good-will towards the latter by favouring the Company with a loan of several lacs of rupees.

Orders were now sent to the 53rd regiment, in garrison at Lahore, to march immediately to Ramnugger, and every available soldier was despatched to the army. The 98th Foot were pushed to Lahore, from Umballah ; and General Sir Dudley Hill's army of reserve was held in readiness to move on Lahore at an hour's notice. The Earl of Gifford and Sir Henry Lawrence, who had attended Lord Gough during the battle, left the camp on the 18th, for Lahore.

Indeed, reports had reached the inhabitants of Lahore that Shere Sing had been successful, and alarming apprehensions of a rising arose in the minds of the English politicals at the Residency. The contiguity of the two hostile armies at Chillian had nearly been productive of some serious mistakes : two or three officers *en route* to join the British camp, approached the Seikh outposts. They had, however, time to escape.

Chutter Sing arrived in his son's camp two or three days subsequently to the battle, and materially contributed to swell the Seikh forces. The enemy fired a royal salute in his honour. The English officers (Major Lawrence, Lieutenants Herbert and Bowie), who had been taken prisoners whilst occupying the forts of Attock and Peshawur, accompanied Chutter : they were treated with much consideration by the Seikh chieftains. A strong guard was posted at their quarters, to prevent the Akalee fanatics from despatching them. They received permission to come into the

British camp, for a few days, on parole of honour; and were the bearers of overtures for peace from Shere Sing. The terms of treaty submitted by the latter for the acceptance of Lord Gough savoured of the most foolish arrogance. This interchange of negotiations answered our purpose; for it kept the enemy quiet until the army of Mooltan arrived. Shere Sing endeavoured to delude his followers into the belief, that the British troops had failed in their assaults on Mooltan, and that Moolraj, or at least a large portion of his troops, was in full march to join them. But the arrival of some men who had witnessed the entrance of the British troops into the fort, soon dissipated this delusion. They conveyed the intelligence of the approach of General Whish's force. Lord Gough incurred much unpopularity, by forbidding the despatch of any letters to the provinces, till his own official bulletin was ready.

It has been my aim to present a faithful account of the Battle of Chillianwallah. I

was present, but of course much of this account rests on the statements of others who bore a part in the affair. One great incentive to me to write this narrative was a hearty wish to preserve from oblivion the deeds of noble men ; for it is a matter of great surprise to me, to find that, up to the present time, no account of the second Seikh campaign, or of any of the battles, has yet been given to the public.

When the importance of the actions of Chillianwallah and Goojerat is considered, and the sensation in England which the intelligence of them created—when we recall to mind Cabinet Councils and Queen's speeches, in which allusion is made to the glorious termination of the Punjaub war—when we remember the unanimous meed of praise awarded in the Houses of Parliament to Lord Gough, for his illustrious exploits—surprise at this is considerably increased.

It will be seen that no opinion has been pronounced in these pages on the policy pursued by his Excellency in these operations ;

it has been my object merely to place on record the plain facts connected with the action, and the different opinions current in the camp respecting it. The letters which appeared in the Indian newspapers during the progress of the campaign, containing animadversions on Lord Gough, were often based on false statements, and dictated by the most paltry malice. Men, who had been unsuccessful in their applications for staff appointments, vented their spite in elaborate articles, casting the most unwarrantable aspersions on the character of that illustrious soldier. Thus they were able to gratify their vindictive feelings without any fear of detection, for the papers to whom their dastardly libels were sent did not previously insist on their authentication.

The injury which Lord Gough sustained in this way has been somewhat counterbalanced, however, by the glorious reception with which he has been honoured in his native land. Such a reception was justly due, for England has not sent forth a more successful General since the days of Wellington and Waterloo.

THE
BATTLE OF GOOJERAT,
AND
SUBSEQUENT EVENTS.

THE British army had remained stationary at Chillian since the 13th of January, 1849, and its patience was nearly exhausted, when Lord Gough struck his tents on the 15th of February.

It will be remembered, that the Seikhs were about three miles in our front, posted on the heights of Russoul. On the morning of the 12th they evacuated Russoul, and took up a position at Kooree. On the 13th they precipitately decamped, their destination being

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Wuzeerabad, a town on the Chenab, with a ford, which had been rendered memorable by the crossing of General Thackwell's force. Some of the Seikhs debouched through the Koree Pass, situated on our right flank ; others went through the Bimber and Kurrian Passes.

It will be scarcely believed, that the British army was in utter ignorance of the direction which Shere Sing had taken. The Politicals attached to our force, it is true, could see that the Seikh camp had vanished, but whither the enemy had gone they knew not. Some hazarded the opinion, that they had retired towards Attock, others imagined they had gone up the river Jhelum. The arrival of some spies in camp at last cleared up the mystery. It was the general impression, that Shere Sing purposed to effect the passage of the Chenab at Wuzeerabad, and to hasten by forced marches to Lahore. If he had succeeded in reaching that place, its fate was certain ; for the British garrison was too weak in numbers to resist, for

any length of time, the assault of such an overwhelming force. Moreover, the people of Lahore would have risen in revolt, and aided the besiegers. It is said, the Seikhs at the capital entertained sanguine expectations that Shere Sing would achieve their deliverance; and they publicly expressed this belief in the presence of their British masters. Shere Sing is reported to have said, that it was his intention to have made forced marches to Umritsur, to have crossed the river Sutlege, and, after collecting recruits on the road, to have sacked Delhi.

There were various conjectures afloat as to the reasons which prompted the Sikh leaders to desert their strong entrenchment, and hazard a contest in the open plain. Some say, that they were suffering from a lamentable scarcity of provisions, a natural result of their cooped-up position; and that, by descending into the plain, in the direction of Goojerat and Wuzeerabad, they would have enjoyed a comparative plenty. Others incline to the opinion,

that the Seikhs lost confidence in their position, being cognizant of the fact that the precipitous ravine in their rear would preclude their escape, in case the British troops should be victorious, and succeed in turning their left flank. It was generally asserted, that their object was to reach Goojerat, a town not far from Wuzee-rabad, which was connected with cherished religious associations.

The Khalsa had never joined battle with an enemy near Goojerat without gaining the victory; and, buoyed up by such traditions as these, they were anxious to fight the British army there. Shere Sing himself placed every confidence in the numerical superiority and innate bravery of his troops. It is said, that before the battle of Goojerat he paraded his troops before his chief prisoner, Major Lawrence, and observed to him, "With these troops I shall defeat the *Engrese Sirkar*, or English Company." The rejoinder was, "If you had 200,000 such as these, Sirdar, you could not do it." It was even hinted, that the

Seikh leaders were designedly alluring their men to destruction by holding out to them vain hopes ; whilst others stated, that the Seikhs had it in contemplation to intercept the army of Mooltan in its march to Ramnugger. It is probable that a combination of these reasons accelerated Shere Sing's departure. He was harassed for food, entertained doubts as to the advisableness of holding Russoul, and perhaps indulged the hope that he might be able to cross the Chenab, and accomplish the capture of Lahore. He did not retire, because of the incapacity of the country in his rear to furnish provisions ; and his distrust of the Affghans, between whom and the Seikhs had always existed in times past, a deadly religious feud

The English reader is probably acquainted with the fact, that the Affghans are followers of the creed of Mahomed, whilst the Seikhs are Hindoos ; and the Seikhs had frequently committed outrages on the tombs of the Affghans, who eagerly embraced every opportunity of retaliation.

On the 11th of February, the Seikhs made great demonstrations in front of the Koree Pass, drove in our patrolling party, and appeared desirous of precipitating a general engagement. But this was, in all probability, a *ruse*, to conceal the movement of a part of their force towards Goojerat.

The enemy appeared to be divided into two columns, one of which threatened our rear. Intelligence had been brought in by the spies that the Seikhs were determined on attacking us. Signal guns were now fired by our heavy battery in the front of the camp, and preparations made for battle. But it did not coincide with Lord Gough's views to encourage these warlike advances ; the army remained therefore within their field-works, the cavalry alone, under Gen. Thackwell, going out to skirmish with the enemy. On the 13th, that most talented officer, Brigadier Cheape, of the Engineers, arrived in camp from Mooltan, with some squadrons of the 10th and 14th Irregular Cavalry ; who, having performed unusually prolonged marches, had left General Whish in

their rear. Thus Brigadier Cheape, now Sir John, K.C.B., arrived in time to render that scientific aid to the authorities, of which they stood so much in need. It must be known to every one, that Brigadier Cheape conducted the approaches at the siege of Mooltan.

Some weeks previously, an apprehension had prevailed that the enemy would cross the Jhelum, and take up a position in the mountainous defiles near Attock. This would have been at variance with the wishes of those who were anxious to join their families as soon as possible. Every one had grown impatient of the monotony of life in the British entrenchment at Chillian; the only excitement being produced by some encounters which occasionally took place between Goorchurras and the British patrols in the jungle; in all of which the former were defeated.

The officers of the different corps erected mounds in front of their respective lines, to enable them to watch the movements of the enemy; and regiment vied with regiment in the height of their respective mounds. To these

mounds the idle resorted at all hours of the day, to beguile the time. Lord Gough himself was the first to erect a hillock for the purposes of reconnoissance.

On the morning of the 14th, when Lord Gough received intelligence that the Khalsa army had taken possession of Goojerat, orders were issued that the troops should march, at 9 A.M., towards the enemy; the march was, however, deferred till 12 by another order. It being afterwards ascertained that the camels could not return from their grazing-ground till late in the day, the march was countermanded till next morning, when the troops struck their tents at 4 A.M. If the camel-drivers could by any means retard our movements, they most assuredly did so. The greater part of them were Punjaubees, and as ill-looking, uncivil fellows as can well be imagined.

It was with feelings of unmixed satisfaction that the troops wended their way backwards; and it was the earnest hope of many, that the next battle would be fought under the walls of Lahore; for such a consummation

would have brought them near their cantonments.

The first march of our army was to Lussooree, a place almost equally distant from Ramnugger, where the British army had a *tête du pont*, and Wuzeerabad, the supposed destination of the Khalsa force. It was at Lussooree, where the forces of Lord Gough and Sir Joseph Thackwell effected a junction, after the passage of the Chenab river. The march of the British army was through a continuous line of jungle; and those uninitiated in the mysteries of the Politicals were in constant expectation that the enemy would suddenly emerge from the brushwood, or open a sudden fire of artillery.

At Lussooree the reports of the various spies relative to the movement of Shere Sing, were most conflicting, and no reliance could be placed on any of them. It was evident enough that they had not proceeded towards Ramnugger, but that their line of march was on Wuzeerabad. There were many reports ;

some to the effect that the enemy had crossed, or were just crossing, the river at the Wuzee-rabad ford; others, that they were in full march towards us. At one time, Lord Gough seemed more than certain that they had effected the passage of the river, and were on their road to Lahore.

A council of war was now held, and it was determined that the cavalry and horse artillery should push on to Ramnugger with the greatest expedition, and from thence to Lahore, for the purpose of intercepting Shere Sing's progress. Orders had been sent to General Whish to detach a force to Wuzeerabad, to contest the passage of the river. This able officer had, however, anticipated this order, and sent a force, under Colonel Byrne, consisting of Her Majesty's 53rd, the 13th Native Infantry, Holmes' Irregulars, and some guns. It should be observed, that General Whish had arrived some days before at Ramnugger, with a portion of the Mooltan army. On the 14th, information was conveyed to him, that five

hundred Seikhs had crossed the Chenab at Wuzeerabad. But when Colonel Byrne reached that place, he found that six thousand men, with guns, were encamped on the other side of the river. On the 17th, this body made a demonstration of crossing the Saodra ford; but Colonel Byrne was on the alert, and ready to dispute the passage. They then retired on Goojerat. It should be observed, that Colonel Byrne had just previously received explicit instructions to offer no opposition, in the event of the enemy attempting to force a passage, but to retreat on Brigadier Markham. These orders had been countermanded, we suppose, before Colonel Byrne determined to place guns in position at the ford. If the left bank of the Chenab had been destitute of British troops, it is very probable that the Khalsa army would have crossed the river.

The determined opposition of Colonel Byrne's small detachment would no doubt have kept the whole Seikh army at bay. There were few boats; and the enemy, whilst struggling in the water, would have been mowed down in hun-

dreds by the skilful marksmen of the 53rd. Brigadier Dundas, with the Bombay forces, was still some marches in his rear; but Lord Gough had urged him to use the greatest expedition, and was in daily expectation of his arrival.

The British forces were now gradually concentrating, and every hope was entertained of a quick and decisive issue to these combinations. Our position at Lussooree was such, that we could intercept the retreat of the enemy towards the Jhelum. Lord Gough daily advanced a few miles towards the Seikhs, who were, according to report, posted between Goojerat and Wuzeerabad. The British army halted at Sudoolapore one day. This place will be remembered as the scene of the defeat of Shere Sing's attempt to annihilate General Thackwell's force on the 3rd December, 1848. On the 17th, the army encamped at Koonjah. On the 20th, it found itself at Shadeewal, distant but a few miles from Goojerat, before which town the enemy had taken up their ground. On the 18th, Brigadier Markham, with the 32nd Foot, 51st and 72nd

Native Infantry, proceeded up the left bank of the river from Ramnugger to Kanaokee, to which place Lord Gough had directed that forty-seven boats should be sent. On the morning of the 20th, he crossed the river, and effected a junction with the Commander-in-Chief. Brigadier-General Dundas joined us on the night of the 19th. His Excellency had previously expressed much impatience at his non-arrival; but it would appear that too much was expected from the gallant officer, for the 60th Rifles, &c., made a march of thirty miles on the 18th, and fifteen on the 19th. As reports prejudicial to Brigadier Dundas gained publicity, it is only just to counteract them by a statement of the facts. Would that the British Army contained many more such talented, brave officers!

Two or three days prior to the anticipated battle, his Excellency resolved to reduce the baggage of the army, by sending all superfluous tents and camp-followers to Ramnugger. He himself set a praiseworthy example, con-

tenting himself with one tent. The records of the various departments, with the officers attached to them, were also dispensed with for a time. By this means we got rid of seven or eight thousand camels.

Reports now reached camp that the enemy, though rather disheartened at the strength of our reinforcements, intended to await our attack in the open plain. The dry bed of the river Dwara, a tortuous water-course nearly surrounding the town, stretched in a southerly direction to Shadeewal. It was deep and broad, and capable of affording concealment and protection to the Seikh infantry and guns. Besides this, there was a small nullah, which falls into the Chenab, covering their left. As the ground between these nullahs was open and level, Lord Gough determined to conduct his advance on it. The nullahs might have formed a serious obstacle to the progress of the heavy guns; at least, they would have considerably delayed us.

The Seikhs were not so powerful in artillery

as they might have been, had they not sent away several guns across the Jhelum. Their object in thus detaching guns might have been to form a support or focus, on which they could have rallied in the event of a defeat.

On the memorable 21st, the army advanced over a beautiful plain, occasionally cultivated and adorned with foliage. The larks were singing merrily, and the sun shone on an extensive line of bayonets and sabres. As we approached Goojerat, the drums of the Seikhs, beating to arms, were distinctly heard. Here and there, a body of Goorchurras, dressed in white, with their accoutrements glittering in the sun, were visible in the distance.

The line of battle was formed in the following manner :—On the right of the nullah, the infantry division of Gen. Gilbert was posted; the heavy guns, eighteen in number, being placed between his two brigades. Contiguous to the Gilbert division, stood General Whish, with his division; one of his brigades (Markham's) being in reserve. He was covered by the Horse

Artillery (troops of Fordyce, Love, Kindleside, Mackenzie, and Anderson, and No. 17 Light Field Battery). On the right flank moved the cavalry brigades of Lockwood and Hearsey. On the left of the nullah was seen Colin Campbell, with his infantry division, protected by Nos. 5 and 10 Light Field Batteries ; Hoggan's brigade being in support. On Campbell's left, the line was prolonged by the Bombay forces under Brigadier-General Dundas ; and on the extreme left was stationed White's cavalry brigade, supported by the troops of Horse Artillery of Duncan and Huish. The 5th and 6th Light Cavalry, the Bombay Field Batteries, and the 45th and 69th Regiments Native Infantry, under Colonel Mercer, moved in the rear, for the protection of the baggage.

I will now detail the strength of each division and brigade. Whish's division consisted of the brigades of Harvey (the 10th Foot, 8th and 52nd Native Infantry) and of Markham (the 32nd Foot, 51st and 72nd Native Infantry). Gilbert's division com-

prised the brigades of Penny (the 2nd Bengal Europeans, the 31st and 70th Native Infantry) and of Mountain (the 29th Foot, the 30th and 56th Native Infantry). The brigades of Carnegy (the 24th Foot, the 25th Native Infantry) and of Macleod (the 61st Foot, the 36th and 46th Native Infantry) constituted the division of Colin Campbell. Dundas's division comprised the 1st Bombay Europeans, the 60th or King's Royal Rifles, the 3rd and 19th Native Infantry, and the artillery divisions of Blood and Turnbull. Lockwood's cavalry brigade consisted of the 14th Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry. Hearsey's or the irregular brigade numbered the 3rd, 9th, 11th, and 13th Irregular Cavalry. The 3rd Dragoons, 9th Lancers, 8th Light Cavalry, and Scinde Horse were under the command of Brigadier White.

Lord Gough took up his station near the heavy guns. The second in command, Sir Joseph Thackwell, exercised a superintendence over all the troops to the left of the nullah. The intention of the chief was to penetrate

the centre of the enemy's line with his right wing, and, enabling our left wing to cross the nullah with little loss, to cause it to push back the enemy's wing opposed to it on the Sikh centre.

The Sikhs opened fire on our advancing troops at a most unusual distance. The line was halted, and the artillery and skirmishers pushed to the front. There was a large mound here, from which the Staff obtained an excellent view of the enemy's position. The Sikh guns were served with great rapidity; but their shots did little mischief. The cannonade, however, opened by us, about 9 A.M., was of such an overwhelming power and precision, that the enemy soon withdrew. As soon as their fire slackened, our infantry deployed into line, and advanced. The enemy now fell back in great numbers on a village named Burra-Kabra, a strong position, where they were almost hidden from view. This village was flanked by two Sikh batteries. General Gilbert ordered Penny's Brigade to storm it,

and the 2nd Europeans, under the gallant Brigadier himself, soon forced their way into the place. The resistance was most obstinate. The 2nd Europeans sustained great loss, one hundred and forty-three privates and six officers being killed. Lieutenant Sprot was the only officer killed.

But let the gallant eye-witness, before alluded to, here detail the proceedings of his noble regiment, the 2nd Bengal Europeans :

“ A very annoying fire was opened upon us from a village about two hundred yards in front, and our brigade was ordered to storm it. Our men, who had been held down all the time, started up with a cheer. It was the last some of them gave, poor fellows ! A round shot took off a man’s head close to me, and spattered his brains in my face, the bullets whizzing about like hail, and, as we came nearer, grape was poured into us ; but not a man wavered for a second. ‘ Officers to the front—lead on your men ! ’ shouted the Major ; and we sprang forward amidst the shower of

balls, dashed across a deep nullah, gave one rattling volley, and poured into the village at every point. Many of the Seikhs stood and fought like men; but the greater portion (there must at least have been about 1000) left the village at one end, as we entered at the other. Those who remained were shot or bayoneted on the spot. There was no quarter given. A number of them shut themselves up in their houses; but our men beat down the doors, and poured in volley after volley, and sullenly and savagely they died, fighting to the last. We captured three of their standards in the village; and then, leaving the left wing to keep possession, we defiled to the right, and found ourselves under a hot fire of grape and canister, totally unsupported, as we had advanced in front of the whole line to storm the village, and the troop of horse artillery had been obliged to retire, being temporarily disabled. This was the most deadly fire we were exposed to during the day, the balls hissing about like winged

serpents. A troop of horse artillery dashed past us at a gallop, drew up, unlimbered, and returned the enemy's fire. The whole line of infantry was seen advancing; our guns poured in a withering fire; the enemy left theirs and fled."

In this action, as well as at Chillianwallah, the Seikhs caught hold of the bayonets of their assailants with their left hands, and closing with their adversary dealt furious sword-blows with their right. This circumstance alone will suffice to demonstrate the rare species of courage possessed by these men. It may be doubted by many, that one Sikh foot soldier repulsed three lancers at Chillianwallah, but such has been stated to be a fact. He received the thrust of the lance on his shield, and rushing under it, cut at the lancer or shivered the lance into atoms with his *tulwar*.

The loss of the 31st Native Infantry, amounted to 128 rank and file, killed or wounded, whilst the casualties of the 70th Native Infantry, were forty-four rank and file, killed or wounded. The enemy soon deserted their guns, though they directed a heavy fire on

this brigade when it emerged from the village. The native regiments claim much of the credit of this gallant charge. Major Mac Cansland, commanding the 70th Native Infantry, was severely wounded in this affair. His life was in danger more than once. When his soldiers had placed him in a dooly or native litter, and were conveying him to the rear, a cannon-ball entered at one end, and skimming his head went out at the other. He is now recovering.

The village of Chowta-Kabrah was carried in brilliant style by Harvey's Brigade. The 10th Foot, under Colonel Franks, once more added to their never-fading laurels. They effected their entrance into this small fortified place in the face of a most galling fire of musketry from loop-holes, and suffered a loss of sixty privates, killed or wounded. The 8th and 52nd Native Infantry ably supported the 10th Foot. The former lost fifty-nine privates, killed or wounded ; the latter had thirty-five, rank and file, put *hors de combat*. Anderson's troop was exposed to a very heavy fire. So many of its horses were disabled, that the com-

manding officer was compelled to send to the rear for others. The gallant leader himself fell mortally wounded, to the poignant regret of the whole army.* Fordyce's troop also suffered rough treatment ; in fact it was almost annihilated. Fordyce was compelled to send a requisition to the 10th Foot for men to work the guns. The enemy, however, sustained equal injury from the fire of these devoted troops.

The Seikh Cavalry made frequent efforts to turn our right flank ; but their movements were immediately counteracted by the energetic Hearsay. The enemy poured a heavy fire into the 14th Light Dragoons, whose skirmishers often resolutely repulsed the daring foe. Warner's troop of horse artillery here rendered good service, and its fire arrested the advance of the Goorchurras, who swarmed in clusters. A large party of these men penetrated to the rear of the heavy guns, and approached Lord

The heroic Anderson was attached to the Mooltan troops. When ordered to hasten to Lord Gough's camp, he made a march of sixty miles in forty-eight hours !

Gough. The personal escort, a troop of the 5th Light Cavalry, under Lieutenant Stannus, however, charged, and achieved the complete destruction of these men. This gallant officer, however, received a severe wound on this occasion. Mr. Cocks, of the civil service, who accompanied the chief, sought a personal encounter with one of these Goorchurras. The Seikh dismounted, and succeeded in inflicting a bad wound on Mr. Cocks's leg; but the latter fully avenged himself, despatching the ruffian by a well-delivered thrust. This intrepid civilian, one of the Somers family (the worthy scion of such a gallant race,) was stretched on a sick bed for a length of time afterwards. It was feared that he would be compelled to undergo amputation; but he is now restored to health.

Campbell's division did not come into collision with the enemy's infantry, although it experienced a heavy fire. The Bómbay troops saw little of the battle; the enemy gradually retired, as they advanced. The 60th Rifles skirmished; but they suffered no loss from the enemy.

The enemy opened a feeble fire on White's

Brigade, which was effectually responded to by Huish's and Duncan's troops. The Seikhs, having deserted a gun in front of this Brigade, a party of Huish's troop, who were despatched to secure it, found it to be one of their lost guns, which had fallen into the hands of the enemy at Chillian. How delighted they were to recover it !

Large bodies of the Sikh cavalry hovered in our front ; and the Affghan cavalry on their right, under Akram Khan, having mustered up courage enough to approach us, and threaten our left flank, General Thackwell ordered the Scinde Horse, supported by two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, to charge them. The former, headed by the dauntless soldier, Malcolm, dashed headlong upon the enemy, and drove everything before them, capturing two standards. At the conclusion of the charge, the General rode up to the commanding officer, and passed a high eulogium on the conduct of his men. He declared, that their valour could not have been surpassed by any troops. These men obey

the words of command delivered in the English language, and understand many of the cavalry manœuvres. They wear helmets, and a narrow plate of steel, running down the back seams of their sleeves and the front of their overalls, (a good substitute for the stripe,) forms some protection. They possess also great superiority over other irregular cavalry, both in discipline and equipment. A single Affghan, during the advance of our troops, sought his destruction in the midst of the 3rd Dragoons. He was quickly sacrificed.

As soon as the Affghans were routed, the enemy's right wing fled. Lord Gough, seeing this, ordered Sir Joseph Thackwell to pursue with the cavalry. The infantry soon lost sight of these long-legged fugitives. Some brigades proceeded a little distance beyond Goojerat, others were engaged in collecting the captured guns and ammunition. The whole country was strewn with guns, bullocks, wagons, tents, uniforms, and articles of merchandize. The deserted hampers of merchants who, overcome

by fear, had taken to flight, occasionally attracted the eye. It fell to my lot to light on a splendid bottle of Maraschino, whilst a friend made capture of a bottle of champagne. The 9th Lancers and 8th Light Cavalry occasionally overtook parties of the enemy conveying away guns. A swarm of cavalry was seen near four guns, which the enemy were preparing to discharge, when the sudden and well-directed fire of Blood's troop of horse artillery, within a few yards, made them desert them.

The slaughter, perpetrated by the British Dragoons in this pursuit, was fearful. No quarter was given, and every Seikh, armed or unarmed, fell under the sword or the pistol. Often an enemy was descried concealed in a tree, when a shot would bring him to the ground, and, whilst he was falling, a dragoon would deal him a blow with his sword.

The country for miles presented a dreary spectacle of the dead and the dying. Many a Sing threw away his clothes and arms, to

lighten himself and conceal his profession. Many hid themselves in the corn-fields; but the dragoons, dispersing through them like hounds, ousted them from their lair. Others found a place of refuge in the numerous villages. The brigades of Hearsay and Lockwood, inclining to the left, soon got into communication with General Thackwell, capturing several guns in their advance, and committing awful havoc amongst the flying Sings. The 14th Dragoons were conspicuous in this bloody work of retribution. Corporal Payne of that regiment captured a standard, cutting down the bearer. Captain Scudamore, of the same regiment, received a severe wound from a man whose life he had spared.

The zeal and activity of Colonel King in this pursuit were surpassed by no one. Previous to this action, whilst the army lay at Chillianwallah, he earned the particular thanks of Lord Gough; and General Thackwell states in his despatch on Goojerat, that he was under peculiar obligations to him for his energetic conduct whilst

in command of detached bodies of cavalry, convoys, &c. He even anticipated the orders of his superiors : for instance, two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, two of the 14th Dragoons, 6th Light Cavalry, and four of "Warner's guns," were despatched by him on the 1st of February towards Goojerat, to bring in a convoy of provisions, and to escort the twelve captured guns to Ramnugger. The detachment had reached Bogrewallah, where they purposed bivouacking, when the gallant Colonel King, who was in command of the detachment, heard that there was a probability of the convoy being attacked by a large body of the enemy near Goojerat. Colonel King immediately pushed forward, and was in time to prevent the Seikh cavalry effecting their object. Captain Bid-dulph, who commanded the convoy, was fully alive to the danger of his situation. When the Seikhs courted collision with us on the 11th, in front of the Koree Pass, Sir Joseph Thackwell personally superintended the skirmishing of the dragoons. Colonel King, who

commanded the 14th on this occasion, seemed eager for the conflict.

The Seikhs, in the early part of the day, not appreciating the display of quarter on the part of the British, fell victims to our vengeance. Hand-to-hand encounters were frequent. In these encounters, Neville Chamberlain, of the Irregulars, particularly distinguished himself by the numbers of the enemy he slew. The troops did not draw rein till they had proceeded a distance of fourteen miles, and until the evening had closed in.

General Thackwell proposed bivouacking on the halting-ground, and prosecuting the pursuit early next morning. But luckily his intention was thwarted by an order from Lord Gough, desiring the return of the cavalry to camp. I say, luckily, because a bivouac there would have subjected the men to severe privations; for the baggage, tents, camp-followers, everything, indeed, was at Goojerat. The men had been in their saddles since seven o'clock in the morning. If they had partaken

of anything, it was only a sandwich; and there was little water at hand. No doubt had the cavalry followed the enemy early on the following morning, they must have overtaken the infantry, and most of the guns, on this side the Jhelum. But the British cavalry must have attempted the annihilation of these fugitive masses without the aid of guns. The only troop which rendered any assistance during the heat of the pursuit, was that of Blood, and he was compelled to halt long before the cavalry drew rein.

This troop (a Bombay troop) excited the admiration of the army. It is equipped after the manner of the Royal Artillery, and disciplined on the detachment system. Its guns are six-pounders, and the horses sturdy and handsome, of the Arab breed. When it is remembered what harassing labour this troop had endured, after having made daily forced marches for some time previous without intermission, it is, indeed, difficult to withhold admiration. It outstripped Huish's troop of the 21st in splendid style.

The Seikhs left their camp standing near the Bara-Duree, a kind of pleasure-house close to Goojerat. It was soon denuded of everything by the camp-followers, whose predatory tastes are proverbial. They were not satisfied with the mere spoil of the interior of the tents, but even dragged away the canvass itself after them. The cavalry passed this camp in hot pursuit; when they returned there was not a vestige of it remaining.

Next day an order was issued, commanding all persons possessed of any spoil to surrender it immediately to the Commissariat Department, under pain of severe punishment. This produced little effect, as officers afterwards discovered to their cost. So wholesale had been the plunder, that the camels, in addition to the usual baggage, were laden with Sikh swords, muskets, carpets, tents without end. Our *mehter* or sweeper amassed a fortune by the sale of his share of stolen property. An infantry officer entered one of the enemy's tents, when to his surprise a stalwart Sikh

confronted him; the latter, however, drawing his sword, dashed past him, at the same time delivering a blow which proved serious. This officer's name escapes my memory. I felt very anxious to examine the interior of a Seikh tent; but the heat of the pursuit did not permit my wishes to be realized.

The troops were employed in exploding the different magazines and tumbrils, with which the camp abounded; and for days subsequent to the battle, frequent were the loud reports in all parts of the field. A serious accident occurred at this time to two men of the 2nd Europeans, and four sepoys of the 70th Native Infantry. They thoughtlessly sat down to smoke near an ammunition-wagon, and were discussing the events of the day, when a spark ignited the powder, and they were hurled into the air. One man's head was blown off, and the faces of the others were like "blackened masks," and their eyes seemed bursting from their heads.

The enemy offered considerable opposition

to the entrance of our troops into Goojerat. Eighty men who remained in the fort, surrendered to the 32nd Foot. There was a native hospital; and to the surprise of our men, the Seikh sentries were pacing round it as unconcernedly as if no defeat had taken place. A temple and garden containing two hundred men, were gallantly stormed by two companies of the 10th Foot. On the 22nd, the captured guns were disposed in line in the park. Fifty-three guns fell into our hands.

The enemy succeeded in conveying some across the Jhelum, which were afterwards delivered up to Sir Walter Gilbert. The fidelity displayed by the Seikh gunners is worthy of record. The devotion with which they remained at their posts, when the atmosphere around them was absolutely *fired* by the British guns, does not admit of description. One instance of this may be related:—A large gun drew a very heavy fire on itself from the British artillery, and all its gunners were disabled, save two men. These men continued to

serve it, as our line advanced. When one of those heroic fellows kissed the dust, the other, unaided, fired two rounds; but, on the near approach of our troops, took to flight. The British guns were so overwhelming, both in numbers and calibre, and their fire so rapid and precise, that the enemy declared there was a ball for every Sing.

Some Seikhs, however, had entertained such sanguine expectations of success, that they imputed our victory to supernatural aid. On passing by a wounded Seikh, he exclaimed, "God has given you the battle, sir." The Goorchurras were supplied with nails for the purpose of spiking our guns; and it was their intention to have made a resolute advance for that purpose. The Seikh chieftains, as usual, showed great want of courage; for they deserted the field, and fled towards the Jhelum very early in the day, being apprehensive that the British cavalry of the left would cut off their retreat. The English officers, prisoners in their camp, were taken

away with them. A light cavalry trooper, close to me, saved the life of a man, who declared himself to be one of Lieutenant Herbert's servants. This trooper was an original character; he was loaded with umbrellas, brushes, looking-glasses, &c., the property of some unfortunate Seikh merchant, who had been so closely pressed, that he cast away his goods to accelerate his escape.

The poverty of some of the villagers around Goojerat was distressing. The condition of the Irish people in the famine may, perhaps, have been worse. After the action, they were frequently seen to cut open the carcasses of horses for food. The Khalsa army had latterly suffered from shortness of provisions; and consequently robbed the peasantry of everything they possessed, not excepting the money the latter had received from the British Commissariat, in exchange for flour and other supplies.

In Lord Gough's despatches much of the credit solely due to the Scinde horse, was awarded to the 9th Lancers. It appears that

General Thackwell directed the Scinde horse and two squadrons of the 9th Lancers, the other two squadrons being in support, to charge the Affghan cavalry. The staff officer, by whom this order was to have been conveyed, commanded the Scinde horse to charge, supported by the 9th Lancers. The charge accordingly took place, and the Scindians bore the brunt of the affair, the Lancers merely following them. Thus originated this unfortunate mistake in the despatches, against which Captain Malcolm afterwards loudly remonstrated. The *intention* of the General was one thing; the *thing done* was another. But, considering the result, the mistake was fortunate; for the moral effect produced on the enemy by this bold attack of this Native cavalry was most impressive, and the example set to the remainder of the Hindostanee cavalry most invaluable.

The Affghans never halted till they reached the river Jhelum, a distance of more than thirty miles. Akram Khan, who was wounded,

did not stop till he reached a place near Rawul Pindee.

Amongst the anecdotes connected with this battle, there is one to the effect that, on Lord Gough inspecting the 10th Foot, previously to the day of action, Colonel Franks declared that his regiment was ready to carry the Seikh position at the point of the bayonet, without firing a shot, as before at Sobraon. Lord Gough, remembering the fate of the 24th Foot at Chillianwallah, rejoined, "That is the very thing I do not want you to do."

Lieut.-Colonel Franks was devoted in his attention to his regiment. During the campaign he completely usurped the functions of his adjutant. The 10th, always distinguished, was foremost in the breach at Mooltan. The wealth acquired by some of the privates of the 10th and 32nd regiments, consisting of gold mohurs, (a thirty-two shilling piece,) rupees, and jewellery, would surpass conception. The attention of the whole army was directed to the fact by a court-martial on a private soldier,

for purloining the property of a fellow-comrade. The prisoner escaped because the complainant could not prove the money stolen to be *his property*. In this case there was a violation of the truth of the old saying, "*Honour among thieves.*"

A hospital was established for the wounded enemy, and every attention given by the medical men to their respective cases. The loss sustained by the British army in the battle of Goojerat was 76 rank and file killed, and 595 wounded. Five officers were sent to their long home; Anderson and Day of the Artillery, Lloyd of the 14th Lancers, Sprot of the 2nd Europeans, and Cox of the 8th Native Infantry. Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Engineers suffered amputation of the leg, from the effects of which he died a few days subsequently. The twenty-four officers wounded were, Goddard and Scudamore of the 14th Lancers; Stannus, Best, Jeffrey, Farquharson, Griffiths, Darnell, Jamison, Lowther, Smith, Sir Richmond Shakespear, Boyd, Elderton,

Toogood, Sandford, Matheson, Gully, MacCausland, C. L. Edwards, Fytche, Whiting, Murray, and Provost-Marshal Budd

On the morning of the 22nd, Brigadier-General Campbell, with a small force, was despatched to the Bimber Pass to secure any guns which might have taken that route. Sir Walter Gilbert, selected to prosecute the pursuit of the fugitive Seikhs, started from Goojerat on the 22nd with a large force, and proceeded to the Jhelum by Dinghee and the Khoree Pass; and, to the surprise of the whole army, the Bombay troops received orders to accompany him. They had scarcely enjoyed one day's cessation of marching from the time they left Mooltan, and had undergone considerable fatigue in their tedious march to that place. The Bombay sepoy were prevented from making the forced marches, accomplished by the Bengal troops, by sore feet. Was it just to revile these poor fellows for dilatoriness, and contrast them with the troops of the other Presidency? It was

not so surprising that their feet became blistered, but that they did not altogether drop off.

The tale of the hardships and difficulties encountered by the Bombay troops during this eventful campaign, would be almost sufficient to scare away all aspirants after military fame from the recruiting serjeants. The Bengal regiments, which had participated in the assault and capture of Mooltan, were permitted to stand fast at Goojerat. On the advance of the British line towards Goojerat on the 21st, the haggard looks of the men of the 60th Rifles were striking. Not only did their looks betray the extent of the fatigue they had endured, but even their gait also showed it. This dismal appearance was considerably heightened by the sombre hue of their dress. It was a pity that this gallant corps did not come into immediate contact with the enemy, for its ball-practice would have startled them.

What a pleasing contrast the discipline, dress, and bearing of the sepoys of the Bombay regiments presented to those of the Bengal

army. The former bore a much stronger resemblance to the English troops. They were well set up, moved with rapidity, and their clothes seemed to fit them. The native officers had the recommendation of youth and activity, whilst those attached to the Bengal regiments were incapacitated by age.

It has been customary at Bombay to select the most energetic and intelligent men of a regiment for promotion. As a necessary consequence, the troops have been better drilled. The young native officers take a pride in their position, and employ all their energy to recommend themselves for further advancement. The young sepoy bestows attention to his duties, in the hope of soon gaining increased rate of pay and the rank of officer.

In Bengal promotion goes by seniority. Non-commissioned officers, just as they become fitting subjects for a pension, receive a commission. Just as their energies are evaporated, and their pride extinguished, they are expected to infuse life and activity into others. It sel-

dom happens that the troops of the two Presidencies are thus conjoined in action. I was an eye-witness of the coolness with which the Bombay sepoys manœuvred under fire.

The chief objects of the enemy at the battle of Goojerat were, to turn our right flank, and penetrate to the guns. Every one must have been struck with the simplicity of Brigadier Hearsay, who records in his despatch that there had been a difference between himself and Brigadier Lockwood. Such a statement was very superfluous, when it is considered that the only words uttered by Brigadier Lockwood were, that he had received certain orders from the Commander-in-chief. Brigadier Hearsay assumed the command of all the cavalry on the right flank, as senior cavalry officer. Brigadier Lockwood never disputed his authority. No one can acquit the gallant old officer of bad taste in thus making allusion to a momentary misunderstanding on the part of his junior.

From all that has been stated, it will be

seen that the defeat of the enemy was mainly attributable to the powerful fire of the British artillery, the charge of cavalry on the left, and the bold advance of the infantry brigades of Penny and Harvey. There can be no doubt that the never-ending line of the British troops did much to strike fear into the breasts of the ill-fated Seikhs.

The enemy, according to Lord Gough, opposed to us sixty pieces of artillery. The British army mustered sixty-six guns, not including the eighteen heavy pieces of ordnance and the Bombay artillery. It must be remembered, that some of these guns were held in reserve. Indeed, it was madness in the enemy to have joined battle with us in the open field. Their only chance of success consisted in awaiting our attack in an entrenched position like that of Russoul. It is evident that the impression created by the battle of Chillianwallah, secured us an easy victory at Goojerat. The arch-rebel, Shere Sing, overrated the capacity of his troops.

General Gilbert followed up the enemy with such rapidity, that the Seikh chieftains, despairing of successful resistance, now determined to surrender to their pursuers. The work of disarming, which commenced at Manykyalla, was completed at Rawul Pindee ; the Seikh chieftains delivering their swords into the hand of Sir Walter. Sirdars Chutter Sing and Shere Sing were among the first to propose surrender. All the other chiefs came in, with the exception of Bhaie Maharaj and Colonel Richpaul Sing. Forty-one pieces of artillery were also brought in, and sixteen thousand men laid down their arms. The reluctance of some of the old Khalsa veterans to surrender their arms was evident. Some could not restrain their tears ; while on the faces of others, rage and hatred were visibly depicted. They each received a present of one rupee from the Company *Bahadour*. Many officers were anxious to obtain possession of some of the weapons here taken ; but neither their entreaties nor offers of money had any effect on the British authorities.

They were all broken up. The Seikhs were impelled to this surrender from a want of provisions, and distrust of the Affghans in their rear. They perceived, from the untiring energy of their pursuers, that no opportunity would be afforded them of rallying, and making another trial of the chances of war. The spirits of the sirdars had sunk to a very low ebb, and the slaughter perpetrated by the British troops at Goojerat inspired them with terror. They were completely hemmed in, the noble Abbot's troops being in their rear, Colonel Steinbach's force on their right, and Sheik Emamood-Deen was marching against them on their left by Chukoowall.

It may interest the reader to learn how many guns fell into the hands of the British army during this campaign. Fifty-three were captured at Goojerat; three discovered after the battle; forty-nine surrendered to Sir Walter Gilbert; twelve were captured at Chillianwallah, and fifty at Mooltan. Therefore the enemy lost one hundred and sixty-

seven pieces of ordnance. Whence these instruments of death could have been collected, no one could tell. They sprang, it would seem, like the men of Cadmus, from the earth. When Colonel M'Sherry took possession of Govindghur, he discovered an immense number of guns buried in the earth. It is strange, that up to this second Seikh campaign the British were utterly unacquainted with the resources of the country. Though British Politicals were stationed at Lahore and Jullunder, they never obtained information that a town and fort so near them were overstocked with cannon. Of what benefit were the numerous spies and political informers who were entertained by the Residency?

After the battle of Goojerat, small detachments were posted at the principal fords on the Chenab to disarm any fugitives from the Seikh army who might be returning home. After being divested of their swords and muskets they were at liberty to go wherever they pleased. They were also permitted to retain their horses

and garments. It was expected that their cattle would have been seized for our irregular cavalry regiments ; indeed, many irregular cavalry officers lingered all day long at the fords to watch the transit of the discomfited Goorchurras. They expressed a wish that they might be permitted to raise regiments out of these disorganized elements ; for they recognized mettle and symmetry in the horses, and prime stuff in the men.

I stood at the bridge of boats on the right bank of the River Chenab at Wuzee-rabad, when Chutter Sing and Shere Sing, with a few retainers, made their appearance. They sported two or three elephants, with handsomely caparisoned howdahs, but were themselves mounted on horseback. Chutter is an old, blear-eyed man, wears spectacles, and stoops. He appeared in too infirm health to be capable of rendering any assistance to his son, Shere Sing, in the field of battle, or in the general control of the troops. The principle of division of labour was embraced

by them; the father conducting the diplomatic duties, the son carrying on the military operations. Shere Sing is of good height, robust, and with a manly gait. He appeared unabashed; the expression of his countenance being stern, half savouring of a scowl. It was with strange interest that I saw the havildar, or serjeant on duty, advance to the party, present arms, and demand their weapons. The look of anger with which some of the Bunnoo infantry, who formed the escort of their beloved chief, complied with this request, will never be effaced from my imagination. Some of them muttered an invocation or prayer as they grasped their beloved musket for the last time.

Lord Gough and his staff were in waiting on the other bank to receive them. From the delay which had taken place in their arrival, his Excellency feared that they must have effected the passage of the river at Saodra ford, two or three miles higher up. In truth, Shere Sing, not relishing the prospect of himself and his followers being stripped of

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their weapons, went up to the other ford ; but finding that its passage involved some danger, and that it was guarded, was compelled to go to Wuzeerabad. The sensation which their approach created in camp was great. As they passed by General Thackwell's camp on the right bank, all the privates of the European regiments flocked out of their lines to catch a glimpse of them. Great numbers of private dragoons, mounted on their tattoos or poneys (private property) might have been seen moving with the throng, staring in vacant admiration. On the left bank, the whole of Lord Gough's camp turned out to feast their eyes with the sight of men who had displayed so much resolution and military skill.

His Excellency was surrounded by an immense number of officers, and the scene was very imposing. Shere Sing on reaching the bridge inquired, in a hasty way, if Major Lawrence was at hand ? This officer, on the fall of Peshawur, was kept in confinement by the Seikhs till the 16th February, when

he received permission to visit his brother at Lahore, on parole, his wife and family being kept as hostages. Shere Sing possessed great confidence in him, and hence his anxiety to see him at this critical moment. Major Lawrence, now a Lieutenant-colonel, is the brother of Sir Henry Lawrence, K.C.B., now the first Commissioner of the Board for the Administration of the affairs of the Punjaub. Mrs. Lawrence had been in captivity also with her children ; she was treated with kindness. Dr. and Mrs. Thomson were also prisoners. An English female, the wife of a private soldier, shared their confinement. Mrs. Lawrence had made an attempt to escape from Peshawur, at the outset of the disturbances, but fell into the hands of the enemy, through the treachery of a confidential servant. She was one of the ladies commonly designated the Cabul prisoners, who encountered such fearful hardships.

The share taken by the different brigades in this crowning victory was so dissimilar,

and the phases of this battle so different to beholders from different points, that a variety of opinions prevailed as to the nature of the action. The Bombay troops had no chance of earning distinction.

This sketch must not be brought to a conclusion, without adverting to the noble conduct of Captain Walter Unett, of the 3rd Light Dragoons. This officer received three bad wounds, whilst executing the splendid charge with the Gray squadron at Chillianwallah; but he could not brook confinement within his tent, when any deed of glory was to be accomplished. He once more placed himself at the head of the Gray squadron at the battle of Goojerat, and was detached for the purpose of affording protection to Blood's battery. This squadron did much execution among the flying Seikhs. It was expected by many that the honour of C.B. would have been conferred on him, in addition to the Brevet-Majority. It would not have been misplaced, and would have formed an incentive to other

men to emulate such noble deeds. That many men have received the honour who had not established so good a claim to it as Major Unett, may be easily proved. It is not yet too late for the authorities to perform this act of justice. "Better late than never." All officers who commanded detached squadrons at Chilianwallah were promoted to the grade of Brevet-Majors ; consequently Unett, whose squadron was the *only one* which crossed swords with the enemy, has not received a reward proportioned to his superior merits.

Objection may be taken to certain other rewards bestowed as inadequate to certain services. Neither Gilbert* nor Thackwell have received a substantial reward. It has been hoped that the Government will take the first opportunity of conferring the second class of the Bath on Brigadier-General Tennant, who commanded the Artillery division. All other Divisional Commanders, even Brigadier Cheape, who did not hold a divisional command,

* We hail, with unfeigned delight, the elevation of General Gilbert to the dignity of a baronet.

received the honorary dignity of K.C.B. Tennant directed the movements of the artillery during the campaign. So important were the services of the artillery in this final action, that Lord Gough observed, "That was General Tennant's victory;" yet Tennant was only made C.B. That he was not a Companion of the Bath previously, and that the Government did not intend to give more than one step for the victory, are lame excuses for the neglect. The Ministry have so often violated this regulation before, that they might assuredly have gone a little farther in Tennant's favour. Witness the sudden jump of Pollock and Nott to the G.C.B.

Astonishment may very naturally be expressed, that the different regiments employed in the battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat have not received permission to carry the names of those actions on their colours and appointments. This omission must be imputed to the Indian Government, with whom it rested to pay this desirable compliment to the valour of the British troops. But it was not only in this

respect that the Indian Government displayed an indifference injurious to the troops. They would not incur the responsibility of granting batta or a pecuniary donation to the force, without a reference to the home authorities. Viscount Hardinge, immediately on the conclusion of the Sutlege campaign, ordered the distribution of twelve months' batta to the army. He decreed medals, and the honour of bearing the names of the various engagements on the regimental appointments.

The miserable pittance granted by the Company for the second Seikh campaign—six months' batta—was not issued till one year after. The inconvenience which this delay entailed on the Indian army, formed a fruitful source of complaint in the different newspapers. If this batta had been quickly distributed, officers might have met the additional expenses unavoidably incurred in the campaign; but, owing to the delay, they were forced to have recourse to the banks, where the interest, fees, and postage, swallowed up a large portion of

the donation. Lord Gough, entertaining expectations that clasps would be awarded for each action, ordered that presence-rolls for the actions at Sudoolapoore, Chillianwallah, and Goojerat, should be prepared immediately by commanding officers of regiments. His surprise may be imagined, when a succeeding mail brought an intimation from the Court of Directors, that a medal would be granted to *all* troops employed within the Punjaub territories during any portion of the campaign, and one clasp to those actually engaged in the battle of Goojerat. They grounded their decision, on the plea that it was contrary to custom to grant honorary distinctions for any general actions which had failed to elicit the thanks of the House of Commons. Lord Gough, very irate, as may be expected, remonstrated against this injustice, and cited the battles of Marajpore and Punniar as precedents, where troops had received decorations, without having been previously honoured with the thanks of Parliament.

In the name of those unfortunate men, whose empty sleeves and trowsers indicated their participation in bloody scenes—in the name of the unwounded but dauntless survivors, Lord Gough called on the Court of Directors to concede a clasp for the battle of Chillianwallah. The noble lord's appeal was not in vain ; for a subsequent steamer conveyed the pleasing news, that a clasp would be issued to those engaged in the battle-field of Porus and Alexander.

Of course, a clasp is promised to the conquerors of Mooltan. It would, however, have been very invidious to grant a clasp for Mooltan, and withhold one for Chillianwallah ; for this reason, that the Mooltan troops, who were present at Goojerat, would have carried two clasps and a medal, whilst Lord Gough's army, which had borne the brunt of the battles of Sudoolapore, Chillianwallah, and Goojerat, would have received only *one* clasp and a medal. Our gratitude, therefore, is due to that illustrious old warrior, to whom it can

never be imputed as a fault, that he was indifferent about the claims and merits of his soldiers. With what admiration have I beheld him uttering words of kindness and encouragement to poor wounded soldiers, stretched on their beds of misery; and giving his manly, unaffected tribute of praise to those gallant men, Major Walter Unett amongst the number, whose deeds of valour contributed to elevate him to the peerage. Lord Gough has always had the reputation of commiserating the sufferings of others, without possessing a particle of the affectation common to other great men.

This narrative must not be concluded without a solemn protest against the system of hampering the Commander-in-chief with political agents. Lord Gough was entangled with the political shackles. Where the chief authority is resident in another person, it is impossible to form a correct estimate of the character of a general. Major Mackeson, the governor-general's agent, controlled the movements of the Chief; and it was he who urged

the advance of the British troops into the jungle at Chillian, as may be gleaned from Lord Gough's despatch.

Every one must admire the wise and manly decision of Sir Charles Napier, who would not accept the office of Commander-in-chief, except on condition that he should be perfectly exempt from all control in the field. The mischief, of which the political agents have been productive, is prodigious.

Formerly officers in command of armies were vested with political powers. Agents were attached to the troops ; but they were always subordinate to the General. . In short, they were merely officers experienced in the habits of the country, who were at hand to offer advice when wanted. Lord Lake was always armed with political powers, enabling him to make treaties subject to the approval of the Governor-General. It will be remembered that Arthur Wellesley was empowered to enter into any negotiation with the Mahrattas which seemed advisable to him. All the

great heroes of Indian history achieved their triumphs when free and uncontrolled. These remarks must not be construed into any reflection on Major Mackeson. We enjoy his personal acquaintance, and are able, therefore, to state that the civil and military services of the Company combined, do not contain a more clever or more energetic officer, nor one more conversant with the habits and feelings of the Seikhs. Whilst he was Commissioner at Ferozepore, he obtained intelligence of the murder of Van Agnew and Anderson at Mooltan, sooner than the Resident of Lahore.

Lord Gough, on this occasion, introduced a novelty in the system of despatch-writing. Instead of endeavouring to condense the reports of the several divisional commanders in his own despatch, he submitted them all for the inspection of the Governor-General, and thus obtained their publication along with his own. Though despatches are thus rendered very voluminous, they are to be preferred to such laconic bulletins, as "*Veni, Vidi, Vici.*"

Of course it is easier to obtain a correct notion of a battle from the assembled sketches of the various Generals of Division, than from the report of one man.

Another novel feature in this campaign was the conversion of the heavy guns into use as field-pieces. The elephant battery, commanded by Sir Richmond Shakespeare, moved with considerable celerity; for the remarkable docility of this animal insures its prompt obedience to the word of command. Two elephants will drag an eighteen-pounder over any ground. The bullock batteries also executed their manœuvres with wonderful rapidity. As soon as the guns were unlimbered, the bullocks, guided by their drivers, went to the rear in the most regular order. These animals are perfectly steady under the hottest fire. Lord Hardinge has told us, that the elephant batteries were first brought into use during the Sutlege campaign; but it should be remembered that they were then directed against entrenchments which might have been not inaptly called fortifications.

The presence of a carriage and four horses in the British camp created much surprise. It was the state-coach of Sir Henry Lawrence, and sent from Lahore for the convenience of his brother's wife, who proceeded immediately to the capital on being released from her captivity. How the postillions did rattle over the rugged roads!

Lord Gough and his staff paid a flying visit to Rotas and Jhelum. After minutely inspecting them he decided on locating a detachment of troops at the latter place. Colonel Mercer, a very zealous officer, was sent there with the 53rd Foot, and 20th and 69th Native Infantry.

This narrative was finished when our attention was called to a rumour affecting the character of the 14th Dragoons, in connexion with the battle of Goojerat, which has been circulated in certain circles in England.

Malevolent libellers, not content with casting the most defamatory aspersions on this gallant regiment, in consequence of the retreat

of Pope's brigade at Chillianwallah, have insinuated that the reserve force, in support of the 2nd Cavalry brigade, consisting of some troops of the 14th, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, wilfully lost several opportunities of making effective charges on parties of Goorchurras.

Why this accusation of lukewarmness should have been preferred against the reserve *alone* it is difficult to discover. No portion of Lockwood's brigade got into personal contact with the enemy until the retreat. The Irregulars of Hearsey were also restricted to acting on the defensive. As has been before stated, nothing would have more effectually answered the purpose of the enemy, than a charge by the reserve or other parts of the brigade. The Seikh horse were as numerous as the waves of the sea in the front of our cavalry. They were in anxious expectation of being able to get into the rear of the British army. Had any wide gap occurred, they would have instantly availed themselves

of it. The charge of Lockwood, Hearsey, or Doherty would have left an opening, by which a large body of Goorchurras might have penetrated to the rear. Under such circumstances it was the policy of wise commanders to watch the enemy, and keep them in check whilst the grand attack by our centre division was progressing. The force of cavalry here, when compared with the Goorchurras, was small. As has been before hinted, the chief object to be attained by the British army, was the destruction of the Seikh centre. The services of the British cavalry were to be put in requisition during the retreat.

I have already borne testimony to the gallantry exhibited by the 14th when in pursuit of the enemy. Brigadier Hearsey, in his official report to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, records, that "the conduct of the 14th Dragoons throughout the day was most exemplary and steady ; and," he adds, "I have not the least doubt, had an opportunity occurred, it would have been

most eagerly seized, to the utter destruction of any body opposed to it." Brigadier Lockwood, in his report to the same General, states that a deep nullah in his front formed a considerable obstruction to his movements. Hearsey also writes that, in a certain stage of the action, he placed Colonel Doherty, with two squadrons, to fill up the gap to the left. This malicious reflection on the character of the King's Light Dragoons must be attributed to the wording of a letter which appeared in some of the newspapers. That letter, after giving a good description of the different movements of Frank's regiment, the 10th Foot, adds, "Why our cavalry on the right did not charge, it is impossible to tell." This epistle was penned by an officer attached either to the 10th Foot or 52nd regiment Native Infantry, who was utterly ignorant of the incidental circumstances which weighed with such an experienced soldier as Hearsey.

The voluminous Correspondence connected with the Punjaub campaign reveals the melan-

choly fact, that the most spirited and attractive descriptions of the various scenes in the battles have emanated from men lamentably ignorant of most material facts; whilst those men whose exalted rank constituted them the chief agents in those transactions, and who are conversant with every detail, have given to the public the most lame and impotent accounts which could have been written.

The victor of Mooltan, General Whish, may be instanced as a man whose deficiency in the art of description, has been productive of considerable injury to some gallant soldiers. No man possesses a greater desire, without the ability, to give merit its due, than he. Colonels Markham and Franks achieved the most brilliant feats under the walls of Mooltan. The former earned a title to the greatest renown at the action of Sooruj-Koond, where he captured several guns, vanquishing a large body of the enemy. If Sir William Whish possessed half the illustrative genius of Sir Harry Smith, the fame of those gallant soldiers

would have been duly recorded. Sir William's despatch, in connexion with Goojerat, afforded some amusement to the press of India. At the conclusion of it he gravely informs Lord Gough, that his Adjutant-General, his own son, mounted a camel, his own horse being wounded, "a tolerable substitute for a horse." In one of his despatches from Mooltan he thanks Captain Kennedy and Lieutenant Need, his aides-de-camp, for their unremitting exertions "*to promote the service,*" and adds, he cannot describe "the grateful feeling their conduct has impressed on him."

One fact, however, mentioned in this officer's despatch, forcibly illustrates the character of fire to which the Seikhs were exposed. Whilst commenting on the services rendered by the Horse Artillery troops of Captains Mackenzie and Anderson, he says, that "they began a spirited cannonade and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour, (the average of firing at Waterloo,) until the enemy's guns were si-

lenced." If all the troops employed delivered an equally rapid fire, well might the enemy have exclaimed "that there was a ball for every Sing." That the fire of the British artillery was not so effective as it was rapid, is an opinion one feels diffident to proclaim, but incontrovertible truth it is.

From an inspection of the field of battle, it might have been seen that but few Sikh bodies were stretched along the enemy's line, except near the villages of Burra and Chowta-Kabrah or Kalerah. These had to sustain not only the fire of our heavy guns, &c., but also the assault of such impetuous soldiers as the men of the 10th Foot and 2nd Bengal Europeans.

In this pursuit, so full of instruction to the enemy, innumerable Sikhs fell an easy sacrifice to British vengeance. Some persons declared, that if the cavalry had bivouacked for the night on their halting-ground, and been permitted to continue the pursuit early the following morning, few Sikhs and no guns

would have re-crossed the river Jhelum. The tedious journey to Peshawur might thus have been averted, and much expenditure saved to the Government.

But whether this error of judgment was intentionally committed by his Excellency was difficult to ascertain, they said. Whispers prevailed in certain quarters, that it was eagerly expected by certain high individuals that the enemy would make another stand, and thus considerably augment the harvest of laurels to be reaped.

It is a notorious fact, that Lord Gough is the personal friend of, Sir Walter Gilbert; therefore he naturally felt a great anxiety to furnish him with an opportunity of reaching a higher step than he had already attained. That Sir Walter Gilbert materially contributed to achieve the victories of Moodkee, Ferozeshah, Sobraon, and Goojerat, by his daring valour and great experience, must be generally known. Therefore that his Excellency should be desirous of affording him a chance of at-

taining the highest military distinction, the Grand Cross of the Bath, is not surprising.

It will be remembered that this great military honour is usually granted to those officers who have been fortunate enough to command an army in an encounter. Now, as Sir Joseph Thackwell had established his claim to this distinction by gaining the victory at Sudoolapore over Shere Sing and the rebel army, it seemed only right that that excellent soldier, Gilbert, should be provided with a similar chance of acquiring renown, and thus be enrolled in the list of Knights Grand Cross of the Bath, with such eminent men as Wellington, Anglesey, Combermere, Strafford, Londonderry, Aylmer, Codrington, Beresford, Napier, Harry Smith, Frederic Adam, Hardinge, Seaton, Pollock, and Gough.

To impart an adequate idea of the credit due to Sir Walter for his energetic pursuit, it will be well to follow him in his successive marches from the 22nd of February, the day on which he left Goojerat. The first

day's march brought him to Dinghee, a town already mentioned in this narrative. He ascended the Koree Pass, and reached the other side of it on the 23rd. On the 24th he approached Nowrungabad, a town not far from the river Jhelum. The enemy were now descried encamped on the other side of the river—the residue of the mighty army which had given us battle on the 21st. On the 27th, a portion of the army crossed a ford opposite to Nowrungabad, when the enemy hastily decamped. Goolab Sing's troops, under Steinbach, hereupon moved against the foe. On the 27th, Sir Walter, with that mental acumen and corporeal vigour which has given him the victory in so many steeple-chases and flat races, pushed on to Rhotas, a fortress of immense strength, fortified as well by nature as by art, which he reached in the evening, after a most distressing march.

On the 4th March, the Bengal troops marched to Rhotas. On the 6th, the prisoners came into Gilbert's camp, bearing the intelli-

gence that the Seikhs were ready to throw down their arms. Rhotas was a town of a circumference of six or eight miles ; the walls were thick, but not capable of resisting artillery. On the 7th, the Buckreallah Pass was reached. On the 8th, Shere Sing had an interview with General Gilbert and Major Mackeson ; and having been assured that nothing but unconditional surrender would satisfy them, went back to his army, to communicate with them.

The army reached Pucka Serai on the 8th March. Manickyala was approached on the 9th, and on the 11th the troops cast eye on Hoormuck, where the chief sirdars tendered their submission. On the 14th, Sir Walter entered Rawul Pindee, where the process of disarming was completed.

On the 15th, the force reached Janeeka Sung. On the 21st of March, Peshawur appeared in sight after a march of twenty-one miles. The Bengal troops, at the commencement of the pursuit, outstripped their Bombay

comrades, whom they did not again see till they had reached Peshawur. A most important reason has been already assigned, why the Bombay troops could not make marches of equal length with the Bengalees. In the early part of this pursuit, Brigadier Mountain, commanding the Bengal division, (now Adjutant-General of Her Majesty's Forces in India,) having pushed on to Rhotas with some cavalry, was accidentally shot in the hand by a pistol. The fact is, that, whilst he was placing his pistols in the holsters, one went off. This gallant soldier, whose zeal and bravery have been already mentioned, was consequently compelled to return to the Head Quarters camp. Brigadier-General Colin Campbell was appointed in his stead to head the Bengal column; but it is believed this officer did not succeed in overtaking the energetic Gilbert till he was near Peshawur.

Major Mackeson, the Political Agent, must not be excluded from his fair share of praise. There are some who maintain that it was his suggestions which accelerated the speed

of the General, and rendered this march so memorable in the annals of war. Let the reader picture to himself the hero of a hundred gold and silver cups, the harvest of a successful turf career, galloping in post haste to Attock, accompanied by his staff and a small escort of cavalry. The Affghans, on the other side of the river Indus, felt much surprise on beholding the grim warrior and his party. Some five thousand men were engaged in destroying the bridge of boats; but a troop of our horse artillery being brought up, the foe decamped, leaving seventeen of his best boats in our hands.

The 14th Dragoons were much harassed by these marches, and they did not enjoy any further opportunities of increasing their reputation.

It was truly predicted, that the battle of Goojerat would terminate hostilities — that was a defeat from the effects of which the enemy never rallied. Lord Gough states, in his despatch of the 25th March, from Wuzee-

rabad to the Governor-General, "that these brilliant results (viz. the surrender of the Seikh Sirdars and their troops) have been obtained without a single shot being fired by us since the battle of Goojerat."

This assertion was in strict accordance with fact; for the British force did not once open fire on the Seikhs after the 21st of February. Though General Gilbert had no opportunity of exhibiting his military skill and proficiency in the art of war in a pitched battle, yet his display of energy and unswerving decision of purpose under most trying circumstances, entitle him to as high a position in the roll of eminent generals, as the victor of Aleewall or he of Mooltan. He had to contend against the rugged difficulties of the mountains, the formidable obstructions of the rivers, and the involuntary dilatoriness of the troops and beasts of burden.

The Affghan army, commanded by Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, retreated from Peshawur on the 19th. This chief, aware of the mischief-

ous spirit which animated his troops, directed that the gates should be closed. By this exercise of forethought this beautiful city was preserved from devastation. Most of the houses in the suburbs, the Seikh cantonment at Alli Mardar Khan's Bagh, or Garden, and the fort of Jumrood, were levelled with the ground. They succeeded in effecting their retreat through the mountainous passes with perfect safety.

It was reported that the British Politicals had offered a large pecuniary consideration to induce the Khyburrees to deliver Dost Mahomed Khan into their hands. The Ameer was compelled in self-defence to outbid his old friends and companions. It will be remembered, that this chieftain was for some years a prisoner in the hands of the British. Portraits of him, executed by the Misses Eden, sisters of the late Earl of Auckland, are still extant. It is passing strange, that this man had derived no useful lesson from his past experience. He had been deposed by British

troops, and had witnessed the mighty resources of the East India Company. The wealth, strength in guns and troops, and the stability of the power of the Company *Bahadoor*, were well known to him. Such infatuation is unaccountable.

There can be no doubt that the gallant Herbert would have maintained the defence of Attock for many weeks longer, had not the Affghan chief sent peremptory orders to those Affghans who composed a portion of the garrison to surrender, without delay, to the Seikh Sirdars. Herbert was captured in the execution of an attempt to escape down the river Indus. He was detained captive for several weeks in the camp of Shere Sing, and only delivered up on the surrender of the Seikh Sirdars at Rawul Pindie. He was present at the commencement of the battle of Goojerat. His resolute stand in a fortress on the high road of communication, for such a length of time—a solitary Englishman among Affghans and Seikhs, all the adjacent country being in

open insurrection against the Lahore Government—should have secured him honours of no ordinary character.

Again, words are wanting to convey an adequate idea of the consummate tact and dauntless valor displayed by the brave James Abbott at Nara, or the Huzara hills. He alone held his post till relieved by Sir Walter Gilbert's force. This fortress was more isolated than Attock; and the endeavours of the enemy to obtain possession of it were unabating. Several mutinies arose in the garrison; some were the result of bribes, whilst others owed their origin to the circumstance of the pay being considerably in arrear. But the gallant and ill-requited Abbott weathered the storm triumphantly, overcoming the most dangerous conspiracies. I have no hesitation in expressing my deliberate conviction that the honour of knighthood was never conferred on any one more deserving of the spurs, than the determined, able, and vigilant hero of Nara.

In the humble effort to direct public admiration to those who deserved it, the signal services of Taylor must not be overlooked, who contrived to keep in subjection the turbulent province of Bunnoo, at a most critical period. At the commencement of the outbreak, Bunnoo supplied the best materials of which the Seikh army was composed. The Bunnoo regiments possessed a greater amount of discipline, and exhibited greater courage, than the rest of the army. Taylor has well earned his promotion.

Before taking leave of the reader, we humbly desire to record our hearty approbation of the spirit which has just prompted the Government to bestow the second class of the Bath on that excellent soldier, Brigadier Wheeler, whose ability and vigour were conspicuous on several occasions. He rendered eminent service to Sir Harry Smith at the battle of Aleewall, and effected the capture of the important fort of Kangra subsequently to the Sutlege campaign. He was also entitled to great praise for his

energetic endeavours to suppress the rebellion in the Jullundur Doab, and to capture the author of it, the notorious Ram Sing.

When it was known that the Governor-General contemplated enrolling Seikhs in the infantry regiments, many denounced the measure as being attended with great danger. They thought it running sufficient risk to send down two strong regiments of Seikhs, designated the regiments of Loodianah and Ferozepore, into the provinces. But the Government could not probably find better employment for the turbulent, self-willed race whom they had subdued. To raise new regiments was the only remedy. That the Seikhs will ever love our rule, or lose that patriotic spirit which now consumes them, is most improbable. The discontent of the Sikh will be communicated to the Hindoo; and if a formidable insurrection should ever take place in India,—if our well-drilled native regiments ever direct their weapons against us, it will be mainly attributable

to the element of disaffection now blended with the subject mass. That the natives are prone to band together for the redress of what they are pleased to call grievances, that great soldier, Sir Charles Napier, can amply testify. In the latter part of the year 1849, in how many Sepoy regiments were conspiracies organized, the malcontents resolving not to cross the Sutlege to relieve the troops stationed in the Punjaub, until they received a promise of the extra batta given before the annexation of the Seikh territories to all troops crossing the Sutlege? The Governor-General, at the termination of the war, declared that this extra batta or allowance should no longer be issued to the troops, the Punjaub having become a British dependency. How many regiments in the Meerut division alone, exhibited mutinous symptoms, Sir Charles? Did you not, with that wisdom so characteristic of you, in one instant avert the danger by granting a most liberal furlough to the native army?

The troops had not enjoyed that boon for some time, and now received it with real gratitude. The Seikhs, however, are not contented with merely banding together for the reform of supposed abuses : they are disposed to act. India, from the mouth of the Ganges to the hill-girt Peshawur, inhabited by millions of warlike people, is now tributary to England. What an awful responsibility ! The more extensive the tract, the more slippery becomes the British ascendancy. There is a greater need than ever of energetic, enlightened rulers, like Dalhousie, Ellenborough, and Hardinge. The question now occurs, Are there sufficient British regiments in India ? No. Fifty Queen's infantry regiments would not do more than insure security against a serious internal rebellion. If railways were established, fewer men might suffice. We hold India by the bayonet ; but, rest assured, it is a very dangerous weapon in the hands of a native soldiery.

TRIBUTE
TO
THE REV. W. J. WHITING.

THERE are some facts connected with the Rev. W. J. Whiting, Chaplain of the army, which may possess interest to many readers. This excellent minister of the Gospel had obtained leave of absence to England on furlough, when orders were promulgated for the formation of the army of the Punjaub. As it appeared that the troops were going to take the field without any spiritual aid and protection, the reverend gentleman determined to forego the anticipated delight of visiting England, and to offer his services in his spiritual capacity to the Commander-in-Chief. It need scarcely be said that the offer was speedily accepted, and Mr. Whiting pro-

ceeded to purchase *new* tents, horses, &c., having previously disposed of all his property. Chaplains rank with field-officers in India; yet, strange to say, Honourable John does not think Mr. Whiting's services deserving of a higher rate of remuneration than Captain's batta. If the remuneration were to be proportioned to the services performed, he would be authorized to draw the batta of a Major-General of Division! If the poor wounded men of the 24th Foot, who were in danger of being trodden upon in the hospital by the sudden rush of the panic-stricken camp-followers during the battle of Chillianwallah, when the worthy chaplain seized a long bamboo, and, flourishing it in the air, kept these intruders at a respectable distance—if, we say, these poor men were to be consulted on the occasion, they would most assuredly declare him worthy of a field-officer's batta!

Our reverend friend having enjoyed the acquaintance of Colonel Havelock, made fre-

quent efforts to recover his corpse at Ramnugger, and drew down the Seikh fire on himself by his daring search for it. That he succeeded in recognizing that hero's corpse, has been already stated. After Chillianwallah, *Padre Whiting*, by which name he will be ever known, earnestly entreated Lord Gough to grant him an escort to enable him to recover and bury the bodies of his poor fellow-countrymen. This request was at length granted.

The escort consisted of four companies of Englishmen (we hate the word so generally used in India, namely, Europeans), two hundred sappers and miners, and two troops of native cavalry. Whilst they were collecting the dead, the Seikhs in great force approached close, but did not offer any molestation. Their attitude was, however, so threatening that Mr. Whiting was compelled to leave untouched four men of the 29th Foot, who had fallen far in advance. Such an attempt would have precipitated a

collision. The reverend gentleman prudently determined to reserve the fighting for him to whom the operations were entrusted. At the end of the campaign it was found that only four Christians, out of the large number of the slain, were deprived by circumstances of funeral rites. There were three services every Sunday. On one occasion, two hundred and fifty-seven officers presented themselves to receive the holy sacrament. The fund established by Mr. Whiting for the relief of the widows and children of the slain, was the means of consoling many a hopeless mind. The money really collected did not fall short of 11,283 rupees, or 1,128*l.* 6*s.*, estimating the rupee at two shillings; this sum was actually disbursed. Lord Dalhousie offered a donation of five thousand rupees; but Mr. Whiting accepted only two thousand rupees. Lord Gough authorized him to draw on him for four thousand rupees; he took only one thousand, as his Lordship had con-

tributed to other charities. Forty-eight widows of officers were relieved out of this fund, according to their several necessities.

Some of the wounded men, on arrival at Bombay, received three thousand rupees of this money. Strange to say, the authorities, with their customary dilatoriness, did not issue their pay till the last moment. Six hundred rupees were expended in supplying the wounded in the field hospital with grateful comforts. One thousand rupees were allotted to the fund instituted for the erection of suitable monuments at Chillianwallah and Goojerat in honour of the fallen. The balance was handed over to the Lawrence Asylum, a most commendable establishment for the education of the children of poor European soldiers.

After the battle of Goojerat, a large number of wounded Sikhs were collected in the field hospital, where medical aid was extended to them. The Government allowed two annas, or three pence, daily, for the support of every Sing. Our reverend friend perceiving that

they were in a very deplorable condition, swaddled in filth, raised a sum of money among his friends, and supplied them with clean sheets, blankets, &c. The subscriptions to the great Whiting fund were chiefly voluntary; Mr. Whiting made a public appeal only on sacramental services. Lord Ellenborough generously contributed five hundred rupees to this fund.

Letters from the Governor-General, Lord Gough, the Bishop of Calcutta, and Court of Directors, bearing testimony to the extraordinary merit of Mr. Whiting, are here subjoined:—

Copy of a Letter from the Most Noble the Marquis of Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, to the Rev. Walter John Whiting.

Government House, Simla,

MY DEAR SIR,

October 27th, 1849.

I cannot let you leave Simla, and lay down your appointment as my Chaplain, without conveying to you more directly than I have yet done my sense of your great and most praiseworthy services, while serv-

ing as Chaplain to the army during the late war in the Punjaub.

My position at some distance from the army did not enable me to be an eye-witness of those services, but universal testimony bore me assurance of your conspicuous zeal and benevolence, of your earnest, and unwearied, and impressive discharge of every professional duty, and of your activity and usefulness in every situation in which you were placed.

In acknowledgment of these services, and not from any personal acquaintance, I appointed you to be Chaplain to the Governor-General, the only means I had of publicly testifying my sense of your merits. I should be glad if I could bestow on you some more substantial proof of my feeling. As it is, I can but offer you again my best thanks for your conduct as Chaplain to the army of the Punjaub, and my best wishes for your health and prosperity.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Very truly yours,

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

Rev. W. J. Whiting,

Chaplain to the Governor-General.

Copy of a Letter from the Right Honourable Lord Gough, Commander-in-Chief of the Army in India, to the Rev. Walter John Whiting.

Head-quarters, Camp Shahdora,

MY DEAR WHITING,

31st March, 1849.

I cannot permit the army of the Punjaub to separate without conveying to you the high sense I entertain of your great exertions and invaluable services throughout the eventful period of military operations in the Punjaub.

I feel I speak but the sentiments of every individual in that army, as well the soldier as the officer, when I say that they felt the greatest consolation in having a minister of the Gospel with them, who so kindly, so zealously, and so devotedly performed the sacred duties of his calling in the most trying scenes.

To the wounded you gave your valuable advice and sympathy;—to the dying you pointed out the only salve to a broken and contrite spirit; and through you the friends of the deceased have had the consolation of knowing that the last rites of religion were afforded where seldom a man of your calling presented himself, namely, in the field of battle.

I cannot conclude without assuring you that few circumstances of a long life have afforded me more heart-felt gratification than in frequently witnessing the crowd of communicants at the Lord's Table in the midst of the din of war.

May you, my dear Mr. Whiting, long live to enjoy that greatest of all blessings the consciousness of having usefully and honourably performed your sacred duties!

Believe me always sincerely yours,

(Signed) GOUGH.

To the Rev. W. Whiting.

*Copy of a Letter from the Very Rev. the Lord Bishop
of Calcutta.*

Bishop's Palace,

MY DEAR FRIEND,

June 26th, 1849.

I have been wishing for some time to assure you of the pleasure I derived from the accounts of your pious labours with the troops during the late campaign in the Punjaub. I sent you yesterday a copy of my Thanksgiving Sermons, in which I have referred to you by name.

The comfort and instruction you must have afforded to the late Commander-in-Chief, and the officers and private men, during the anxieties of that eventful conflict, especially to the sick and wounded, are most gratifying, I can assure you, to me as Bishop. Your encouraging also the troops, when struck with a momentary panic, to return to their duty, must have been duly appreciated by the Governor-General, who, indeed, appointed you his Chaplain as an acknowledg-

ment of your services. The pious interment, also, of the fallen was highly becoming your sacred profession.

Let me intreat you to continue the same activity in the faithful preaching of the pure Gospel of our Lord and Saviour, now that your duties are in tranquil scenes. We have all need to be stirred up to prayer and devotedness—to study of the Holy Scriptures—to separation from the spirit and follies of the world—and to presenting a conspicuous example of holiness in our doctrine and our conduct before the Christian flocks by which we are surrounded.

The spring of all this exertion must be vital religion, cultivated in the inward soul under the influences of the Holy Spirit, and by faith and love in a crucified Saviour.

I am, yours faithful,

D. CALCUTTA:

To the Rev. Mr. Whiting.

*Copy of a Letter from the Honourable the Court of
Directors to the Rev. Walter John Whiting, A.M.*

East India House,

SIR,

29th July, 1850.

Having laid before the Court of Directors of the East India Company your letter, dated the 31st of May, I am instructed to acquaint you that the letters

from the Governor-General, the late Commander-in-Chief, and the Lord Bishop of Calcutta, all acknowledging, in terms of the highest approbation, the value and efficiency of your services as Chaplain to the Army of the Punjaub, during the late military operations, have been placed among the records of this House.

The Court at the same time command me to state, that they cordially participate in the sentiments so expressed to you, by the highest civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities in India, and desire themselves to record their admiration of your conduct, and especially of the manner in which you administered the consolations of religion to the wounded and dying in the midst of the horrors of war.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

JAMES MELVILLE.

To the Rev. W. J. Whiting, A.M.

In justice to the Roman Catholic priests present in the Sutlege and second Seikh campaigns, it must be remarked that they also were always to be found amidst the din of war, deterred by no earthly dangers, affording

spiritual consolation to their beloved children quietly resigned to the embrace of death. One of these faithful pastors fell a sacrifice to his noble zeal at the battle of Ferozeshah. The only reward these poor men reap is prospective.

D E S P A T C H E S

RELATING TO THE

CAMPAIGN IN THE PUNJAUB.

1848-9.

*General Lord Gough, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, to the
Governor-General of India.*

Ramnugger, November 23, 1848.

DEEMING it necessary to drive the rebel force at this side the river across, and to capture any guns they might have had on the left bank, I directed Brigadier-General Campbell, with an infantry brigade of the troops under his command, accompanied by the cavalry division, and three troops of horse artillery under Brigadier-General Cureton, to proceed, during the night of the 21st, from Saharun, four miles in front of my camp at Noewulla, to effect this object. I joined the Brigadier at three in the morning to witness the operation.

I hope to be able to inclose Brigadier-General Campbell's report, with a return of the killed and wounded, which I regret to say is much greater than I could have anticipated, in a great measure from the officers leading being unacquainted with the difficult nature of the ground in the vicinity of the river, and of which no native information ever gives you a just knowledge; and in some measure to the impetuosity of the artillery and cavalry, who, notwithstanding these difficulties, charged to the bank of the river, thereby

exposing themselves to the fire of about twenty-eight guns. I deeply regret to say a gun was left behind, but spiked, having actually, in the impetuosity of the advance plunged down a bank close under the fire of the enemy's guns. It was reported to me it would occasion a fearful loss of life to bring it away, which alone could be effected by manual labour, and scarping the banks under even the fire of the matchlockmen on the opposite bank; I could not, therefore, consent to such a sacrifice. Though blameable as it may appear to have taken the guns into such close proximity to the enemy's guns in position, which could not, from the river intervening, be captured, it is impossible not to admire the daring gallantry exhibited by the troops, both of cavalry and artillery.

I witnessed with intense anxiety, but equally intense admiration, a charge made by Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, at the head of the 14th Light Dragoons, who, I fear, misconceived the orders he received from the officer commanding the cavalry division, or from the inequalities of the ground, and the fearful dust occasioned by such a rapid movement, mistook the body he was instructed to charge, and moved upon and overwhelmed another much closer to the river, which exposed him to a cross fire from the enemy's guns. I never witnessed so brilliant a charge, but I regret to say the loss was considerable, were it only in that of Brigadier-General Cureton, than whom a better or a braver soldier never fell in his country's service. The brave leader of the 14th, Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, is missing; he charged into a gale of the enemy, and has not since been seen, regretted by every soldier who witnessed his noble daring.

The enemy suffered severely; numbers were precipitated into the river and drowned, and a standard was captured.

The Goorchurras were more daring than I have before seen them, but the brilliant charges both of the 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons will have taught them a lesson they will not readily forget. This was a cavalry affair alone; the infantry

never was, nor could have been, brought into play without an unnecessary exposure of life; but the cavalry and artillery engaged under Brigadier-General Campbell, whose judicious arrangements were most creditable to him, nobly supported the well-earned fame of the Indian army, and is but a prelude to, I have no doubt, the honourable fulfilment of what their country expects of them.

Brigadier White conducted the movements of the force, of which the 3rd formed a part, and as usual acted with gallantry and judgment; and Lieutenant-Colonel Grant commanded the artillery arm with much credit. I regret to say that gallant old soldier, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, has lost an arm, but I am thankful that all are doing well.

Lord Gough to the Governor-General.

Camp before Ramnugger, November 27, 1848.

In continuation of my letter to your Lordship of the 23rd instant, I now do myself the honour to forward the report of Brigadier-General C. Campbell, C.B., commanding the troops on the morning of the 22nd instant, of the operations of that day.

I also beg to inclose a copy of a general order which I have caused to be issued to the army of the Punjaub on the occasion.

Brigadier-General Campbell, C.B., commanding the 4th Division, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Camp near Ramnugger, November 24, 1848.

I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Commander-in-chief, that, in obedience to his Lordship's instructions, the troops in advance under my orders, moved, at three o'clock A.M., on the morning of the 22nd instant, from their encampment near to Saharung, with a view to attack a considerable portion of the enemy's regular troops, who were, with several guns, stated to be on this bank of the Chenab, in the vicinity of Ramnugger. On reaching the

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high ground to the right of the town, it was ascertained that these troops, with their guns, had crossed to the encampment of the enemy on the opposite bank, where his whole force was in position; at the same time, however, several small parties of the enemy were observed to be retiring from the town of Ramnugger in the direction of the ford in front of the enemy's encampment, when Captain Warner and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troops of horse artillery were ordered by Brigadier Cureton, in command of that arm and of the cavalry of the army, to pursue these parties, and to open fire on them while crossing at the ford. These troops of horse artillery, in their eagerness to overtake the enemy, pushed forward through the deep and heavy sand which extends for a long distance on this side to the very margin of the river, and through which the guns could only be moved with great difficulty. Their fire inflicted considerable loss on the enemy while crossing.

In withdrawing from this position, which was effected under the whole of the enemy's artillery, amounting to 28 guns, posted on the high ground which immediately overhangs the river on the opposite bank, I regret to say that one gun and two ammunition-waggons, belonging to Colonel Lane's troop, got so imbedded in the heavy sand behind a deep bank, that they could not be recovered.

The enemy, upon observing the difficulty in which this gun was placed, immediately crossed with great confidence the whole of his cavalry, in numbers between three and four thousand. They clung to the banks of the river, and kept constantly under cover of the fire of their artillery on the opposite bank.

This cavalry was charged on separate occasions by Her Majesty's 3rd and 14th Light Dragoons, and 5th and 8th Regiments of Light Cavalry. His Lordship the Commander-in-chief was an eye-witness of the brilliant conduct of these several corps, and of the intrepid manner they were led by their officers. The enemy were overthrown upon every occa-

sion, who fled for shelter to the river side to be under the cover and protection of their artillery; but I lament to say, that these several defeats of the enemy's cavalry were not effected without loss.

Brigadier-General Cureton, commanding the cavalry of the army, was killed while leading a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons to the support of the 5th Light Cavalry. In this officer, who had the honour of enjoying his Lordship's entire confidence and warmest regard, the service has lost one of its most distinguished officers, and one who was beloved by the whole army.

I regret also to have to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock, commanding Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, is reported to be missing. He was last seen charging the enemy at the head of his noble regiment, and has not since been heard of.

I am sorry to have further to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, commanding the 5th Regiment Light Cavalry, has been severely wounded, and lost his arm. Some other officers and men have also been wounded, whose names are mentioned in the inclosed return of casualties.

(Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the advance force of the army of the Punjaub, under the command of Brigadier-General C. Campbell, C.B., in the action with the enemy on the 22nd of November, 1848,—14 killed; 59 wounded; 12 missing.

Names of officers killed, wounded, and missing:—Ensign G. N. Hardinge, extra aide-de-camp, severely wounded; Brigadier-General C. R. Cureton, C.B., commanding cavalry division, killed; Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel W. Alexander, 5th Light Cavalry, severely wounded; Brevet Captain J. S. G. Ryley, same regiment, severely wounded; Captain A. Wheatley, same regiment, wounded; Captain R. H. Gall, Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons, severely wounded; Captain J. F. Fitzgerald, same regiment, very severely wounded; Captain A. Scudamore, same regiment, slightly wounded;

Lieutenant W. McMahon, same regiment, severely wounded; Cornet Honourable R. W. Chetwynd, same regiment, slightly wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Havelock, K.H., same regiment, missing; Lieutenant J. S. Holmes, 12th Irregular Cavalry, severely wounded.)

NOTIFICATION.

Foreign Department,
Camp Umballah, 8th December, 1848.

THE Right Honourable the Governor-General has much pleasure in publishing, for general information, the following despatch from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief :—

Head-Quarters,
Flying Camp, Hillah, 5th Dec. 1848.

My Lord,—It has pleased Almighty God to vouchsafe to the British arms the most successful issue to the extensive combinations rendered necessary for the purpose of effecting the passage of the Chenab, the defeat and dispersion of the Sikh force under the insurgent Rajah Shere Sing, and the numerous Sikh sirdars, who had the temerity to set at defiance the British power. This force, from all my information, amounted to from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with 28 guns, and were strongly entrenched on the right bank of the Chenab, at the principal ford, about two miles from the town of Ramnugger.

My despatch of the 23rd November will have made your Lordship acquainted with the motives which induced me to penetrate thus far into the Punjaub, and the occurrences of the previous day, when the enemy were ejected from the left bank of the Chenab. My daily private communications will have placed your Lordship in possession of the difficulties I had to encounter in a country so little known, and in the passage of a river, the fords of which were most strictly watched by a numerous and vigilant enemy, and presenting more difficulties than most rivers, whilst I was surrounded by a hostile peasantry.

Finding that to force the passage at the ford in my front must have been attended with considerable loss, from the very strong entrenchments and well-selected batteries which protected the passage, I instructed the field-engineer, Major Tremenhare, in co-operation with the quartermaster-general's department, to ascertain (under the difficulties before noticed) the practicability of the several fords reported to exist on both my flanks, while I had batteries erected and made demonstrations so as to draw the attention of the enemy to the main ford in my front, and with the view, if my batteries could silence their guns, to act simultaneously with the force I proposed to detach under an officer of much experience in India, Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell.

On the night of the 30th November, this officer, in command of the following force, and more particularly detailed in the accompanying memorandum :—

	European.	Native.	Total.
3 troops horse artillery . . .	3	0	3
2 light field batteries . . .	2	0	2
1 brigade of cavalry . . .	1	4	5
3 brigades of infantry . . .	2	6	8

—two 18-pounders with elephant draft and detail artillery, pontoon train, with two companies sappers, moved up the river in light marching order, without tents and with three days' provisions, upon a ford which I had every reason to consider very practicable (and which I have since ascertained was so), but which the major-general deemed so difficult and dangerous, that he proceeded (as he was instructed should such turn out to be the case) to Wuzeerabad, a town 22 miles up the river, where Lieutenant Nicholson, a most energetic assistant to the resident at Lahore, had secured 16 boats, with the aid of which this force effected the passage on the evening of the 1st and morning of the 2nd instant.

Upon learning by an aide-de-camp sent for the purpose that the major-general's force had crossed and was in movement, I directed a heavy cannonade to commence upon the enemy's

batteries and encampment at Ramnugger, which was returned by only a few guns, which guarded effectually the ford, but so buried, that although the practice of our artillery was admirable under Major Mowatt and Captain Sir Richmond Shakespear, we could not, from the width of the river, silence them. This cannonade, however, inflicted very severe loss to the enemy in their camp and batteries, and forced him to fall back with his camp about 2 miles, which enabled me, without the loss of a man, to push my batteries and breast-works, on the night of the 2nd, to the bank of the river, the principal ford of which I then commanded; by this I was enabled to detach another brigade of infantry, under Brigadier Godby, at daylight on the 3rd, which effected the passage, with the aid of pontoon train, six miles up the river, and got into communication with Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell.

The cannonade and demonstration to cross at Ramnugger was kept up on the 2nd and 3rd, so as to fix a large portion of the enemy there to defend that point. Having communicated to Sir Joseph my views and intentions, and although giving discretionary powers to attack any portion of the Sikh force sent to oppose him, I expressed a wish that, when he covered the crossing of Brigadier Godby's brigade, he should await their junction, except the enemy attempted to retreat : this induced him to halt within about 3 or 4 miles of the left of their position. About two o'clock on the 3rd, the principal part of the enemy's force, encouraged by the halt, moved to attack the detached column, when a smart cannonade on the part of the enemy took place, and an attempt to turn both Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's flanks, by numerous bodies of cavalry, was made. After about one hour's distant cannonade on the part of the Sikhs, the British Artillery never returning a shot, the enemy took courage and advanced, when our artillery, commanded by that excellent officer Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant, poured in upon them a most destruc-

tive fire, which soon silenced all their guns and frustrated all their operations, with very severe loss upon their side; but the exhausted state both of man and horse induced the major-general to postpone the attack upon their flank and rear, as he was directed, until the following morning, the day having nearly closed when the cannonade ceased.

I regret to say that, during the night of the 3rd, the whole of the Sikh force precipitately fled, concealing or carrying with them their artillery, and exploding their magazines. I immediately pushed across the river the 9th Lancers and 14th Light Dragoons in pursuit, under that most energetic officer, Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert. The Sikhs, it appears, retreated in the greatest disorder, leaving in the villages numerous wounded men. They have subdivided into three divisions, which have become more a flight than a retreat; and I understand a great portion of those not belonging to the revolted Khalsa army have dispersed and returned to their homes, thus, I trust, effectually frustrating the views of the rebel Shere Sing and his rebel associates.

I have not received Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's report, nor the returns of his loss, but I am most thankful to say that our whole loss, subsequent to the 22nd November, does not much exceed 40 men; no officers have been killed, and but three wounded. Captain Austin, of the artillery, only appears severely so.

I have to congratulate your Lordship upon events so fraught with importance, and which will, I have no doubt, with God's blessing, tend to most momentous results. It is, as I anticipate, most gratifying to me to assure your Lordship that the noble army under my command has, in these operations, upheld the well-established fame of the arms of India, both European and Native, each vying who should best perform his duty. Every officer, from the general of division to the youngest subaltern, well supported their commander-in-chief, and cheerfully carried out his views, which at a future period,

and when we shall have effected the views of the Government, I shall feel proud in bringing to your Lordship's notice.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GOUGH.

Return of the Strength of the Force sent under the command of Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, K.C.B.

Camp Ramnugger, 5th December, 1848.

3 troops of horse artillery, 2 light field batteries, 1 European dragoon regiment, 2 light cavalry regiments, 1 irregular cavalry regiment, 2 regiments of European infantry, 5 regiments and 2 companies of Native infantry, and 1 company of Pioneers, proceeded with Major-General Sir J. Thackwell.

Reinforcement sent:—1 regiment of European infantry, 1 regiment and 2 companies of Native infantry.

N.B. Two 18-pounders, two 9-pounders, pontoon train, and detachment of irregular cavalry, returned from Wuzceera-bad. European regiments employed:—3rd Light Dragoons, 24th, 61st, and 2nd European Infantry.

(Signed) GOUGH.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India,

H. M. ELLIOT,

Secretary to the Government of India,

With the Governor-General.

Foreign Department,

Fort William, 2nd February, 1849.

The President of the Council of India in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the following general order by the Right Honourable the Governor-General, with the Commander-in-chief's despatch, dated the 16th of January, detailing the operations of the army under his Excellency's command at Chillianwallah.

By order of the President of the Council of India in Council,

FRED. JAS. HALLIDAY,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Foreign Department,
Camp Mukko, the 24th January, 1849.

The Governor-General, having received from the Commander-in-chief in India a despatch, dated the 16th instant, directs that it shall be published for the information of the army and of the people of India.

In this despatch, his Excellency reports the successful operations of the troops under his immediate command, on the afternoon of the 13th instant, when they attacked and defeated the Sikh army under the command of Rajah Shere Sing.

Notwithstanding great superiority in numbers, and the formidable position which he occupied, the enemy, after a severe and obstinate resistance, was driven back, and retreated from every part of his position in great disorder, with much slaughter, and with the loss of 12 pieces of artillery.

The Governor-General congratulates the Commander-in-chief on the victory thus obtained by the army under his command; and, on behalf of the Government of India, he desires cordially to acknowledge the gallant services which have been rendered on this occasion, by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, the generals, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army in the field.

The Governor-General offers his thanks to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. and K.H., for his services; and to Brigadier White, for his conduct of the brigade of cavalry on the left.

Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B., and Brigadier General Campbell, C.B., are entitled to the special thanks of the Governor-General, for the admirable manner in which they directed the divisions under their orders.

To Brigadier Mountain, C.B., and to Brigadier Hoggan, the Governor-General tenders his acknowledgments for the gallant example they offered in the lead of their men; and to them, to Brigadier Godby, C.B., and Brigadier Penny, C.B., for their able conduct of their respective brigades.

The warm thanks of the Governor-General are due to Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding the artillery division, to Brigadier Brooke, C.B., and Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B., for their direction of the operations of that distinguished arm, and for the effective service which it rendered.

To the heads of the various departments, and to the officers of the General and Personal Staff, whose services are acknowledged by the Commander-in-chief, the Governor-General offers his thanks.

The Governor-General deeply regrets the loss of Brigadier Pennycuik, C.B., and of the gallant officers and men who have honourably fallen in the service of the country.

It has afforded the Governor-General the highest gratification to observe, that the conduct of the troops generally was worthy of all praise.

The Governor-General, indeed, is concerned to think that any order or misapprehension of an order could have produced the movements by the right brigade of cavalry which his Excellency the Commander-in-chief reports.

To the artillery, European and Native, to the cavalry on the left, and to the European and Native infantry, the Governor-General offers his hearty thanks; especially to those corps, European and Native, which his Excellency reports to have acted under trying circumstances with a gallantry worthy of the greatest admiration.

The Governor-General will have sincere satisfaction in bringing the services of this army under the favourable notice of her Majesty's Government and the Honourable East India Company.

A salute of 21 guns has been ordered to be fired from every principal station of the army in India.

The Governor-General repeats to the Commander-in-chief and to the army the assurance of his cordial thanks; and expresses his confident belief, that the victory which, under divine providence, they have won, will exercise a most important influence on the successful progress of the war in which they are engaged.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India,

H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
With the Governor-General.

Copy.

From his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

Dated Head-Quarters,
Camp Chillianwallah, January 16, 1849.

My Lord,—Major Mackeson, your lordship's political agent with my camp, officially communicated to me on the 10th instant, the fall of Attock and the advance of Sirdar Chutter Sing in order to concentrate his force with the army, in my front, under Shere Sing, already amounting to from 30,000 to 40,000 men with 62 guns, concluding his letter thus:—"I would urge, in the event of your Lordship's finding yourself strong enough with the army under your command to strike an effectual blow at the enemy in our front, that the blow should be struck with the least possible delay."

Concurring entirely with Major Mackeson, and feeling that I was perfectly competent effectually to overthrow Shere Sing's army, I moved from Loah Tibba, at daylight on the 12th, to Dingee, about 12 miles. Having learnt from my spies, and from other sources of information, that Shere Sing still held with his right the village of Lukhneewalla and Futteshaw-ke-Chuck, having the great body of his force at the village of Woolianwalla, with his left at Russool, on the

Jhelum, strongly occupying the southern extremity of a low range of different hills, intersected by ravines, which extend nearly to that village. I made my arrangements accordingly that evening, and communicated them to the commanders of the several divisions; but to ensure correct information as to the nature of the country, which I believed to be excessively difficult and ill-adapted to the advance of a regular army, I determined upon moving on this village with a view to reconnoitre.

On the morning of the 13th the force advanced. I made a considerable detour to my right, partly in order to distract the enemy's attention, but principally to get as clear as I could of the jungle, on which it would appear that the enemy mainly relied.

We approached this village about 12 o'clock, and I found, on a mound close to it, a strong piquet of the enemy's cavalry and infantry, which we at once dispersed, obtaining from the mound a very extended view of the country before us, and the enemy drawn out in battle array, he having, either during the night or that morning, moved out of his several positions, and occupied the ground in our front, which, though not a dense, was still a difficult jungle, his right in advance of Futtehshaw-ke-Chuck, and his left on the furrowed hills before described.

The day being so far advanced, I decided upon taking up a position in rear of the village, in order to reconnoitre my front, finding that I could not turn the enemy's flanks, which rested upon a dense jungle, extending nearly to Hailah, which I had previously occupied for some time, and the neighbourhood of which I knew, and upon the raviney hills near Russool, without detaching a force to a distance; this I considered both inexpedient and dangerous.

The engineer department had been ordered to examine the country before us, and the quartermaster-general was in the act of taking up ground for the encampment, when the enemy

advanced some horse artillery, and opened a fire on the skirmishers in front of the village.

I immediately ordered them to be silenced by a few rounds from our heavy guns, which advanced to an open space in front of the village. Their fire was instantly returned by that of nearly the whole of the enemy's field artillery; thus exposing the position of his guns, which the jungle had hitherto concealed.

It was now evident that the enemy intended to fight, and would probably advance his guns so as to reach the encampment during the night.

I therefore drew up in order of battle, Sir Walter Gilbert's division on the right, flanked by Brigadier Pope's brigade of cavalry, which I strengthened by the 14th Light Dragoons, well aware that the enemy was strong in cavalry upon his left. To this were attached three troops of horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Grant.

The heavy guns were in the centre.

Brigadier-General Campbell's division formed the left, flanked by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry, and three troops of horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

The field batteries were with the infantry divisions.

Thus formed, the troops were ordered to lie down, whilst the heavy guns under Major Horsford, ably seconded by Brevet-Majors Ludlow and Sir Richmond Shakespear, opened a well-directed and powerful fire upon the enemy's centre, where his guns appeared principally to be placed; and this fire was ably supported on the flanks by the field batteries of the infantry divisions.

After about an hour's fire, that of the enemy appeared to be, if not silenced, sufficiently disabled to justify an advance upon his position and guns.

I then ordered my left division to advance, which had to move over a great extent of ground, and in front of which the enemy seemed not to have many guns. Soon after, I directed Sir Walter Gilbert to advance, and sent orders to

Brigadier Pope to protect the flank and support the movement. Brigadier Penny's brigade was held in reserve, while the irregular cavalry under Brigadier Hearsey, with the 20th Native Infantry, was ordered to protect the enormous amount of provision and baggage that so hampers the movement of an Indian army.

Some time after the advance, I found that Brigadier Pennycuick's brigade had failed in maintaining the position it had carried, and immediately ordered Brigadier Penny's reserve to its support; but Brigadier-General Campbell, with that steady coolness and military decision for which he is so remarkable, having pushed on his left brigade and formed line to his right, carried everything before him, and soon overthrew that portion of the enemy which had obtained a temporary advantage over his right brigade.

This last brigade, I am informed, mistook for the signal to move in double time; the action of their brave leaders, Brigadier Pennycuick and Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks (two officers not surpassed for sound judgment and military daring in this or any other army), who waived their swords over their heads as they cheered on their gallant comrades. This unhappy mistake led to the Europeans outstripping the native corps, which could not keep pace, and arriving completely blown at a belt of thick jungle, where they got into some confusion, and Lieutenant-Colonel Brooks, leading the 24th, was killed between the enemy's guns. At this moment a large body of infantry, which supported their guns, opened upon them so destructive a fire, that the brigade was forced to retire, having lost their gallant and lamented leader, Brigadier Pennycuick, and the three other field-officers of the 24th, and nearly half the regiment, before it gave way. The native regiment, when it came up, also suffering severely. In justice to this brigade, I must be allowed to state, that they behaved heroically, and, but for their too hasty, and consequently disorderly advance, would have emulated the conduct of their left brigade, which,

left unsupported for a time, had to charge to their front and right, wherever an enemy appeared. The brigade of horse artillery on their left, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, judiciously and gallantly aiding, maintained an effective fire.

Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, on the extreme left and rear, charged the enemy's cavalry wherever they showed themselves.

The right attack of infantry, under that able officer Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, was most praiseworthy and successful. The left brigade, under Brigadier Mountain, advanced under a heavy fire upon the enemy's guns, in a manner that did credit to the brigadier and his gallant brigade, which came first into action and suffered severely: the right brigade, under Brigadier Godby, ably supported the advance.

This division nobly maintained the character of the Indian army, taking and spiking the whole of the enemy's guns, in their front, and dispersing the Sikhs wherever they were seen.

The major-general reports most favourably of the fire of his field-battery.

The right brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier Pope, was not, I regret to say, so successful. Either by some order, or misapprehension of an order, they got into much confusion, hampered the fine brigade of horse artillery, which, while getting into action, against a body of the enemy's cavalry that was coming down upon them, had their horses separated from their guns by the false movements of our cavalry, and, notwithstanding the heroic conduct of the gunners, four of those guns were disabled to an extent which rendered their withdrawal, at the moment, impossible. The moment the artillery was extricated and the cavalry reformed, a few rounds put to flight the enemy that had occasioned this confusion.

With this exception, the conduct of the troops generally was most exemplary. Some corps, both European and native, acting under most trying circumstances (from the

temporary failure in our left centre and right, and the cover which the jungle afforded to the enemy's movements), and with a gallantry worthy of the highest admiration.

Although the enemy, who defended not only his guns, but his position, with desperation, was driven in much confusion, and with heavy loss, from every part of it; and the greater part of his field-artillery was actually captured: the march of brigades to their flanks to repel parties that had rallied, and the want of numbers and consequent support to our right flank, aided by the cover of the jungle and the close of the day, enabled him, upon our further advance in pursuit, to return and carry off unobserved the greater portion of the guns we had thus gallantly carried at the point of the bayonet.

I remained with Brigadier-General Campbell's division, which had been reinforced by Brigadier Mountain's brigade, until near eight o'clock, in order to effect the bringing in of the captured ordnance, and of the wounded, and I hoped to bring in the rest of the guns next morning. But I did not feel justified in remaining longer out. The night was very dark. I knew not how far I had advanced. There were no wells nearer than the line of this village. The troops had been arduously employed all day, and there was every appearance of a wet night: rain did fall before morning.

I should have felt greater satisfaction if I were enabled to state, that my expectations in regard to the guns had been realized; but although a brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier White, with a troop of horse artillery, were on the ground soon after daylight, we found that the enemy, assisted by the neighbouring villagers, had carried off their guns, excepting twelve, which we had brought in the night before. Most of the captured waggons I had caused to be blown up before leaving the ground.

The victory was complete, as to the total overthrow of the enemy; and his sense of utter discomfiture and defeat, will, I trust, soon be made apparent, unless indeed the rumours

prevalent this day of his having been joined by Chutter Sing, prove correct.

I am informed that the loss of the Sikhs has been very great, and chiefly amongst their old and tried soldiers. In no action do I remember seeing so many of an enemy's slain upon the same space: Sobraon perhaps only excepted.

I have now, my Lord, stated the general movements of this army previous to and during the action of Chillianwallah, and as that action was characterized by peculiar features, which rendered it impossible for the Commander-in-chief to witness all the operations of the force, I shall beg leave to bring prominently to your Lordship's notice, the names of the several officers and corps particularly mentioned by the divisional commanders.

I have already stated the obligations I am under to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, and Sir Walter Gilbert, and to Brigadier-General Campbell, for their most valuable services. I warmly concur with them in the thanks which they have expressed to the several brigadiers and officers commanding corps, and to the troops generally.

Sir Joseph Thackwell names, with much satisfaction, Brigadier White's conduct of his brigade; Major Yerbury, commanding 3rd Light Dragoons; the gallant charge of Captain Unett, in command of a squadron of that corps; Major Mackenzie, commanding the 8th; and Captain Wheatley, commanding the 5th Light Cavalry; and the conduct of Captain Moore, of the 8th, with a squadron detached in support of the artillery. He further notices the assistance he derived from the zeal and activity of Captain Pratt, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Tucker, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general of his division, of Captain Cautley, major of brigade, of his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thackwell, and of Lieutenant Simpson, sub-assistant commissary-general.

Brigadier-General Campbell speaks in terms of admiration of the 5th Brigade, led on by that distinguished officer,

Brigadier Pennycuick; and particularly of the gallant exertions of Her Majesty's 24th Foot, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Brookes; and the good and steady advance of the 25th and 45th Native Infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Corbett and Major Williams. He particularizes the undaunted example set to his brigade by Brigadier Hoggan; the continued steadiness and gallantry of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Macleod, under the most trying circumstances; the distinguished conduct of Major Fleming and the officers of the 36th Native Infantry; and of the 46th Native Infantry, under Major Tudor; as also the able and zealous exertions of the Brigade Major, Captain Keiller. The Brigadier-General also brings to notice his obligations to Major Tucker, assistant adjutant-general of the army; and to Captain Goldie and Lieutenant Irwin, of the engineers, who were sent to his assistance, and the cordial and able support which he received from Major Ponsonby, his assistant adjutant-general; and he particularly mentions the conduct of Ensign Garden, his deputy assistant quartermaster-general; and Captain Haythorne, his aide-de-camp; further naming Lieutenant Grant of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment; Lieutenant Powys, of Her Majesty's 61st, who attended him as orderly officers; and of Lieutenant and Adjutant Shadwell, of Her Majesty's 98th, who was with him as a volunteer.

Sir Walter Gilbert speaks warmly of the charge led by Brigadier Mountain, against a large battery of the enemy, and followed up on his right by Brigadier Godby; and of the subsequent conduct of these officers; as also of the conduct of Major Chester, assistant adjutant-general; and Lieutenant Galloway, deputy assistant quartermaster-general of the division; of Lieutenant Colt, his aide-de-camp; of Captain Sherwill, and Lieutenant Macdonnell, majors of brigade; and of Captain Glasfurd; and Lieutenant W. E. Morton, of the engineers.

The major-general further mentions the undaunted bravery

on this occasion of Her Majesty's 29th Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve; the distinguished conduct of the 2nd European Regiment, under Major Steel; and the manner in which Majors Smith and Way, of the 29th, and Major Talbot, of the 2nd Europeans, seconded their able commanders. He also expresses his thanks to Lieutenant-Colonel Jack, commanding the 30th Native Infantry; Major Bamfield, commanding the 56th Native Infantry, who was mortally wounded; Major Corfield, commanding the 31st Native Infantry; and Major McCausland, commanding the 70th Native Infantry; for the manner in which they led their regiments into action: naming likewise Captain Nemubhard, of the 56th, who succeeded to the command of that corps; Captain Dawes, commanding the field-battery of the division; and Captain Robbins, of the 15th, who acted as his aide-de-camp.

The reserve, consisting of the 15th Native Infantry, and eight companies of the 69th Native Infantry, was ably handled by Brigadier Penny, well seconded by Lieutenant-Colonels Sibbald and Mercer, commanding the corps. The brigadier particularly mentions the steady conduct of the Rifle Company of the 69th, under Captain Sissmore; and acknowledges the services of Captain Macpherson, his major of brigade; and Brevet Captain Morris, of the 20th Native Infantry, who attended him as orderly officer.

Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding the artillery division, rendered me every aid, and presided over the noble arm, of which he is the head, most creditably to himself and most beneficially to the service. The brigadier-general particularly mentions Brigadier J. Brooke, who commanded the whole of the horse artillery; Brigadier Huthwaite, commanding the foot artillery; Lieutenant-Colonels C. Grant and F. Brind; Major R. Horsford and Major Mowatt; all of whom were in important commands. He further brings to notice Captain J. Abercrombie, deputy assistant adjutant-general; Lieutenant Tombs, deputy assistant quartermaster-

general, his aide-de-camp; Lieutenant Olpherts; Captain Hogge, commissary of ordnance; and Lieutenant de Tessier, who attended him as orderly officer.

I have, in the beginning of this despatch, noticed the services of Brevet-Major Sir Richmond Shakespear and Brevet-Major Ludlow, in command of the heavy batteries under the general superintendence of Major Horsford; and it only remains for me to add, that the conduct of Major Fordyce; Captains Warner and Duncan; Lieutenants Robinson and Walker, commanding troops and field-batteries; as well as the officers and men of the artillery generally, have been named in terms of praise by the divisional commander.

Lieutenants C. V. Cox and E. Kaye, brigade-majors of this arm, have been also named by their respective brigadiers.

From the engineer department, under Major Tremenhere, I received active assistance, ably aided by Captain Durand, Lieutenants R. Baird, Smith, and Goodwyn.

To the general staff I am greatly indebted. Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, C.B., quartermaster-general; and Major Lugard, acting adjutant-general; and Captain C. Ottor, acting assistant adjutant-general of Her Majesty's forces; Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B., adjutant-general of the army; Major C. Ekins (killed), a valued and much regretted officer, deputy adjutant-general; and Major Tucker, assistant adjutant-general of the army; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Garden, C.B., quartermaster-general of the army; Lieutenant W. F. Tytler, assistant quartermaster-general; and Lieutenant Paton, deputy assistant quartermaster-general of the army; Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, judge-advocate-general; and Lieutenant G. B. Johnson, deputy judge-advocate-general; Major G. Thomson, assistant commissary-general; Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. W. Curtis, assistant commissary-general; Captain C. Campbell, paymaster to the army; Captain J. Lang, postmaster; and H. Franklin, esquire, inspector-general of Her Majesty's hospitals.

To my personal staff I am also much indebted, Captain F.

P. Haines, military secretary; Major H. Bates, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant A. Bagot, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant S. J. Hire, aide-de-camp; Captain Gabbett, aide-de-camp; Lieutenant G. N. Hardinge, aide-de-camp; and Lieutenant W. G. Prendergast, Persian interpreter.

The unwearied exertions of Dr. Renny, superintending-surgeon, and of Dr. Mac Rae, the field-surgeon, in the care of the wounded, have been beyond all praise.

The Earl of Gifford kindly accompanied me throughout the operations, and was most useful in conveying my orders to the several divisions and brigades. I had also the advantage throughout the day of the active services of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry M. Lawrence, Major Mackeson, Mr. Cocks, C. S., Captain Nicholson, and Lieutenant Robinson, as well as of Major Anstruther, of the Madras Artillery, and Lieutenant H. O. Mayne, of the 6th Madras Light Cavalry.

Captain Ramsay, joint deputy commissary-general, with the several officers of that department, has been most indefatigable, and has hitherto kept the army well supplied.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GOUGH, General,
Commander-in-chief.

Returned of killed, wounded, and missing of the army of the Punjab, under the personal command of the Right Honourable Lord Gough, G.C.B., in the action with the Sikh forces, under Rajah Shere Sing, at Chillianwallah, on the 13th January, 1849.

General Staff—1 European officer, 1 horse, killed; 2 European officers wounded.

Artillery Division.—Horse Artillery Brigade.

1st Troop, 2nd Brigade—5 rank and file, 1 lascar, killed; 1 rank and file, 4 lascars, 2 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 22 horses, missing.

2nd Troop, ditto—4 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded; 2 horses missing.

3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade—1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, killed ; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 3 lascars, 1 Syce, wounded ; 1 rank and file, 6 Syces, 31 horses, missing.

4th Troop, ditto—1 European officer, 1 Syce, 6 horses, killed ; 2 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded ; 4 horses missing.

1st Troop, 3rd Brigade—1 rank and file, 1 horse, killed ; 1 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

2nd Troop, ditto—1 rank and file wounded.

Foot Artillery Brigade.

1st Company, 1st Battalion, No. 10 Battery—1 horse wounded.

3rd Company, ditto, No. 17 Battery—3 horses killed ; 2 European officers, 1 trumpeter, 2 rank and file, wounded ; 1 horse missing.

1st Company, 4th ditto—1 rank and file killed ; 7 rank and file wounded.

2nd Company, ditto—1 rank and file killed ; 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, wounded.

4th Company, ditto—1 rank and file wounded.

6th Company, 7th ditto, No. 5 Battery—1 horse killed ; 5 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded ; 1 horse missing.

Park Establishment—1 serjeant killed.

Total—1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 14 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 Syce, 11 horses, killed ; 3 European officers, 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 28 rank and file, 8 lascars, 1 Syce, 7 horses, wounded ; 2 rank and file, 6 Syces, 61 horses, missing.

Engineer Department, 6th Company of Pioneers—3 rank and file wounded.

Cavalry Division.—1st Brigade.

H. M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons—1 serjeant, 23 rank and file, killed ; 2 European officers, 14 rank and file, 14 horses, wounded.

H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons—1 European officer, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, killed ; 1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 12 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded ; 2 rank and file, 4 horses, missing.

5th Light Cavalry—2 serjeants, 1 trumpeter, 3 rank and file, 7 horses, killed; 2 European officers, 1 native ditto, 2 serjeants, 11 rank and file, 7 horses, wounded.

8th Light Cavalry—1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 2 horses missing.

2nd Brigade.

Brigade Staff—1 European officer wounded.

H. M.'s 9th Lancers—4 rank and file killed; 8 rank and file, 5 horses, wounded; 4 horses missing.

1st Regiment Light Cavalry—3 rank and file, 1 Syce, 1 horse, killed; 1 native officer, 1 serjeant, 2 rank and file, 1 Syce, 7 horses, wounded; 3 horses missing.

6th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 European officer, 2 native ditto, 4 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 2 European officers, 1 warrant officer, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, wounded; 6 horses missing.

Total—2 European officers, 2 native ditto, 3 serjeants, 1 trumpeter, 39 rank and file, 1 Syce, 38 horses, killed; 8 European officers, 2 native ditto, 1 warrant officer, 6 serjeants, 55 rank and file, 1 Syce, 36 horses, wounded; 2 rank and file, 19 horses, missing.

2nd Infantry Division.—3rd Brigade.

2nd European Regiment—6 rank and file killed; 2 European officers, 5 serjeants, 54 rank and file, wounded.

31st Regiment of Native Infantry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 2 havildars, 12 rank and file, wounded.

45th Regiment of Native Infantry—4 havildars, 13 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 1 native ditto, 1 havildar, 53 rank and file, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

70th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 native officers, 3 rank and file, killed; 20 rank and file wounded.

4th Brigade.

H. M.'s 29th Foot—2 serjeants, 29 rank and file, killed; 4 European officers, 5 serjeants, 4 drummers, 194 rank and file, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

20th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 European officers, 1 native ditto, 10 havildars, 1 drummer, 53 rank and file, killed; 9 European officers, 9 native ditto, 12 havildars, 1 drummer, 187 rank and file, wounded.

56th Regiment of Native Infantry—2 European officers, 4 native ditto, 7 havildars, 32 rank and file, killed; 6 European officers, 6 native ditto, 18 havildars, 4 drummers, 205 rank and file, wounded; 2 havildars, 36 rank and file, missing.

Total—4 European officers, 7 native ditto, 24 serjeants or havildars, 1 drummer, 138 rank and file, killed; 26 European officers, 16 native ditto, 43 serjeants or havildars, 9 drummers, 725 rank and file, wounded; 2 havildars, 42 rank and file, missing.

3rd Infantry Division.

Divisional and Brigade Staff—2 European officers killed, 2 ditto wounded.

5th Brigade.

H. M.'s 24th Foot—11 European officers, 4 serjeants, 1 drummer, 188 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 10 European officers, 8 serjeants, 2 drummers, 256 rank and file, wounded; 38 rank and file missing.

25th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 European officer, 6 native ditto, 13 havildars, 2 drummers, 78 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 3 native ditto, 3 havildars, 2 drummers, 82 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 2 havildars, 10 rank and file, missing.

6th Brigade.

15th Regiment of Native Infantry—4 havildars, 4 rank and file, killed; 3 European officers, 1 native ditto, 7 havildars, 37 rank and file, wounded.

69th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 havildar, 3 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 8 havildars, 2 drummers, 51 rank and file, wounded.

7th Brigade.

H. M.'s 61st Foot—11 rank and file killed; 3 European officers, 7 serjeants, 93 rank and file, wounded.

36th Regiment of Native Infantry—1 native officer, 2 havildars, 25 rank and file, killed; 6 European officers, 2 native ditto, 3 havildars, 66 rank and file, wounded.

46th Regiment of Native Infantry—3 rank and file killed; 3 native officers, 4 havildars, 1 drummer, 43 rank and file, wounded.

Total—14 European officers, 7 native ditto, 24 serjeants or havildars, 3 drummers, 312 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 28 European officers, 9 native ditto, 40 serjeants or havildars, 7 drummers, 628 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 2 havildars, 48 rank and file, missing.

Grand Total—22 European officers, 16 native ditto, 53 serjeants or havildars, 5 trumpeters or drummers, 503 rank and file, 1 lascar, 2 Syces, 52 horses, killed; 67 European officers, 27 native ditto, 1 warrant officer, 90 serjeants or havildars, 17 trumpeters or drummers, 1439 rank and file, 8 lascars, 2 Syces, 44 horses, wounded; 4 serjeants or havildars, 94 rank and file, 6 Syces, 80 horses, missing.

NOMINAL ROLL OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS, KILLED, WOUNDED,
OR MISSING.

General Staff—Killed: Brevet-Major C. Ekins, deputy adjutant-general of the army. Wounded: Brevet-Major H. T. Tucker, assistant adjutant-general of the army, contusion; Lieutenant J. S. Paton, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, severely.

Artillery Division.

4th Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—Killed: Lieutenant J. A. Manson.

3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—Wounded: Brevet-Major E. Christie, very dangerously, since dead.

3rd Company, 1st Battalion Artillery—Wounded: Captain M. Dawes, slightly; 1st Lieutenant C. S. Dundas, severely.

Cavalry Division.

Brigade Staff—Wounded: Brigadier A. Pope, C.B., commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade, severely.

- H. M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons—Wounded: Captain W. Unett, severely; Lieutenant T. H. Stisted.
- 5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Wounded: Lieutenant R. Christie, dangerously; Lieutenant A. P. C. Elliot, severely.
- H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons—Killed: Lieutenant A. J. Cureton. Wounded: Major C. Steuart.
- 6th Regiment Light Cavalry—Killed: Lieutenant A. M. Shepherd. Wounded: Captain W. J. E. Boys, Lieutenant H. R. Grindlay.

2nd Infantry Division.

- 2nd European Regiment—Wounded: Lieutenant M. R. Nightingale, very severely; Lieutenant J. Bleaymire, slightly.
- 31st Regiment of Native Infantry—Wounded: Captain W. R. Dunmore, slightly.
- H. M.'s 29th Foot—Wounded: Major M. Smith, slight contusion; Lieutenant the Honourable H. M. Moncton, severely; Lieutenant H. T. Metge, very severely; Ensign G. H. Nevill, slightly.
- 30th Regiment of Native Infantry—Killed: Captain W. H. Ross, Ensign A. C. de Morel. Wounded: Brevet-Major M. E. Loftie, severely; Captain W. C. Campbell, slightly; Captain R. S. Ewart, ditto; Captain C. F. Fenwick, very severely; Captain J. Morrieson, slightly; Lieutenant H. Swinhoe, severely; Ensign T. Pierce, slightly; Ensign J. C. Wood, very severely; Ensign W. T. Leicester, ditto.
- 56th Regiment of Native Infantry—Killed: Lieutenant W. W. Warde, Ensign F. W. Robinson. Wounded: Major D. Bamfield, very severely, since dead; Lieutenant W. C. Gott, slightly; Lieutenant L. B. Jones, severely; Lieutenant F. V. R. Jervis, ditto; Lieutenant J. H. Bacon, slightly; Lieutenant J. W. Delamain, severely, arm since amputated.
- 45th Regiment of Native Infantry—Wounded: Captain R. Haldane, severely; Lieutenant J. Palmer, do.; Ensign M. H. Combe, slightly; Ensign W. L. Trotter, badly.

3rd Infantry Division.

Divisional Staff—Wounded : Brigadier-General C. Campbell, C.B., slightly.

Brigade Staff—Killed : Brigadier J. Pennycuik, C.B. and K.H.; Captain C. R. Harris, major of brigade. Wounded: Brevet Captain A. B. Morris, officiating brigade-major, slightly.

H.M.'s 24th Foot—Killed : Lieutenant-Colonel R. Brookes, Major H. W. Harris, Captain C. Lee, Captain J. S. Shore, Captain R. W. Travers, Lieutenant G. Phillips, Lieutenant O. B. Payne, Lieutenant J. A. Woodgate, Lieutenant W. Phillips, Ensign H. E. B. Collis, Ensign A. Pennycuik. Wounded: Major H. Paynter, dangerously; Captain W. G. Brown, slightly; Captain L. H. Bazalgette, severely; Lieutenant G. E. L. Williams, dangerously; Lieutenant R. A. Croker, severely; Lieutenant G. F. Berry, slightly; Lieutenant J. B. Thelwall, severely; Lieutenant and Adjutant W. Hartshorn, slightly; Lieutenant A. J. Macpherson, severely; Lieutenant J. H. Archer (H.M.'s 96th), slightly.

25th Regiment of Native Infantry—Killed : Lieutenant A. Money. Wounded : Lieutenant A. G. C. Sutherland, slightly; Lieutenant F. A. Jeune, ditto.

15th Regiment of Native Infantry—Wounded: Lieutenant and Adjutant G. G. Anderson, severely; Lieutenant H. R. Shawe, slightly; Lieutenant W. G. Ellice, ditto.

69th Regiment of Native Infantry—Wounded : Captain J. A. James, severely; Lieutenant J. Nesbitt, ditto.

H.M.'s 61st Foot—Wounded : Captain J. Massey, severely; Ensign J. Nagel, ditto; Ensign J. H. H. Parks, slightly.

36th Regiment of Native Infantry—Wounded: Captain F. A. Carleton, severely; Lieutenant, Interpreter, and Quarter-Master A. N. Thompson, since dead; Lieutenant and Adjutant C. S. Weston, severely; Lieutenant J. D. May-

may, slightly; Ensign F. J. S. Bagshaw, severely; Ensign C. J. Godby, dangerously.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-Col.
Adjutant-General of the Army.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Head-Quarters, Camp Chillianwallah.
17th January, 1849.

List of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores captured from the
Enemy in the Action of the 13th January.

Camp Chillianwallah, 15th Jan. 1849.

No.	Calibre.	Nature.
1	3·84	7 -pounders
2	3·80	7 -pounders
3	3·79	7 -pounders
4	3·40	5½-pounders
5	3·67	6 -pounders
6	3·80	7 -pounders
7	3·76	7 -pounders
8	3·75	7 -pounders
9	2·90	3 -pounders
10	3·94	7½-pounders
11	3·74	6½-pounders
12	3·60	6 -pounders

Six of these guns have carriages and limbers, and six are without limbers; all of the pattern nearly in use with our field-pieces.

Two ammunition-carriages (one partly destroyed by explosion), 1 platform-cart, 144 cartridges, liners fixed to shot; 16 cartridges unfixed, and 18 port-fires have also been brought into park.

(Signed) J. ABERCROMBIE, Captain,
Dep. Assist. Adj.-Gen. Arty., Army of the Punjab.

(Signed) J. TENNANT, Brig.-Gen.,
Commanding Artillery Division.

(True Copy.)
(Signed) P. GRANT, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

(True Copies.)
H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Govt. of India,
with the Governor-General.

*From the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, to the
Right Honourable the Governor-General of India,
&c. &c. &c.*

Head-quarters, Camp Ramnugger,
December 10, 1848.

My Lord,—In continuation of my letter of the 5th instant, I have now the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's despatch, dated the 6th idem, but only received last night, detailing the operations of the force under his command, after it had been detached from my head-quarters.

I can only repeat the warm approval I have already expressed of the conduct of the major-general and of every officer and man under his command, and I beg your lordship's favourable consideration of the services of those named by Sir Joseph Thackwell.

I beg to inclose a rough sketch of the operations of the 3rd instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GOUGH.

*From Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. and K.H.,
to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of
the Army.*

Head-quarters, Camp Ramnugger, Camp Heyleh,
December 6, 1848.

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, that agreeably to his Excellency's orders, I left the camp at Ramnugger with the troops named in the margin,* at about half-past 3 o'clock on the morning of the 1st December, 1848, instead of at 1 o'clock as I had ordered, some of the troops having lost their way among the intricacies of the rear of the encampment, and proceeded to the vicinity of the ford on the Chenab at Runnee-Khan-ke-Puttun, distant thirteen miles from Ramnugger, which, owing to the broken ground and narrow roads, where any existed for the first four miles, I did not reach before 11 o'clock. The enemy had infantry at this ford, which report afterwards magnified to 4,000 men, but the villagers said it was much deeper than the one at Allée Shere-ke-Chuck, a mile higher up the river. I am much indebted to Lieutenant Paton, deputy assistant quartermaster-

- * Major Christie's Troop Horse Artillery.
- Captain Huish's Troop Horse Artillery.
- Captain Warner's Troop Horse Artillery.
- ; Captain Kinleside, No. 5 Light Field Battery.
- Captain Austin, No. 10 Light Field Battery.
- Captain Robinson and 2 18-pounders, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, Horse Artillery.
- 2 companies of pioneers.
- The pontoon train.
- 1st Brigade of Cavalry, commanded by Brigadier White.
- 3rd Light Dragoons, commanded by Major Yerbury.
- 5th Light Cavalry, commanded by Captain Wheatley.
- 8th Light Cavalry, commanded by Captain Moore.
- 3rd Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Major Tait.
- 12th Irregular Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant Cunningham.

general, for his anxious exertions in examining this ford ; and from his report I came to the conclusion that this ford of Allee Shere-ke-Chuck could not have artillery on the left bank of the river to cover the passage of the troops, from the insecure bottom of the first ford, neither could the pontoon train be of much use for the same reason, and the deep sands which lay between the fords. The pontoon train might have been laid over the main stream under cover of a battery, near the enemy's infantry ; but beyond the river the sands seemed wet and insecure, and a branch of the river beyond them was said to be deep with a muddy bottom. Under all these disadvantages, I came to the decision that it was more advisable to try the passage of the river near Wuzeerabad, where Captain Nicholson, assistant to the Resident at Lahore, informed me that at the ferry were seventeen boats, and a ford not more than 3 feet 10 inches deep, with a good bottom, than to run the risk of a severe loss by passing the river near the enemy. This survey of the ford occupied three hours, and at two o'clock I put the column in movement to the ford and ferry at Wuzeerabad, which was in the posses-

3rd Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Eckford.

31st Native Infantry, Major Corfield.

56th Native Infantry, Major Bamfield.

3rd Division of Infantry, Brigadier-General Campbell, commanding.

6th Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Pennycuik.

H.M.'s 24th Foot, Major Harris.

2 flank companies, 2nd Battalion company, 22nd Native Infantry, Major Sampson.

8th Brigade of Infantry, Brigadier Hoggan.

H.M.'s 61st Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel McLeod.

36th Native Infantry, Major Flemyng.

46th Native Infantry, Major Tudor.

Of the above detail, the following returned in charge of the two 18-pounders and pontoon train :

2 guns of No. 10 Light Field Battery. ;

12th Irregular Cavalry.

2 companies 22nd Native Infantry.

sion of Lieutenant Nicholson's pattans, where the leading infantry arrived about five o'clock in the afternoon, having made a march of about twenty-five miles. The 6th brigade of infantry and some of the guns were passed over the Chenab immediately, and I am indebted to Brigadier-General Campbell, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, horse artillery, and Captain Smith of the engineers, for their great exertions in forwarding this object. Brigadier Eckford I hoped would have crossed the river by the three fords that evening; but as it became too dark and lazy for such an operation, he halted for the night on the dry sands near the last branch of the river. Major Tait, 3rd Irregular Cavalry, was enabled to pass over three of his risallahs; in doing which I am sorry to say three sowars and one horse were drowned. On the morrow the infantry, cavalry, and all the troops were soon over the river by ferry and ford, and all the baggage and commissariat animals passed the same by twelve o'clock, without any further loss.

At two P.M., after the troops had dined, I marched in order of battle, three brigade columns of companies, at half distance left in front, at deploying interval. The 1st brigade of cavalry, in the same order on the right, with strong flanking parties and rear guard, and the 3rd Irregular Cavalry on the left, with orders to patrol to the river and clear the right bank, aided by infantry, if necessary: in this order I arrived at Doorawal at dusk, about twelve miles from the ferry, and halted for the night. On Sunday, December 3, at daylight, the troops proceeded in the same order towards the Sikh position, and I intended to have reconnoitred and commenced an attack upon it by eleven o'clock: hearing, however, when within about four miles of it or less, that reinforcements were expected to pass over the Chenab at the ford near Ghurree-ke-Puttun, it became necessary to secure that post, and which had been found without an enemy an hour before, but to which it now seemed that a body of about 600 of the enemy were seen approaching, and I detached a wing of the

56th Native Infantry, and two risallahs of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry under Major Tait, who secured the post and frustrated the attempt of the enemy. This caused so much delay, that enough of daylight would not be left for the advance and attack on the left and rear of the enemy's position. About two P.M. some of the enemy's guns opened on a patrol of the 5th Light Cavalry, and he was seen advancing in large bodies of cavalry and infantry, and the picquets which occupied three villages with large plantations of sugarcane being too much in advance to be supported, fell back without any loss, and the enemy occupied these villages with cavalry on the right, guns and bodies of infantry, and the main body of their cavalry with horse artillery were on their left. When the enemy's guns opened, I ordered Brigadier-General Campbell to deploy the infantry into line in front of the village of Sudoolapoor, Brigadier Eckford and part of Brigadier Hoggan's brigade being extended in order not to be outflanked. It was not until the enemy came well within range of our guns that I caused them to open their fire, which they then did with great effect. The enemy tried to turn both our flanks, which having foreseen, I had caused Captain Warner to move his troop of artillery to the left of the infantry, and had sent the 5th Light Cavalry to the left to support these guns, and to act in conjunction with the two risallahs of the 3rd Irregular Cavalry under Captain Bidulph, who were posted on open ground, and these soon drove the enemy back. The attempt to turn our right was met by extending the 8th Light Cavalry and Her Majesty's 3rd Light Dragoons, supported by Major Christie's troop of artillery. As the cavalry of the right advanced, the enemy's suwars gave way, and they fell back on their infantry, having lost some men by the skirmishers of the 3rd Light Dragoons. After a cannonade of about two hours the fire of the enemy slackened, and I sent Lieutenant Paton to desire the cavalry on the right to charge and take the enemy's guns if possible; intending to support them by moving the brigades in échelon

from the right at intervals according to circumstances ; but as no opportunity offered for the cavalry to charge, and so little of the daylight remained, I deemed it safer to remain in my position than attempt to drive back an enemy so strongly posted on their right and centre, with the prospect of having to attack their entrenched position afterwards. From this position the Sikhs began to retire at about 12 o'clock at night, as was afterwards ascertained, and as was conjectured by the barking of dogs in their rear. I have every reason to believe that Shere Singh attacked with 20 guns, and nearly the whole of the Sikh army were employed against my position, which was by no means what I could have wished it ; but the fire of our artillery was so effective, that he did not dare to bring his masses to the front, and my brave, steady, and ardent infantry, whom I had caused to lay down to avoid the heavy fire, had no chance of firing a shot, except a few companies on the left of the line. The enemy's loss has been severe ; ours comparatively very small. I regret not being able to capture the enemy's guns ; but with the small force of cavalry, two regiments on the right only, it would have been a matter of difficulty for tired cavalry to overtake horse artillery, fresh and well mounted. In these operations the conduct of all has merited my warmest praise, and the patient endurance of the artillery, cavalry, European infantry and sepoy, under privations of no ordinary nature, has been most praiseworthy.

To Brigadier-General Campbell I am much indebted for his able assistance during these movements, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, commanding the artillery, Major Christie, Captains Huish, Warner, Austin and Kinleside, and the officers and men under their command, I cannot bestow too much praise for their skill and gallantry in overcoming the fire of a numerous artillery, some of which were of heavy calibre. I am also greatly indebted to Captain Smith of the engineers, for his exertions in passing over guns at the Wuzerabad ferry, and for his assistance in conveying my orders on

various occasions. And my thanks are due to Lieutenants Yule and Crommelin of the same corps, and Lieutenant Bacon of the sappers ; to Lieutenant Paton, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, my best thanks are due for his exertions and assistance in the advance of the troops and during the action ; and to Captain Nicholson, assistant to the resident at Lahore, I beg to offer my best thanks for his endeavours to procure intelligence of the enemy's movements, for his endeavours to procure supplies for the troops, and his able assistance on all occasions. Captain Pratt, my deputy assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant Tucker, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, and Lieutenant Thackwell, aide-de-camp, have been most zealous in performing their respective duties, and have rendered me every assistance ; and I feel assured that if the cavalry and infantry had been brought into close action, I should have had the great satisfaction of thanking brigadiers commanding, officers of corps, and the officers and men, for their gallantry and noble bearing in action, as I now do for their steadiness and good conduct. To Major Mainwaring, Captains Gerrard, Simpson, Faddy, and James, I am much indebted for their exertions in their respective departments.

I beg further to state that on the morning of the 4th I put the troops in motion to pursue the enemy, who had retreated during the preceding night, and encamped about eleven miles from the Chenab, on the road to Jullalpoore, the 9th Lancers having been pushed to the front, but without seeing anything of the enemy, who had retreated by the Jhelum, Jullalpoore, and Pind Dadun Khan roads. On the following day I arrived at this place, and sent two regiments of cavalry on the road to Dingee ; one of them, the 14th Light Dragoons and two regiments of cavalry, and a troop of horse artillery on the road to Jullalpoore ; the latter party observed two bodies of the enemy of about 800 and 400 men each, imagined to be a strong rear-guard, about eight miles from this, and behind a thick jungle which reaches to the river ; and the former went

to Dingee, which place the enemy had left, and the villagers said had gone over the Jhelum. Both parties returned to this camp without, I am sorry to say, having overtaken any of the enemy's troops or guns.

I beg leave to inclose a return of the killed and wounded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOS. THACKWELL, Major-General,
Commanding the advanced post of the Army.

List of Officers killed, wounded, and missing, of a detachment of the army of the Punjaub, on the 3rd December, 1848.

1st Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery.—Lieutenant E. J. Watson, wounded.

10th Light Field Battery, 1st Company, 1st Battalion—Captain E. G. Austin, severely wounded.

22nd Regiment Native Infantry—Jemadar Sudar Khan, severely wounded; amputation of leg.

25th Regiment Native Infantry—Thunnoo Ram Jemadar, killed.

36th Regiment Native Infantry—Lieutenant Garstin, severely wounded.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—Lieutenant A. Gibbons, wounded.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of a detachment of the army of the Punjaub, in the action on the 3rd December, 1848.

Camp Heyleh, December 6, 1848.

1st Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade Horse Artillery—2 horses wounded.

1st Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery—4 rank and file, 8 horses, killed; 7 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded.

Total—1 serjeant, 5 rank and file, 11 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, 8 horses, wounded.

No. 5 Light Field Battery and 3rd Company 7th Battalion—
1 horse killed; 2 Syce drivers, 1 Syce, 2 horses, wounded.

No. 10 Light Field Battery and 1st Company 1st Battalion—
2 horses, killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file,
wounded.

Total—3 horses killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file,
2 Syce drivers, 1 Syce, 2 horses, wounded.

Cavalry—1st Brigade.

H.M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons—3 horses, killed; 1 rank and file,
1 horse, wounded.

5th Light Cavalry—2 horses, killed; 1 havildar, 1 horse,
wounded.

8th Light Cavalry—1 rank and file, 3 horses, killed; 1 horse,
wounded.

Total—1 rank and file, 8 horses killed; 1 havildar, 1 rank
and file, 3 horses, wounded.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 havildar, 2 rank and file, 11 horses,
killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 1 horse,
wounded; 1 rank and file, 1 horse, missing.

12th Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, killed.

Infantry—3rd Brigade.

31st Regiment Native Infantry—1 havildar, 6 rank and file,
wounded.

Total—1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 11 horses, killed; 1 Euro-
pean officer, 1 havildar, 3 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

6th Brigade.

Remarks—1 Bheestie wounded and drowned crossing the
river on the night of the 1st December, 1848; 3 sowars and
1 horse, not included in this.

H.M.'s 24th Regiment—1 serjeant, 1 rank and file, killed;
1 serjeant, 3 rank and file, wounded.

22nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 havildar, killed; 1 native
officer, 2 rank and file, wounded.

25th Regiment Native Infantry—1 native officer, 4 rank and
file, killed; 1 havildar, 7 rank and file, wounded.

Total—1 native officer, 1 serjeant, and 1 havildar, 5 rank and

file, killed; 1 native officer, 1 serjeant, and 1 havildar, 12 rank and file, wounded.

8th Brigade.

H.M.'s 61st Regiment—2 rank and file, killed; 1 serjeant, 8 rank and file, wounded.

36th Regiment Native Infantry—1 native officer, 1 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 2 rank and file, wounded.

46th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file, wounded.

Total—1 native officer, 3 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 11 rank and file, wounded.

Total—21 men, 33 horses, killed; 51 men, 14 horses wounded; 1 man, 1 horse, missing.

Grand Total—73 men, 48 horses.

The Secretary with the Governor-General to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Ferozepore, January 31, 1849.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief's despatches, dated the 5th, 10th and 16th ultimo, reporting the particulars of an action with the enemy at Sadoolapore, and the passage of the Chenab by Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B.

The Governor-General regrets to find that he inadvertently omitted to issue instructions founded on a minute which he had recorded on the subject of the despatches under acknowledgment. His Lordship begs to congratulate the Commander-in-chief on the success of the measures which he adopted for effecting the passage of the Chenab, and to convey to him the assurance of his satisfaction with, and his best thanks for, the judicious arrangements by which he was enabled, with comparatively little loss, to carry into execution his plans for the passage of that difficult river, and for compelling the retreat of the Sikh army from the formidable position which they occupied on its further bank, after they had been engaged, and beaten back by the forces under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell. The result of his

Excellency's movements, in driving the Sikh army from their entrenchments, and forcing them to retire on the other extremity of the Doab, was of much importance.

The Governor-General offers his best thanks to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell for his successful direction of the force under his command, and for the dispositions by which he compelled the enemy to retire, and ultimately to quit the ground he had occupied. The Governor-General tenders his best thanks to Brigadier-General Campbell for the able assistance which he rendered to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant for the powerful and effective use which he made of the artillery under his command.

The Governor-General has had much gratification in observing the terms in which the Commander-in-chief has spoken of the army under his command in the field; and he concurs with his Excellency in bestowing upon them the praise which is their due.

GENERAL ORDERS BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Camp Ferozepore, February 24, 1849.

The following notifications from the Foreign Department, are republished for the information of the army:

NOTIFICATION.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
February 23, 1849.

The Governor-General has the gratification of intimating to the President in Council, and notifying for public information, that he has this day received a despatch from Major Mackeson, C.B., agent to the Governor-General with the Commander-in-chief, conveying the intelligence that the forces under his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, on the 21st instant, attacked and routed the Sikh army in the neighbourhood of Goojerat.

The enemy was beaten at every point and retreated in disorder, leaving in the hands of the British troops, by whom he was pursued, a great portion of his artillery, his ammunition, and the whole of his standing camp.

The official despatches of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief will be published as soon as they are received.

The Governor-General directs that a salute of 21 guns shall be fired, at every principal station of the army, on the receipt of this notification.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

NOTIFICATION.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
February 24, 1849.

The Right Honourable the Governor-General directs the publication of the following letter from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, reporting the complete defeat of the Sikh army on the 21st instant. The detailed despatches will be published hereafter.

From his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in India, to the Right Honourable the Governor-General.

Camp, in front of Goojerat, February 21, 1849.

My Lord,—I have the honour to report to your Lordship that I have this day obtained a victory of no common order, either in its character, or, I trust, in its effects.

I was joined yesterday by Brigadier Markham's brigade, Brigadier-General Dundas having joined late the preceding night. I moved on in the afternoon of yesterday, as soon as these troops were refreshed, from Trikur to the village of Sheediwal, and at seven this morning I moved to the attack,

which commenced at half-past eight o'clock, and by one o'clock I was in possession of the whole Sikh position, with all his camp equipage, baggage, magazines, and I hope a large proportion of his guns; the exact number I cannot at present state, from the great extent of his position and length of pursuit, as I followed up the enemy from four to five miles on the Bimbur road, and pushed on Sir Joseph Thackwell with the cavalry. The rout has been most complete; the whole road for twelve miles is strewed with guns, ammunition waggons, arms and baggage.

My loss was comparatively small (I hope within 300 killed and wounded) when it is considered I had to attack 60,000 Sikhs, in a very strong position, armed with upwards of 60 guns. The loss of the enemy must have been very severe.

The conduct of the whole army, in every arm, was conspicuous for steadiness in movement, and gallantry in action. The details I shall furnish hereafter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GOUGH, General,
Commander-in-chief in India.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

J. STUART, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
with the Governor-General.

NOTIFICATION.

Fort William, Foreign Department,
March 9, 1849.

The President in Council is pleased to direct the publication of the following notification issued by the Right Honourable the Governor-General at his Lordship's head-

quarters, with a despatch from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, reporting the details of the complete victory which was gained over the Sikh forces at Goojerat, on the 21st ultimo by the army under his Excellency's command.

By order of the President of the Council of India in council.

FRED. JAS. HALLIDAY,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
March 1, 1849.

The Governor-General, having received from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief a despatch, reporting the details of the brilliant victory which was gained by the British army at Goojerat, on the 21st ultimo, directs that it be published for the information of the army and of the people of India.

The Sikh army, under the command of Sirdar Chutter Sing and of Rajah Shere Sing, combined with the Afghan troops in the service of the Ameer of Cabool, were posted in great strength near to the town of Goojerat.

Their numbers were estimated at 60,000 men, and 59 guns were brought by them into action.

On the morning of the 21st they were attacked by the forces under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief. A powerful and sustained cannonade by the British artillery compelled them, after some time, to retire from the positions they had well and resolutely maintained.

The subsequent advance of the British army drove them back at once from every point, and retreat having been speedily converted into rout, they fled in the utmost disorder, and abandoning their guns, and throwing away their arms, were pursued by the artillery and cavalry till the evening, for many miles beyond the town.

Fifty-three pieces of the enemy's artillery, his camp, his baggage, his magazines, and vast store of ammunition left in the hands of the British troops, bear testimony to the completeness and to the importance of the victory that has been won.

The Governor-General, in the name and on behalf of the Government of India, most cordially congratulates his Excellency the Commander-in-chief and the whole army on the glorious success which, under the blessing of Divine Providence, their skill and gallantry have achieved: and he offers to his Excellency, to the generals, the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the force, his grateful acknowledgments of the service they have thus rendered to the Government and to their country.

The Governor-General begs especially to thank Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. and K.H.; Major-General Sir W. Gilbert, K.C.B.; Major-General Whish, C.B.; Brigadier-General Campbell, C.B., and Brigadier-General the Honourable H. Dundas, C.B., for the ability and judgment with which they directed the operations of the divisions respectively under their command.

To the chief engineer, Brigadier Cheape, C.B.; to the officers commanding brigades, Brigadier Brooke, C.B.; Brigadier Huthwaite, C.B.; Brigadier Leeson; to Brigadier White, C.B., Brigadier Hearsey and Brigadier Lockwood, C.B.; to Brigadier Hervey and Brigadier Markham; to Brigadier Mountain, C.B.; Brigadier Penny, C.B.; Brigadier Capon and Brigadier Hoggan; Brigadier Carnegie and Brigadier McLeod, the best thanks of the Governor-General are due.

The services of Brigadier-General Tennant and of the artillery of the force have been recorded in the despatch of the Commander-in-chief in terms of which they may justly be proud.

The Governor-General cordially joins with his Excellency in acknowledging their merit, and in bestowing upon them the praise they have earned so well.

To Major Lugard, to Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, C.B., and to the officers of the general staff of Her Majesty's army; to Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, C.B.; to Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, C.B.; and to the officers of the general staff of the army; to Captain Ramsay and the officers of the commissariat department; to Mr. Franklin, inspector-general of Her Majesty's hospitals; to Dr. Renny, and the officers of the medical department, and to the officers of his Excellency's personal staff, the Governor-General offers his best thanks, and assures them of his full appreciation of their services.

And to all the troops of every arm, European and native, the Governor-General desires to convey his entire approbation of their steady and gallant conduct throughout the day; particularly to a portion of the 9th Lancers and the Scinde Horse for their charge against the Affghan cavalry; to the 3rd brigade of infantry under Brigadier Penny, C.B., for their attack on the village of Kabra; and to a portion of Brigadier Hervey's brigade for their charge led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C.B., all of which have been specially reported by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief.

The Governor-General estimates highly the important results which the battle gained on the 21st ultimo is calculated to produce. He entertains a hope that the conviction, which the events of that day must force upon all, of the vast superiority which the British army derived from the possession of science and military resource, will induce the enemy shortly to abandon a contest which is a hopeless one.

The war in which we are engaged must be prosecuted with vigour and determination, to the entire defeat and dispersion of all who are in arms against us, whether Sikhs or Affghans.

The Governor-General has ever felt, and feels, unbounded confidence in the army which serves in India. He relies fully on the conviction that their services will be given cheerfully and gallantly, as heretofore, whatever may be the obstacles opposed to them; and he does not doubt that, with the

blessing of Heaven, such full success will continue to follow their efforts, as shall speedily give to the Government of India the victory over its enemies, and restore the country to the enjoyment of peace.

The Governor-General will not fail earnestly to commend the past services of this army to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government and of the Honourable East India Company.

A salute of 21 guns has been ordered at every principal station of the army in India.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India, with the
Governor-General.

*From the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief in India,
to the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.*

Head-quarters, Camp Goojerat,
February 26, 1849.

My Lord,—By my letter of the 21st instant, written on the field of battle immediately after the action, your Lordship will have been made acquainted with the glorious result of my operations on that day against the Sikh army, calculated from all credible reports at 60,000 men of all arms and 59 pieces of artillery, under the command of Sirdar Chutter Sing and Rajah Shere Sing, with a body of 1500 Affghan horse led by Akram Khan, son of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan; a result, my Lord, glorious indeed for the ever victorious army of India! The ranks of the enemy broken, their position carried, their guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and baggage captured, their flying masses driven before the victorious pursuers from mid-day to dusk, receiving most severe punishment in their flight; and, my lord, with gratitude to a merciful Providence, I have the satisfaction of adding, that

notwithstanding the obstinate resistance of the enemy, this triumphant success, this brilliant victory has been achieved with comparatively little loss on our side.

The number of guns taken in action and captured in the line of pursuit, I now find to be fifty-three (53).

The official report made by the adjutant-general of the army on the 20th instant, will have informed your Lordship that I had directed Brigadier-General the Honourable H. Dundas to join me by forced marches, and that I had closed up to so short a distance of the Sikh army, that they could not possibly attempt the passage of the Chenab, in order to put into execution their avowed determination of moving upon Lahore, make a retrograde movement by the Kooree Pass (the only practicable one for guns), or indeed quit their position, without my being able to attack them and defeat their movement.

On the 18th instant Brigadier Markham had proceeded from Ramnugger up the left bank of the river to Kanokee, to which I had directed forty-seven boats to be sent up. On the morning of the 20th this officer crossed the Chenab, by my instructions, and joined me at eleven o'clock A.M. At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Byrne was directed to move down the left bank, from the position he held in front of Wuzeerabad with two corps of infantry and four guns, leaving two regiments of irregular cavalry to watch the fords, and to prevent any marauding parties or bodies of the routed enemy from effecting a passage.

On the same day a reconnoissance was made of the enemy's position, and it was ascertained that their camp nearly encircled the town of Goojerat, their regular troops being placed immediately fronting us between the town and a deep water-course, the dry bed of the River Dwara. This nullah, which is very tortuous, passing round nearly two sides of the town of Goojerat—diverging to a considerable distance on the north and west faces, and then taking a southerly direction, running through the centre of the ground, I occupied at

Shadiwal. Thus the enemy's position on the right was greatly strengthened, the nullah giving cover to his infantry in front of his guns, whilst another deep, though narrow wet nullah running from the east of the town and falling into the Chenab, in the direction of Wuzeerabad, covered his left.

The ground between these nullahs, for a space of nearly three miles, being well calculated for the operations of all arms, and presenting no obstacle to the movement of my heavy guns, I determined to make my principal attack in that direction and dispose my force accordingly.

On the extreme left I placed the Bombay column, commanded by the Honourable H. Dundas, supported by Brigadier White's brigade of cavalry and the Scinde horse, under Sir Joseph Thackwell, to protect the left and to prevent large bodies of Sikh and Affghan cavalry from turning that flank: with this cavalry I placed Captains Duncan and Huish's troops of horse artillery, whilst the infantry was covered by the Bombay troop of horse artillery under Major Blood.

On the right of the Bombay column, and with its right resting on the nullah, I placed Brigadier-General Campbell's division of infantry, covered by No. 5 and No. 10 light field batteries, under Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, having Brigadier Hoggan's brigade of infantry in reserve.

Upon the right of the nullah, I placed the infantry division of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, the heavy guns, eighteen in number, under Majors Day and Horsford, with Captain Shakespear and Brevet-Major Sir Richmond Shakespear, commanding batteries, being disposed in two divisions upon the flanks of his left brigade.

This line was prolonged by Major-General Whish's division of infantry, with one brigade of infantry under Brigadier Markham in support of second line, and the whole covered by three troops of horse artillery; Major Fordyce's, Captain Mackenzie's, and Anderson's, No. 17 light field battery, under Captain Dawes, with Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's and

Captain Kinleside's troops of horse artillery, in a second line in reserve under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

My right flank was protected by Brigadiers Hearsay's and Lockwood's brigades of cavalry, with Captain Warner's troop of horse artillery.

The 5th and 6th Light Cavalry, with the Bombay light field battery, and the 45th and 69th Regiments, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Mercer, most effectually protected my rear and baggage.

With my right wing I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy's line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss and in co-operation with the right to double upon the centre the wing of the enemy's force opposed to them.

At half-past seven o'clock the army advanced in the order described with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery, covered by skirmishers.

The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effect.

The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity, and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position; but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement by my artillery as before.

The village of Burra-kabra, the left one of those of that name, in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert's advance, and was carried in the most brilliant style by a spirited attack of the 3rd Brigade under Brigadier Penny, consisting of the 2nd Europeans, 31st and 70th Regi-

ments of Native Infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with great slaughter.

A very spirited and successful movement was also made about the same time against a heavy body of the enemy's troops, in and about second or Chota-kabra, by part of Brigadier Hervey's Brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Franks of Her Majesty's 10th Foot.

The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse artillery and light field batteries, which I strengthened by bringing to the front the two reserved troops of horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Brind, Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse artillery, broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced and drove the enemy before it; the nullah was cleared, several villages stormed, the guns that were in position carried, the camp captured, and the enemy routed in every direction! The right wing and Brigadier-General Campbell's division passing in pursuit to the eastward—the Bombay column to the westward of the town.

The retreat of the Sikh army thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight, all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles, their track strewed with their wounded, their arms, and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers.

Throughout the operations thus detailed, the cavalry brigades on the flanks were threatened, and occasionally attacked, by vast masses of the enemy's cavalry, which were, in every instance, put to flight by the steady movements and spirited manœuvres of our cavalry, most zealously and judiciously supported by the troops of horse artillery attached to them, from whom the enemy received the severest punishment.

On the left, a most successful and gallant charge was made upon the Affghan cavalry and a large body of Goorchurras, by the Scinde Horse and a party of the 9th Lancers, when some standards were captured.

The determined front shown by the 14th Light Dragoons and the other cavalry regiments on the right, both regular and irregular, completely overawed the enemy, and contributed much to the success of the day; the conduct of all in following up the fugitive enemy was beyond all praise.

A competent force, under the command of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, resumed the pursuit towards the Jhelum on the following morning, with a view of cutting off the enemy from the only practicable gun road to the Jhelum. Another division of infantry, under Brigadier-General Campbell, advanced on the road to Bimber, scouring the country in that direction to prevent their carrying off the guns by that route, and a body of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, successfully pushed on several miles into the hills and twenty-four from Goojerat, accompanied by that most energetic political officer, Captain Nicholson, for the same purpose, whilst I remained in possession of the field for the purpose of supporting these operations, covering the fords of the Chenab, and destroying the vast magazine of ammunition left scattered in all directions. I am happy to add, that these combinations have been entirely successful, the detached parties coming at every step on the wreck of the dispersed and flying foe.

Having thus endeavoured to convey to your Lordship the particulars of the operations of the battle of "Goojerat," I beg now to offer my heartfelt congratulations to your Lordship, and to the Government of India, upon this signal victory achieved under the blessing of Divine Providence by the united efforts and indomitable gallantry of the noble army under my command, a victory, my Lord, as glorious to the army that gained it, as it must be satisfactory to yourself and the Government of India, from the very important and decisive results to be expected from it.

It is quite impossible for me sufficiently to express my admiration of the gallant and steady conduct of the officers and men, as well Native as European, upon this occasion.

The brilliant service they have performed in so signally defeating so vastly a superior force, amongst whom were the élite of the old Khalsa army, making a last, united, and desperate struggle, will speak for itself, and will, I am confident, be justly estimated by your Lordship.

I cannot too strongly express to your Lordship my deep sense of obligation to the general officers and brigadier-generals in command of divisions, who so ably carried out my views and directed the operations of their troops on this day.

I beg to annex for your Lordship's information the reports I have received from them, and to bring most prominently to your Lordship's notice the brigadiers commanding brigades; the commanding officers of regiments and of troops of horse artillery and light field batteries, and the several officers of the divisional and brigade staff enumerated in these reports, in terms of such just commendation.

I feel much indebted to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, for the able and judicious manner he manœuvred the cavalry with horse artillery attached, on the left, keeping in check the immensely superior force of the enemy, whose main object was to turn my flanks. I am also greatly indebted to this tried and gallant officer for his valuable assistance and untiring exertions throughout the present and previous operations as second in command with his force.

To Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, whose services upon this, as on all former occasions, were invaluable, and ever marked by energy, zeal, and devotion; as well as to Major-General Whish, Brigadier-Generals Campbell and Dundas, for their able assistance, I am deeply indebted.

To Brigadier-General Tennant, commanding that splendid arm the artillery, to whose irresistible power I am mainly indebted for the glorious victory of Goojerat, I am indeed

most grateful. Conspicuous as the artillery has ever proved itself, never was its superiority over that of the enemy, its irresistible and annihilating power, more truthfully shown than in this battle. The heavy batteries manœuvred with the celerity of light guns; and the rapid advance, the scientific and judicious selection of points of attack, the effective and well-directed fire of the troops of horse artillery and light field batteries, merit my warmest praise; and I beg most earnestly to recommend their brave and gallant commanders, with the several officers named in Brigadier-General Tennant's report, to your Lordship's most favourable notice.

From Brigadier Cheape, the chief engineer, and the talented officers in that department as named in the Brigadier's report, I have received the most valuable assistance in reconnoitring the enemy's position and on the field of battle. The Sappers and Pioneers, under that most able officer, Captain Siddons, did excellent service, and were ever in front to overcome any obstacle to the advance of the artillery.

To the officers of the general staff of Her Majesty's service, Major Lugard, acting adjutant-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gough, quartermaster-general of Her Majesty's troops in India, my best thanks are due; their exertions upon the present occasion and throughout the recent operations were most valuable, and I beg to bring them under your Lordship's favourable notice. I am equally indebted to Captain Otter, acting assistant adjutant-general of Her Majesty's forces, for his valuable services.

To the officers of the general staff of the army, Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, adjutant-general, and Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, quartermaster-general, whose most onerous and very important duties have invariably been conducted to my entire satisfaction, I am under the greatest obligation. Their valuable assistance in the field, and their indefatigable exertions throughout operations of no ordinary character, deserve my warmest thanks and your Lordship's approbation.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Birch, judge-advocate-general, I am much indebted for his assistance upon every occasion.

To Major Tucker, deputy adjutant-general, a most gallant, energetic, and valuable officer; to Lieutenant-Colonel Drummond, deputy quartermaster-general, whose services have been very praiseworthy; to Major Chester, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Tytler, assistant quartermaster-general; Lieutenant Johnston, deputy judge-advocate-general; Major G. Thompson, and Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis, assistant commissary-general; Captain C. Campbell, paymaster to the army, I offer my best thanks for their services whilst attending me in the field, and the efficient manner they have performed their several duties.

Mr. Franklin, inspector-general of Her Majesty's hospitals, has been unceasing in his exertions in rendering every aid to the sick and wounded of the Royal service, and giving the benefit of his long professional experience in such duties; as has Doctor Renny, superintending-surgeon of this army, who has been indefatigable in his professional exertions and well-organized medical arrangements.

I feel I cannot too prominently bring to notice the valuable exertions of Doctor Mac Rae, field-surgeon, and of the medical officers of the army generally; they have been most unwearied and praiseworthy.

To Captain Ramsay, deputy commissary-general, and to the officers of his department, I am much indebted, and feel grateful for their unceasing and successful exertions amidst all difficulties to supply the troops, and thus preserve the efficiency of the army.

The officers of my personal staff have well merited my best thanks and your lordship's favourable notice. Captain Haines, military secretary, who has rendered me most valuable aid; Brevet-Major Bates, A.D.C.; Lieutenant A. Bagot, A.D.C.; Lieutenant S. J. Hire, A.D.C.; Captain Gabbett, A.D.C.; Lieutenant G. Hardinge, A.D.C.; and Lieutenant W. G. Prendergast, my Persian interpreter.

I beg also to acknowledge the valuable assistance I have received from the political officers, Major Mackeson, Mr. Cocks, Captain Nicholson, and Lieutenant Robison, both in the field and throughout the operations. I regret to add that Mr. Cocks was seriously wounded during the action in a rencontre with a Sikh horseman.

I would also bring to your Lordship's notice the name of Lieutenant Stannus, of the 5th Light Cavalry; this officer has commanded the cavalry party attached to my escort throughout the operations to my entire satisfaction. He was severely wounded on the 21st, when gallantly charging a party of the enemy's horsemen.

Major Anstruther, of the Madras Artillery, Lieutenant Mayne, of the Madras Cavalry, and Captain Showers, of the 14th Native Infantry, attended me in the field.

I have most unwillingly been delayed from sooner forwarding this despatch, from the circumstance of having only this day received Brigadier-General the Honourable H. Dundas' report, and some of the casualty returns have not even yet reached me. As soon as the whole come in, a full amended general return shall be transmitted without loss of time for your Lordship's information.

I have the pleasure to inclose a plan of the battle of Goojerat. Also a return of the captured ordnance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GOUGH, General,
Commander-in-chief in India.

P.S.—The casualty lists having arrived, I have the honour to inclose the return of killed and wounded, which I am sorry to see is so much heavier than I at first anticipated. Several of these were occasioned by accidental explosions of the enemy's tumbrils and magazines after the action.

G.

*To Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General
of the Army.*

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, that the Bengal Artillery of the army of the Punjaub were allotted, as follows, during the action of yesterday:—

Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant,

1st troop, 3rd brigade, Captain W. R. Warner. Attached to Brigadier Lockwood's cavalry brigade, on the right.

Major Garbett.

4th troop, 1st brigade, Captain M. Mackenzie. 4th troop, 3rd brigade, Captain J. Anderson. With the 1st division of Infantry, commanded by Major-General W. S. Whish, C.B.

2nd troop, 2nd brigade, Major D. Fordyce. No. 17 light field battery, Captain M. Dawes. With the 2nd Infantry division, commanded by Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B.

Major Mowatt.

No. 5 light field battery, Major E. Ludlow. No. 10 light field battery, Lieutenant Robertson. With the 3rd division of Infantry, under Brigadier-General Campbell, C.B.

4th troop, 2nd brigade, Captain F. Duncan. 1st troop, 2nd brigade, Captain A. Huish. With Brigadier M. White's cavalry brigade on the left.

Lieutenant-Colonel Brind.

2nd troop, 3rd brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Lane, C.B. 3rd troop, 2nd brigade, Captain R. Kinleside, composing the reserve under Brigadier G. Brooke, C.B.

Brigadier E. Huthwaite, C.B.

Major Horsford.

Four 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, drawn by elephants, Major Sir R. Shakespear.

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, drawn by elephants, Captain J. Shakespear.

Major E. Day.

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, Captain E. Masters.

Two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, Captain E. Austin, who, being unable from his wound to accompany his own battery, No. 10, did duty with the heavy guns.

These batteries engaged in action by those attached to the 1st and 2nd divisions, advancing within about 600 yards, and the heavy guns within 800 or 1000 yards of the enemy's artillery, on which they opened their fire about 9 o'clock A.M.; shortly after the action commenced, an opportunity was observed of enfilading one of the enemy's batteries, when the reserve artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel F. Brind was advanced, and placed by Brigadier G. Brooke, C.B., so as to do so. The batteries of the 3rd division engaged as they came up, and those with the cavalry brigades supported their movements as opportunity offered. Nearly the whole engagement being a cannonade, no movement of importance took place among the batteries, which maintained their fire until half past eleven A.M., when many of the enemy's guns were observed to be dismounted and their line broke, and an advance was ordered in pursuit.

I have the honour to state for the Commander-in-chief's information, my perfect satisfaction with the professional exertions of the officers and my high approbation of the steady conduct of both officers and men during the day.

To Brigadiers Brooke, C.B., and Huthwaite, C.B., in general direction of the horse and foot artillery respectively under my orders, Lieutenant-Colonel C. Grant and E. Brind, Majors R. Horsford, E. F. Day, and J. L. Mowatt, all of whom held commands, as well as to all the officers commanding troops and batteries above enumerated, I have to acknowledge by best thanks for their exertions by which these results were obtained. To the divisional staff, Captain J. Abercrombie, deputy assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant H. Tombs, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, and to Lieutenant H. A. Olpherts, my aide-de-camp, I am

much indebted for their exertions, and also to Captain C. Hogge, the commissary, and Lieutenant P. Christie, deputy commissary of ordnance, for their excellent arrangement of their department as well as for their assistance in the field.

Brigadiers Brooke and Huthwaite mention their majors of brigade, Lieutenant C. V. Cox and Lieutenant E. Kaye respectively, as having afforded them able assistance. I have great pleasure finally particularly to bring to his Excellency's notice, the zeal and attention of Mr. Deputy Commissary Spencer during the day, and beg to recommend that old and deserving warrant officer to his kind consideration.

(Signed) J. TENNANT, Brigadier-General,
Commanding Artillery Division,
Army of the Punjaub.

Camp Goojerat, the 22nd February, 1849.

*To Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General
of the Army.*

Head Quarters, Camp Goojerat,
February 26, 1849.

Sir,—In reference to general orders of the 21st instant, I beg to submit for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, a report on the conduct of the engineer department, during the late operations and the engagement of the 21st.

Major Napier, attended by Lieutenant Greatheat, and Major Tremenheere, attended by Lieutenant Glover, were employed on the 21st, the former with the right, the latter with the left column of attack, and were very useful from their previous examination of the ground, and in particular of the position of the nullah on our right flank.

Captain Western, Lieutenants Goodwyn, Crommeline, and Taylor accompanied me, and to all those officers, my acknowledgments are due for conveying communications, and obtaining information on every point required during the day.

I have also the gratification to report to his Excellency, the zealous and able manner in which Captain Cunningham and Lieutenant C. Paton performed the duty assigned to them, of bringing up the fleet of boats ordered by his Excellency from Ramnugger, and placing them so as to enable the portion of the army on the other side of the Chenab to co-operate and to come up: the former officer arrived before the close of the action, and joined Brigadier-General Campbell's division.

The other officers of engineers were detached with the different divisions of the army, and no mention of these officers is needed from me, as whatever service they may have had an opportunity of rendering will be more appropriately reported to his Excellency, or acknowledged by the general officers commanding each division.

Captain Siddons, commanding the Sappers and Pioneers, was attached to the heavy guns, with a portion of his corps, the remainder being detached by companies to the different divisions. Such duty as was required from them, I need hardly say was effectively performed; and I trust it may not be considered by his Lordship out of place, my mentioning here the gallant behaviour and unwearied exertion displayed by these men throughout the present service. I allude, in particular, to the siege operations at Mooltan, and the conduct of that portion of the corps who were employed there.

Prior to the engagement on the 21st instant, the officers of engineers were employed in collecting information and in surveying and reconnoitering; and it is due to Captain Longden, of H.M.'s 10th regiment, who is attached to the engineer department, as surveyor and field engineer, to state the very able assistance he has rendered in all these duties during the whole operations, since I have joined the army.

I beg to add, that I am much indebted to Lieutenant J. H. Maxwell, for the very zealous performance of his duties on all occasions, as major of brigade of engineers; and to Lieutenant J. E. Cracroft, brigade quartermaster, my acknow-

ledgments are also due. And I hope I may be permitted to recommend to his Excellency's favour Lieutenant Hutchinson, of engineers, a very promising young officer, who has been lately acting as my aide-de-camp, and who was very severely wounded on the 21st instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. CHEAPE, Brigadier,
Chief Engineer, Army of Punjaub.

*From Major-General Sir J. Thackwell, K.C.B., and K.H.,
commanding Cavalry Division, to Lieutenant-Colonel
Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.*

Head-Quarters, dated Camp Goojerat,
Feb. 25, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, the operations of the division of cavalry under my command, in the battle fought on the 21st instant, near the town of Goojerat.

The left column of cavalry, under the command of Brigadier White, C.B., consisting of the troops named in the margin,* was assembled in column of troops at half distance, right in front at deploying interval, on the left of the Bombay column of infantry, at seven o'clock in the morning.

The right column, composed of troops named in the margin,†

* Left Column. 1st Brigade of Cavalry.

Brigadier White, C.B., commanding. H.M.'s 3rd Dragoons, Major Yerbury; H.M.'s 9th Lancers, Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton; 8th Light Cavalry, Major Mackenzie; Scinde Horse, Captain Malcolm; Captain Duncan's Troop Horse Artillery; Captain Huish's Troop Horse Artillery.

† Right Column. 2nd Brigade of Cavalry.

Brigadier Lockwood, C.B., commanding. H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, Lieutenant-Colonel King; 1st Light Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford; 2 Risallahs 11th Irregular Cavalry, Captain Masters; 2 Ris-

under the command of Brigadiers Hearsey, and Lockwood, C.B., were formed in column left in front at the same hour.

The 3rd division of infantry and the Bombay brigade, all on the left of the nullah, leading towards Goojerat, being under my immediate superintendence, I remained on the left flank of the army; and I make no doubt Brigadier-Generals Dundas and Campbell have made you fully acquainted with the operations of the troop under their command.

On approaching the village of Nurrawalla, just without the range of the enemy's batteries, the infantry deployed into line, and Brigadier White formed his cavalry in front of that village with its left back, and parallel to a gentle rising of the ground, on which was posted the enemy's right, consisting of a large body of Affghans and Goorchurra horse. From this position a fire of round shot was opened, and the enemy's cavalry extended to the right, so as to threaten to turn our left flank. To oppose the enemy's guns, I ordered Captain Duncan to move his troop of horse artillery to the front, which he did in good style, and opened his fire within 500 or 600 yards. This movement was followed by the advance of Captain Huish's troop; and both did considerable execution upon the enemy, but did not prevent the attempt of the Affghans to outflank our left. The Scinde Horse were on the left of my line; and I ordered them to advance with a squadron of the 9th Lancers, under Captain Campbell, a part of the former to be in reserve, and supported by a squadron of the 9th Lancers under Major Grant, C.B., in échelon on the right. These troops made a most brilliant charge upon the enemy, at the same time I advanced the guns and cavalry towards the enemy's line. The fire of the guns soon put the Goorchurras

allahs 14th Irregular Cavalry, Lieutenant Roberts; Captain Warner's Troop Horse Artillery.

4th Brigade Cavalry.

Brigadier Hearsey, commanding. 3rd Irregular Cavalry, Major Tait, C.B.; 9th Irregular Cavalry, Major Christie. The 5th and 6th Light Cavalry were left in the rear to protect the baggage.

in retreat, and the glorious charge of the troops on the left caused their whole force to seek safety in retreat by the Burradurree. A gun was captured during these proceedings; but as we were then considerably in advance of the left of the infantry—although Captain Duncan was enabled to enfilade a battery opposed to them—and ignorant of the force the enemy might have between the Burradurree and the town, a space covered with trees, it became necessary to proceed with caution; yet I soon was enabled to open a fire upon the enemy, both on the right and left of the former place, which caused them considerable loss, and hastened their retreat.

I may here observe, that all the enemy's tents were left standing near the Burradurree, and on the Sikh right of the town, with probably much baggage in them, all of which were probably plundered by the camp-followers.

The enemy being now in full retreat, I moved Brigadier White's brigade well to the left front, and soon forced the enemy from the Jhelum road, and eventually from that of Beembur, also cutting off large bodies of the enemy, much baggage and many guns, which were secured by this brigade, as well as the troops of the 2nd and 4th brigades, which had been ordered to join in the pursuit. At twenty minutes past four P.M., none of the enemy being in sight, and being, as was said by the villagers, nine or ten miles from Goojerat, I discontinued the pursuit, and returned to camp at this place. In this pursuit Captains Duncan and Huish's troops of artillery, latterly joined by Major Leeson and Major Blood's troop of the same arm, brought their guns to bear upon the enemy with good effect on several occasions, and their advance was as rapid as the intersected nature of the ground (by nullahs) would admit, and the 9th Lancers and 8th Light Cavalry made gallant attempts to close with the enemy's cavalry, which, however, were frustrated by the rapid retreat of the latter, yet a great number of the enemy were slain by this brigade in the pursuit. I witnessed the activity of Captain Unett, and part of his squadron of the 3rd Light Dragoons,

and Brigadier White mentions that the whole of that regiment was actively engaged in this work of retribution.

Being an eye-witness to all the movements of the 1st Brigade, I have great satisfaction in stating that Brigadier White conducted them very much to my satisfaction. I am also well satisfied with the manner in which Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton, Majors Yerbury and Mackenzie, commanded their respective regiments, and in which Major Grant supported the charge of cavalry on the left. The charge of the Scinde Horse reflects the highest credit on Captain Malcolm, and I have great pleasure in having witnessed the gallant bearing of all the officers and men of this brigade during the operations of the day; and I feel sure that their only regret was that the enemy's cavalry so often declined the attack.

To Captains Duncan and Huish and Majors Leeson and Blood, I am much indebted for the manner in which they brought their guns into action whenever an opportunity occurred, and the steadiness and good conduct of both officers and men were very conspicuous.

I have now the pleasing duty to state, that I have received every assistance and support from my deputy assistant adjutant-general, Captain Pratt, on the present occasion, as well as during the campaign. To my deputy assistant quartermaster-general, Lieutenant Tucker, I am greatly indebted for his zeal, activity, intelligence, and successful endeavours to procure intelligence of the movements of the enemy during the operations; he as well as my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Thackwell, Lieutenant Young, of the Engineers, Lieutenant Carter, of the Pioneers, and Cornet Beatson, of the 6th Light Cavalry, accompanied me during the battle, and afforded me essential service in carrying my orders on various occasions during the operations of the day.

Brigadier White states how greatly he was satisfied with the conduct of his brigade-major, Captain Cautley, and the whole of the officers and men of his brigade.

As the operations of the 2nd and 4th brigades of cavalry did not come under my observations, except towards the latter end of the pursuit, I have the honour to forward Brigadier Lockwood's report, and it would appear therefrom that he conducted his brigade judiciously; and I am gratified to learn that both officers and men behaved greatly to his satisfaction, and that the 14th Light Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry conducted themselves gallantly, and evinced every anxiety to close with the enemy. I am happy to observe that the brigadier has mentioned with great approbation the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonels Bradford and King, in command of their regiments; and I cannot avoid here stating, for the information of his Lordship, that I observed with much satisfaction the zeal and judgment evinced by both officers, when in command of considerable bodies of cavalry detached from the camp at Chillianwallah on important duties.

I regret that I have not yet received any report from Brigadier Harsey, or return of casualties from his brigade, or the Scinde Horse: these will be forwarded when they arrive.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. THACKWELL,

Major-General Commanding Cavalry Division.

To the Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General.

Cavalry Division, Army of the Punjaub.

Camp Goojerat, February 22, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, commanding the cavalry division, that, on the morning of the 21st, I formed my brigade, as directed by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, on the right rear of the 1st Division of Infantry, and parallel to Brigadier Markham's reserve; advancing in this order until the enemy opened their fire.

I then deployed the brigade in the following manner:—In

the first line, five troops Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, two squadrons 1st Light Cavalry with the 1st Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery on the left, escorted by a troop of the 14th and a Risallah 11th Irregular Cavalry. In support, the remainder of the 11th Irregular Cavalry, and in reserve, one squadron 14th and one squadron 1st Light Cavalry.

In the commencement of the action I directed Captain Warner to open his fire upon a large body of the enemy near a village in our front; but as they returned a heavy fire within accurate range I changed position left back, and the horse artillery ceased firing.

The enemy's horsemen now appeared in great force upon our right, threatening to turn our flank, so I changed front to the right, directing the reserve to retain its front, and communicate with the infantry.

Captain Warner's guns opened with great effect upon the horsemen, and turned them, but they only retired a short distance, and then a regiment of their regular cavalry moved round by a circuitous route, and got completely into our rear. I immediately detached towards them three guns with a squadron of the 14th, who, in conjunction with Major Christie's corps of irregular cavalry, drove them off.

About this time a large gal of horse came on towards me, and I prepared to charge, but as they turned at once from the fire of the guns, and as there was a nullah in our front, I refrained from advancing after them. The reserve also now advanced in support of Colonel Hervey's brigade of infantry.

I then received orders from the Commander-in-chief to bring on the brigade, which I did, and followed in pursuit of the enemy, until I found myself parallel to the cavalry under the Major-General, when I placed myself in communication with him.

In the pursuit, the 14th Dragoons and 1st Light Cavalry cut down or shot a considerable number of the Sikh infantry, both regular and irregular, and Corporal William Pain, of

the 14th Dragoons, captured a red silk standard, killing, in single combat, the horseman who bore it.

I beg to state to the major-general, that I had the greatest satisfaction in witnessing the steadiness of the troops composing the brigade, in performing several manœuvres under a heavy fire of artillery.

My best thanks are due to Captain Warner, horse artillery, for the able and efficient manner in which he employed his guns; also to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradford, commanding the 1st Light Cavalry; Lieutenant-Colonel King, 14th Light Dragoons; Captain Masters, 11th Irregular Cavalry; and Lieutenant Roberts, 14th Irregular Cavalry; and Lieutenant-Colonel Doherty, who commanded the reserve.

I am also under the greatest obligations to my brigade-major, Captain Yule, 9th Lancers, for the essential assistance he rendered me, not only during the action, but during the period I have commanded the 2nd brigade.

(Signed) C. H. Lockwood,
Commanding 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

To Captain Pratt, Assistant Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division.

Camp near Korie, February 23, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to report to Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B., and K.H., commanding the cavalry division of the army of the Punjaub, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, that agreeable to instructions received from Captain Pratt, assistant adjutant-general, cavalry division, I joined at about half-past eight on the morning of the 21st instant, the brigade of cavalry on the right, under Brigadier Lockwood, with the 3rd and 9th Irregular Cavalry; and as senior cavalry officer in the field on that flank, I assumed command of the whole of

that arm as detailed in the margin,* and a troop of horse artillery under Captain Warner. Soon after, the action commenced by a cannonade, and heavy bodies of horse, amongst them apparently a regular regiment, showed in our front. The cavalry under my command advanced towards them, and the troop of horse artillery was sent to the front with its supports (a squadron of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons and a squadron of irregular horse), and opened a well-directed fire of round shot and shrapnell, which made the enemy fall back to a respectable distance. On this, very numerous bodies of horse went off to our right, apparently with the intention of turning that flank. I manœuvred to the right with the irregular brigade and kept them in check. About this time I received orders from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief not to separate the left of the cavalry too far from the column of infantry advancing in that direction. I was therefore necessitated to close to the left, which I did with Brigadier Lockwood's brigade. At the same time as they again pressed on my right, I ordered three guns to support it, the fire from which made the enemy again draw off. I now observed it was their determination to turn the right, and as I had been joined by Colonel Doherty with two squadrons, I placed him to fill the gap on my left, and ordered Brigadier Lockwood's brigade and three guns to join the irregulars on that flank. This checked the enemy, but a very large body now advanced on the space on our

* Brigadier Lockwood's Brigade:—

H.M.'s 14th Dragoons.

1st Light Cavalry.

Captain Warner's Troop Horse Artillery.

Captain Fordyce's, at the end of the action.

Irregular Brigade.

3rd Irregular Cavalry.

9th Irregular Cavalry.

11th Irregular Cavalry.

13th Irregular Cavalry, 1st squadron.

left, I immediately opposed it with the irregular brigade and Brigadier Lockwood's with a half-battery, and the enemy was again foiled, but they perceiving I had only the artillery supports and a rissalah of horse under the command of Lieutenant Robarts on my extreme right, made a last effort to turn it.

This was promptly met by the 3rd and 9th Irregulars being sent in that direction, the 9th advancing to meet them with the half-battery; thus foiled, they returned to our left, Major Christie following their movement. This was their last attempt, a troop of horse artillery with supports of one squadron of 9th Irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, pushed to the front and got under the fire of their artillery, when several men and horses suffered from round shot. It was now apparent from the distance of the sound of our guns, that the enemy were in retreat and Major Mackeson informed me it was his Excellency the Commander-in-chief's wish, that all the cavalry should pursue and prevent the enemy carrying off their guns; I immediately directed Brigadier Lockwood's brigade to take a sweep to the right and pushed on myself with the 3rd Irregulars and Lieutenant Robarts' rissalah with Captain Warner's troop of horse artillery, the 9th Irregulars and 11th under Captain Masters, following as soon as they could get clear of a deep and quaggy nullah, and we perceived the enemy in full retreat, after a canter of four miles. The artillery opened upon the masses of men, whilst the cavalry advanced on the flank and overtook them near the village of Runnewall, where a great many of the Bunnoo troops were sabred and shot. In this manner the pursuit continued until a deep nullah prevented the horse artillery getting on without delay. Here I left them with two squadrons and pushed on again, overtaking another body and punishing them. I detached Captain Biddulph with half a rissalah to ascertain the cause of a heavy cloud of dust to our left. He reported it was Sir J. Thackwell's division, and I soon after heard his battery of horse artillery open.

Both divisions of cavalry were now closing on the enemy, and Captain Biddulph was so fortunate as to capture five guns, and Major Christie another, that had been left in a nullah by the retreating foe. (Major Christie informs me that this gun would have been left behind if he had not made great exertions in having it brought into camp. He disclaims the capture of it.—J. B. H.) The pursuit continued to the village of Sainthul, when I met and reported to Sir J. Thackwell, and from whence we returned to camp. The distance the cavalry under my command went over in pursuit was fifteen miles. We did not get to the camp of the irregulars, near the Baradurree of Goojerat, until ten o'clock at night, and had thus been fifteen hours on horseback.

I have every reason to be pleased with the conduct of all the officers under my command. Some difference arose as to carrying my orders into effect by Brigadier Lockwood, in consequence of his receiving directions from supreme authority, of which I was not at the time aware, but I found him most zealous and desirous of having an opportunity to charge the enemy at the head of Her Majesty's 14th Dragoons. The conduct of that regiment throughout the day was most exemplary and steady, and I have not the least doubt, had an opportunity occurred, it would have been most eagerly seized, to the utter destruction of any body opposed to it. Brigadier Lockwood's report will bear testimony to the energy of the officers commanding regiments in his brigade, as I do most assuredly of those officers commanding and in the regiments of irregular cavalry. My thanks are due to Major Tait, C.B., commanding 3rd Irregulars, Major Christie, commanding 9th Irregulars, Captain Masters, commanding 11th Irregulars, and Lieutenant Robarts, commanding a rissalah of the 14th Irregulars. The conduct of the horse artillery was beyond all praise, and I feel much indebted to Captain Warner, his officers and men, for the able manner in which that noble arm was employed.

I feel myself much indebted also to Lieutenant Neville Chamberlain, Brigade-Major 4th Brigade Irregular Cavalry, for his assistance in the field during the forenoon, which I cannot too much appreciate, and for the example he set in several hand-to-hand affairs with a furious and exasperated enemy during the pursuit. Lieutenant Crawford Chamberlain, second in command 9th Irregular Horse, although still suffering from his wound, was present with the regiment the whole day, thus showing his usual energy.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, 9th Irregulars, also brought to my notice the steadiness of a squadron of that regiment when under severe artillery fire, by which one sowar was killed and several men and horses wounded.

I shall forward a list of casualties as soon as I can get them from the different officers in command of regiments and parties, but from the constant marching we have had since the battle of Goojerat, and the inclement weather we are now enduring, I have not as yet been able to get them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. B. HEARSEY,
Brigadier 4th Brigade,

Commanding Cavalry on the Right Flank of the Army.

P.S.—I have just got the return of casualties of the 3rd and 9th Irregular Cavalry, which I have the honour to inclose.

To the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-quarters, Camp Goojerat,
February 22, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, that the 1st infantry division, with horse artillery attached (as detailed per margin* from right to left), marched at about half-past

* 4th Troop 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.—Captain Mc Kenzie.

1st Infantry Brigade.—52nd Native Infantry; H.M.'s 10th Foot; 8th Native Infantry.

seven A.M. yesterday, the 1st brigade commanded by Brigadier Harvey, in quarter distance column of regiments, right in front, at deploying distance, with a troop of native horse artillery on either flank, drawn up in corresponding order.

The 2nd brigade in reserve, commanded by Brigadier Markham, and three to four hundred yards in rear, proceeded in contiguous quarter distance columns.

After advancing about two miles or more, the enemy opened their fire, and after the army had made some further progress, both brigades, agreeably to his Lordship's orders (and taken up from the left), deployed, the horse artillery conforming thereto. Immediately afterwards the troops of horse artillery and skirmishers (of the 1st brigade) were ordered to the front, the latter at 300 yards distance. I then requested Brigadier Markham to take ground on the left, that the interval made by the advance of Captain Anderson's four guns might be covered by the 72nd Native Infantry. Both troops began a spirited cannonade and continued it for about three hours, at the rate of forty rounds per gun per hour, until the enemy's guns in our front (like those, I believe, in front of every part of the line through a similar treatment) were silenced.

During the cannonade, on first receiving an order for the further advance of both troops, I learnt from Major Garbett who was in command of them, that the guns in our left front had had so many horses killed and disabled, that they must await the arrival of others from the rear, which I observed were making quick progress to their troop; and which shortly afterwards, I regret to say, lost its gallant captain, who was mortally wounded by a cannon-ball. The duties continued, however, to be efficiently prosecuted under the superintend-

4th Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery.—Captain J. Anderson (except two guns at Wuzerabad).

3rd Company of Pioneers.—Lieutenant McMullin. In reserve.

2nd Infantry Brigade.—51st Native Infantry; H.M.'s 32nd Foot; 72nd Native Infantry.

ence of Lieutenants Francis and Mecham, to the former of whom the command immediately devolved.

After this, both troops being well advanced to the front, and the enemy making one or two threatening demonstrations, I thought it right to make a requisition in the cavalry for a small detachment for their protection, which was promptly complied with by Brigadier Lockwood.

On the advance of the line being directed, the right brigade found the enemy's infantry in great force in its front, with a strong body of cavalry on their left, which rendered it necessary for Brigadier Hervey to make a short flank movement to the right, and throw back the 52nd Native Infantry, in order to counteract any attack the enemy might have in contemplation.

As this unavoidably caused a great gap in the line, I thought it advisable to direct Brigadier Markham at once to occupy it by his brigade, which was accordingly done, and the arrangement immediately reported to his Excellency. The enemy were otherwise preparing to take advantage of this opening, but on seeing the 2nd Brigade advancing to it, halted and gave a few rounds of grape and matchlock fire, which was returned with full effect by file firing from the right divisions and Lieutenant Francis's guns, which latter were being replenished with ammunition, and for the moment in rear of the infantry. Lieutenant Need, aide-de-camp, on noticing the enemy's cavalry and infantry immediately in front of the 2nd Brigade, had made known the same to Lieutenants Francis and Mecham, who, on his suggestion, instantly galloped to the front through an interval made for the purpose by Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, and with a few rounds of grape, co-operated with the infantry (who were advancing to charge) in sending back the enemy in great confusion.

In the flank movement by the 1st Brigade, already adverted to, and which, under a heavy fire from the enemy, of round, grape, and matchlock, with the reformation to line (on disco-

vering that the enemy did not make the anticipated attack) was effected in the most steady and orderly manner. Captain Mackenzie, by his able and judicious co-operation, made his troop particularly useful, and on the enemy's declining to receive the charge of Her Majesty's 10th and the 8th and 52nd Native Infantry, poured in such a continued fire of shrapnell and round upon their retiring masses, as, with what had occurred from the 2nd brigade, effectually to prevent any further threat or molestation to the division under my command, and as far as I could observe, every part of the line had been equally successful in defeating the purposes of the enemy, who, long before noon, must have discovered that the entire loss of their guns, ammunition, camp equipage, and cattle, was inevitable.

On reaching Goojerat, the 2nd brigade, agreeably to his Lordship's orders, commenced collecting the enemy's abandoned guns, nineteen of which were sent in by them forthwith, and occupied the town with the following details, under Major Case, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment (which was afterwards reinforced by the 36th Regiment Native Infantry).

Two Companies H. M.'s 32nd Regiment under Captain Pigott.

Two Companies 51st Regiment Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Wallace.

Possession of the eight gates was first taken, and then of the fort, where about eighty of the enemy laid down their arms, and were made over as prisoners to the 36th Regiment Native Infantry, with other small parties found in different parts of the town, that with few exceptions, made no resistance. The above four companies captured a gun, standard, and some horses, with the loss of one man killed of Her Majesty's 32nd, and an officer of the same corps wounded, Lieutenant Jeffry. The 1st brigade, on halting here, detached a subdivision of Her Majesty's 10th Regiment and the Grenadier Company of 52nd Native Infantry, to expel a party of 200 of the enemy in occupation of the temple and garden, in

rear of which the 8th Regiment Native Infantry is now encamped, which was effected with trifling loss on our side; but the enemy had 30 or 40 killed and wounded, and a great number taken prisoners.

It is particularly satisfactory to me to bring to the favourable notice of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief the conduct of the division under my command during the services of yesterday, performed under his Lordship's immediate orders and direction, and consisting of in fact, the Horse Artillery and Infantry of the (Bengal) Mooltan Field Force, with the exception of the 49th Regiment Native Infantry on detached duty. Brigadiers Hervey and Markham conducted their brigades, under the various circumstances of the day (some of which I have briefly specified), in a manner that merits the strongest commendation, and they were, as heretofore, admirably supported by the officers in command of regiments, viz.:

Lieutenant-Colonel Franks, C. B., H. M.'s 10th Regiment ; Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke, H. M.'s 32nd Regiment.

Major Farquharson, 8th Regiment Native Infantry, and, on his being severely wounded, Brevet Major Williams.

Brevet Major Griffin, 51st Regiment Native Infantry ; Captain Jamieson, 52nd ditto ; Captain Lloyd, 72nd ditto.

I cordially unite with both Brigadiers, in the expression of thanks to the above officers, for the intelligence and zeal with which they carried out their orders, and to all the officers and men under their command, for the steadiness and prompt obedience so uniformly evinced throughout the division.

Brigadier Hervey acknowledges the services of his Brigade-Major Captain Wiggins, in high terms of commendation ; and the active assistance he received throughout the day from Lieutenant B. Reid (34th Regiment Native Infantry), interpreter to Her Majesty's 10th Regiment ; as does Brigadier Markham those of his Brigade-Major Captain Balfour, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment (who has happily recovered from the wound he received in the action of the 12th September last),

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and of Ensign Fraser, 23rd Regiment, appointed acting interpreter of 40th Regiment Native Infantry, who is awaiting the arrival of his regiment from Mooltan, and who gladly made his services useful to the Brigadier.

To Major Garbett, commanding the Horse Artillery attached to my division, my best acknowledgments are due, for his unremitting attention to both troops under his command, and particularly in matters the officers commanding them were not so able of themselves to give directions about. He mentions in the highest terms (as does Brigadier Hervey) Captain Mackenzie and his troop, and notices that, after the lamented death of Captain J. Anderson, the four guns of his troop were well commanded by Lieutenant Francis; and I heartily concur in the testimony he bears to the admirable conduct of the officers and men of both troops, who worked their guns with a rapidity and precision that would have been impracticable except from their uniform coolness and steadiness under a heavy fire from the enemy at both positions, first at 1000 yards, and secondly at 500 yards. Major Garbett also notices in most favourable terms, the able assistance rendered him by Lieutenant De Tessier, Acting Adjutant, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant McMullin and his company of pioneers deserve much credit, having continued with the 4th Troop, 1st Brigade Horse Artillery, and rendered useful service whenever called upon.

Having but recently had my attention drawn to the circumstances I am about to mention, I think, in justice to the gallant officer affected by them, I may be permitted so to do though they refer to anterior conflicts with the enemy. On the 12th September last, after Lieutenant Colonel Pattoun was mortally wounded, the command of the six companies, Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, devolved on Major Inglis, and through the exertions of the gallant troops employed, the enemy's strong position was carried: and a similar result occurred on the 7th of November last, when, from Lieutenant

Colonel Brooke having the command of e of the two columns of attack, that of Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment again devolved on Major Inglis, whose conduct in that important trust was highly satisfactory to the brigadier commanding, and I have accordingly great satisfaction in soliciting the favourable notice of his Excellency to the same.

Major Napier (attended by Lieutenant Greathead), of Engineers, who was attached for the day to the two divisions on the right, aided me much by occasionally reconnoitring positions we were approaching; and in giving me the advantage of his reconnoissance of the preceding day. Captain Glasfurd and Lieutenant J. B. Smith, of Engineers, having been directed to join me, were extremely useful during the day; and I feel much indebted to both; as also to Captain Cheape (51st Native Infantry), late treasurer to the Mooltan Field Force, who attended me throughout, and for whom it was not difficult to find frequent and active employment.

Major Becher, assistant quartermaster-general, and Captain Whish, deputy assistant adjutant-general of the division, as also my aides-de-camp, Captain J. C. Kennedy, Her Majesty's 18th Foot, and Lieutenant A. Need, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, afforded me every assistance, and are entitled to my best thanks for their attention and zeal. The horse of the deputy assistant adjutant-general, from which he had just dismounted, having on the commencement of our cannonade been severely wounded by a cannon-shot, it was some time before another could join from the rear, and immediately a camel served him as a tolerable substitute.

I beg respectfully, in conclusion, to offer to the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief my hearty congratulations on the complete success of his Lordship's arrangements for the day, and on an issue, which, under Divine Providence, has been permitted to be most triumphant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. S. WHISH, Major-General,
Commanding 1st Infantry Division, Army of the Punjab.

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To Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant, C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

Camp Nowrungabad, Feb. 24, 1849.

Sir,—I have to apologize for the delay which has taken place in complying with general orders of the 21st instant, directing reports of the proceedings of the troops employed against the enemy to be forwarded for the information of his Excellency, the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief; but having been, as you are aware, constantly on the move since the morning after the action near Goojerat, in pursuit of the fugitive Sikh army, I have not had an opportunity of doing so.

I have now to report, for the information of his Lordship, the 2nd infantry division, consisting of the troops mentioned in the margin,* advanced from Shadawalla on the morning of the 21st instant, in line of quarter distance columns, at deploying distance, leaving a battery of heavy guns under Major Horsford, of artillery, between the two brigades, No. 17 light field battery under command of Captain Dawes, and, Brevet Major Fordyce's troop of horse artillery, between the right regiments of the left and right brigades respectively.

Having received orders to push forward my light troops, to force the enemy to show their position, I immediately advanced the troop of horse artillery and Dawes' light field battery, which instantly drew a very heavy and well-directed fire from two large batteries which the enemy had established on either side of the village of Kalerah, by which they were nearly screened from the fire of our guns, which, with the light companies, were then still further pushed forward, followed by the division which had deployed into line; the heavy guns in our centre, at this time, opening a very destructive cannonade. Up to this time the village above

* 3rd Brigade:—31st Native Infantry; 2nd European Regiment; 70th Native Infantry.

4th Brigade:—30th Native Infantry; H.M.'s 29th Foot; 56th Native Infantry.

named seemed to be unoccupied, and I directed a party of infantry to take possession of it. Upon the approach of this party a tremendous fire of musketry was opened from the walls, which were loopholed in every direction; the 2nd European regiment was then ordered up in support, under the command of Major Steel, and soon carried it after a most obstinate resistance, in which that gallant regiment suffered rather severely, as well as upon its emerging from the village; soon after which the enemy left many of their guns, and fled in the greatest confusion.

It affords me the highest satisfaction to record the valuable services of Brigadier A. S. H. Mountain, C.B., and of Brigadier N. Penny, C.B., who led the 2nd European Regiment to the attack of the village, in the most gallant and exemplary manner. I should wish particularly to mention the very great assistance I received from Major Horsford, commanding the heavy battery, and Major Fordyce, commanding 2nd troop, 2nd brigade horse artillery, and Captain Dawes, commanding No. 17 light field battery. It is impossible to praise too highly their conduct, and that of all those under their command.

I beg likewise to bring to his Excellency's notice the valuable assistance I received from my divisional and personal staff, Brevet Captain J. A. D. Fergusson, deputy assistant adjutant-general, Lieutenant A. S. Galloway, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, Lieutenant Colt, aide-de-camp, Captain Sherwill and Lieutenant MacDonnell, majors of brigade, and Captain Goldie and Lieutenant Irwin, of the engineers.

Captain W. P. Robbins, 15th Native Infantry, who acted as my aide-de-camp during the action, afforded me great and active assistance, as did also Lieutenant H. B. Hopper, 31st Native Infantry (orderly officer).

My warmest thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel Congreve, C.B., Her Majesty's 29th Foot, Lieutenant-Colonel Jack, 30th Native Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel Holmes, 56th Native Infantry, and to Majors J. Steel, 2nd European

Regiment, W. R. Corfield, 31st Native Infantry, and J. R. McCausland, 70th Native Infantry (severely wounded in the attack on the village of Kalerah), for the exemplary manner in which they led their regiments. I trust I may be permitted to bring to his Excellency's notice the name of Brevet Captain G. Gordon, 50th Native Infantry, officiating sub-assistant commissary-general, who, at my request, destroyed the enemy's camp equipage and loose ammunition.

The conduct of all the troops under my command, European and Native, under a terrific and well-directed cannonade, was such as to call forth my highest commendation.

In conclusion, I regret, that in consequence of our being so constantly on the move since the action, I am unable to forward herein the return of casualties ; but I shall do myself the honour to transmit them with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. GILBERT, Major-General,
Commanding 2nd Infantry Division,
Army of the Punjaub.

P. S. In the absence of the regular returns I may here add that the amount of loss is very trifling, considering the heavy fire kept up by the enemy's artillery on the centre of the division, where the heavy guns were, the 2nd European Regiment having only lost eight men killed, and 135 wounded; the 31st Native Infantry, 11 men killed, and 131 wounded; and 70th Native Infantry, 20 killed and 40 wounded.

In the 4th Brigade H. M's. 29th Regiment lost only 2 men and 6 wounded, the 30th Native Infantry 3 men wounded, and the 56th Native Infantry only 1 man wounded.

To Lieutenant-Colonel P. Grant. C.B., Adjutant-General of the Army.

Camp Dowlutnuggur, February 23, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to report to you, for the information of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, that in obedience to the orders I received from his Lordship, at day-

light of the 21st instant I formed the brigades of the 3rd Division, commanded by Brigadiers Carnegie and McLeod, with the light field batteries attached to them, close to the left bank of the nullah, which passed in front of the village of Shadawal a little after 7 A. M. The brigade under Brigadier Hoggan was formed at the same time in rear to act as a reserve to the whole force intended to be employed on that side of the nullah.

In the advance to the attack of the enemy's position, his Lordship desired me to keep close to the left side of the nullah, and to preserve my communication with the heavy guns, which were placed on the opposite bank.

His Lordship further directed me to approach, but not to pass that part of the nullah, behind which the right of the enemy's army was formed, without further instructions from him.

With a view to the effectual fulfilment of his Lordship's wishes to maintain close communication with the heavy guns on my right, and to prevent their molestation by the enemy from the nullah, I directed the light company of H. M's. 24th to occupy and move along the nullah in advance of the heavy guns, and to render the communication more secure, I supported this company with two guns from No. 10 light field battery, which moved close along the bank of the nullah.

The two brigades were formed, in the first instance, in contiguous columns of regiments (the brigades at full distance), covered by a strong line of skirmishers, and these immediately supported by Nos. 5 and 10 light field batteries, attached to them respectively. These skirmishers communicated on the left with those covering the front of the Bombay division, which were likewise supported by the troop of horse artillery belonging to that force. The whole line moved forward at $\frac{1}{4}$ before 8 A. M., in this order, with the regularity of troops at a review. The country we passed over in our advance was perfectly level, highly cultivated and without an obstruction, being merely dotted here and there with an occasional tree.

At $\frac{1}{2}$ past 9, the skirmishers having arrived within long range of the enemy's guns, the columns were deployed into line, when we again moved forward; at this time the right wing of the enemy's army was plainly to be seen, formed directly in our front beyond a turn in the nullah which seemed to run parallel to the front of their position, in the centre of which and nearly opposite to Nos. 5 and 10 light field batteries, they had two very heavy guns, and several 6 and 9-pounders field-guns, which then opened fire; that from the former, in the first instance, caused some loss in the batteries; and here it was, I regret to say, that Lieutenant Day, of the Artillery, a very brave and most promising young officer, was killed by a cannon-ball.

The line moved onwards to the front, keeping in communication with, and as much as possible, in the alignment of the heavy guns, while the field batteries kept up so destructive a fire upon the enemy in their front, in position behind the nullah, that they finally obliged the whole force to abandon it, and take shelter under cover of the bank of the nullah, and from which they were afterwards driven in confusion and flight, by an enfilading fire from these same field batteries.

About three-quarters of an hour before the enemy had been finally driven in flight from the nullah and from the field, a great effort was made by many, apparently of the principal chiefs, to bring forward a large body of their cavalry, which was followed in a tumultuous manner by the infantry, which had taken shelter in the nullah to attack the centre of the Bombay division. This attack was taken in flank by No. 5 field battery, and caused great loss to the enemy, both in his short advance and subsequent retreat.

The infantry of the 3rd Division had not occasion to fire a shot. The enemy were driven from their different positions, and from the field, by the fire of those two field batteries, aided by that of the Bombay troop of horse artillery.

I cannot find language to express my sense of the calm,

steady and admirable manner, in which these two batteries were commanded and worked by Major Mowatt, the commanding officer, and by Major Ludlow and Lieutenant Robertson, the former commanding No. 5, the latter No. 10 battery; nor am I able adequately to express my admiration of the bravery and gallantry of the other officers of these batteries, and of their non-commissioned officers and men, all of whom I beg to recommend, in an especial manner, to the favourable notice of the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief.

After the troops had crossed the nullah, I received his Lordship's orders to follow the troops of the right wing, in their movement towards the east side of Goojerat, while the Bombay division passed the town on the other side. After clearing the town, the division again resumed its communication with the Bombay troops, and proceeded with them in advance, together with the troops of the 2nd Division on our right, until ordered to halt and encamp.

I beg leave to bring to the favourable notice of the Commander-in-chief the conduct of Brigadiers Carnegie and McLeod, to whom I feel much indebted for the brave example they set their men, and for the officer-like manner in which they managed their respective brigades during the day. Brigadier Hoggan, commanding the reserve, was under the immediate orders of Brigadier-General Dundas on the left.

The two former brigadiers speak in strong terms of the merits and services during the day of their respective brigade-majors, Captain Clarke, of the 25th Native Infantry, and Captain Keiller, of the 6th Native Infantry; and I can confirm their opinion of the zeal, activity, and value of these officers' services, from my own personal observation.

I beg also to recommend to the favourable notice of the Commander-in-chief, the conduct of the several officers commanding regiments, who all set an example of the greatest gallantry to their respective corps, viz., Lieutenant-Colonel

Smith, Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbett, 25th Native Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Her Majesty's 61st, Major Tudor, 46th Native Infantry, and Captain Lang, 36th Native Infantry, they are all truly deserving of his Lordship's favourable notice and approbation. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of Her Majesty's 61st, speaks in terms of praise of the assistance he received from the two majors of that regiment, Major Campbell and Major Stephens; and Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, of Her Majesty's 24th Regiment, in a similar manner, notices the conduct of Major Blachford of that corps.

I received, during the day, the most cordial and valuable assistance from Major Ponsonby, assistant adjutant-general of the division, with whom I have found a real pleasure in being associated on service, and to whom I owe great obligation for the able and careful manner in which he conducts the duties of his department.

I beg to recommend to the particular notice of his Lordship the Commander-in-chief the conduct of Ensign Garden, deputy assistant quartermaster-general, to whom I am also under many obligations for the zeal and ability with which he performs his various duties.

Captain Durand and Lieutenant Morton, of the Engineers, were attached to the 3rd Division, during the action, and accompanied me during the day; they rendered me valuable assistance, and I owe to them, accordingly, my warmest acknowledgments.

I cannot conclude this report without also bringing to the notice of the Commander-in-chief the willing and valuable assistance afforded me by my aide-de-camp Captain Haythorne, and also by my brother officer Lieutenant Shadwell, of Her Majesty's 98th Regiment, who was present in the action as volunteer.

I beg herewith to inclose a return of the killed and wounded, together with a present state of the troops actually

engaged, and returns of the quantity of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. CAMPBELL, Brigadier-General,
Commanding 3rd Division, Army of the Punjaub.

*From Brigadier-General H. Dundas, C.B., commanding
Bombay column, Army of the Punjaub, to the Adjutant-
General of the Bengal Army.*

Head-Quarters, Camp Saikerwalla, February 22, 1849.

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you that, agreeably to the orders I received, the Bombay Infantry division was formed on the left of the line. I advanced for some distance in contiguous columns at quarter distance, the 60th Rifles, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, and 3rd troop Horse Artillery, under Major Blood, being thrown in advance. The division deployed into line, and gradually advanced as the attack on the right developed itself. A party of the enemy's horse made a demonstration of attacking the line, but speedily moved off to their own right, on receiving one or two rounds from Major Blood's troop. A battery of the enemy, which was in front of the Bengal division, was also quickly silenced by this troop, which made excellent practice. The division kept gradually advancing without firing a shot, the enemy moving off so fast we could not reach him, the artillery taking every advantage of opening its fire that was afforded. The infantry kept constantly advancing, passing through the enemy's camp, which was left standing, and round the town of Goojerat on the left, bringing up the left shoulders. The ground at the first was studded with bushes and hedges of prickly pear, which caused some delay in getting through, and on reaching the open country again, not a sign of the enemy was to be seen. Two guns were abandoned by him on this side of the town. Not a casualty occurred in the infantry division or in the troop, with the

exception of two horses. The troop afterwards accompanied Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's division of cavalry in pursuit of the enemy, and it has been reported to me, by Brigadier Leeson, commanding Bombay Artillery, that it rendered good service. The Scinde Horse, under Lieutenant Malcolm, having been attached for the day to Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell's division, I had not an opportunity of witnessing a most successful and gallant charge which was made by that distinguished regiment against a party of the enemy's horse, which was completely overthrown with the loss of their standards, and the attempt to turn our left, which the enemy showed a disposition to try, altogether frustrated. This success was not gained without some loss, which amounted to 3 killed and 16 or 17 wounded. The field battery under Captain Turnbull was attached to the force protecting the baggage, where the troops never came in contact with the enemy, who moved off with the utmost rapidity; there is little room for remark on their conduct, beyond making a steady and regular advance, and for a long distance, and preserving a good order of formation. I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of all—and my thanks are due to Brigadier Capon, commanding the 1st Infantry Brigade, to Lieutenant-Colonel Bradshaw, commanding 60th Rifles, Major Hallett, commanding 3rd Regiment Native Infantry, Major Mignon, commanding 1st Bombay Fusiliers, Major Maut, commanding 19th Regiment Native Infantry, Brigadier Leeson, commanding the artillery, rendering every assistance, and Major Blood, in command of the troop, is entitled to every credit for the efficient service the troop was enabled to perform,

The steady and good order in which the brigade of the Bengal army moved under Brigadier Hoggan, which was in support of the Bombay division, was very praiseworthy.

I am indebted to the officers of the divisional staff for the active assistance they afforded me, Major Greene, assistant adjutant-general, Captain Hart, deputy assistant adjutant-

general, Captain Ramsay, the assistant quartermaster-general, Captain Skinner, the deputy judge-advocate-general, Major St. John, paymaster-general, Lieutenant Mules, of the 1st Fusiliers, postmaster, Lieutenant Ward, 60th Rifles, my aide-de-camp, and Lieutenant Crawley, 15th Hussars, aide-de-camp to Major-General Aitchison, commanding Mysore division, who officiated as my aide-de-camp,* Lieutenant Stevenson, brigade-major of artillery, rendered every assistance in his department. The sappers and miners, under Lieutenant Kendall, were kept prepared for any duty that might have been required in sloping down nullahs for the guns, &c., but the ground was so favourable for the movement of the troops that their exertions were not required in this duty. My thanks are also due to Captain Threshie, assistant commissary-general, on this occasion, as also for the efficient manner in which the duties of his department have been conducted.

Lieutenant Henry, 19th Regiment Native Infantry, aide-de-camp to the Right Honourable the Governor of Bombay, and who was placed in political charge of the prisoner of war, the Dewan Moolraj, joined me in the afternoon, having ridden post from Lahore on purpose to be present, after delivering over charge of his prisoner on the 20th instant.

Herewith I inclose a list of casualties, which is principally in horses, together with a return of ammunition expended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. DUNDAS, Brigadier-General,
Commanding Bombay column, Army of the Punjaub.

* Brigadier Capon also reports favourably of the assistance he derived from Captain Stiles, major of brigade, and Lieutenant Gordon, 60th Rifles, who officiated as aide-de-camp.

From Major J. S. Leeson. Brigadier commanding Artillery Brigade, Bombay Division, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Bombay Division.

Camp Goojerat, February 22, 1849.

Sir,—In compliance with your order, I have the honour to report that the 3rd, or Major Blood's troop of horse artillery, was ordered to accompany the cavalry division under General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B., at about half-past one yesterday, to follow the enemy, who were then retreating. With this troop I proceeded, accompanied by Lieutenant Hamilton and my staff.

After proceeding at a trot and gallop for about nine miles, we joined the cavalry division, and soon joined the enemy's rear, and at a distance of about 400 yards opened fire with manifest good effect; they were then attempting to carry off three guns, and a considerable body of cavalry were hovering round to afford them protection; this they were unable to effect, as our well-directed fire soon obliged the enemy to abandon their guns, camels, carts, bullocks, &c., and a great proportion of their baggage, which fell into our hands.

The enemy still continuing to retreat in a most disorderly manner, we advanced at a gallop for about three miles, and again opened fire with such effect that they were compelled to abandon another gun.

We again advanced some distance further, and were halted by order of the general commanding, who proceeded, and at a quarter to 5 P.M. we began to fall back towards camp, which we reached at half-past 8 o'clock P.M.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. S. LEESON, Maj., H. A.,
Brigadier Comdg. Arty. Bde., Bombay Division.

(True Copy,)

(Signed) EDWARD GREEN, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General, F. F.

General Return of Casualties in the Army of the Punjaub in the Action of Goojerat, on the 21st February, 1849, between the British Forces under the personal command of General the Right Honourable Hugh, Baron Gough, G.C.B., Commander-in-chief of all the Forces in India, and the Rebel Army under Sirdar Chutter Sing and Rajah Shere Sing.

General Staff—1 Provost-Marshall wounded.

Artillery Division.—Horse Artillery.

4th Troop, 1st Brigade—3 rank and file, 1 syce, 17 horses, killed; 1 native officer, 5 rank and file, 2 lascars, 5 syces, 11 horses, wounded.

2nd Troop, 2nd Brigade—7 rank and file, 1 lascar, 25 horses, killed; 1 serjeant, 1 trumpeter, 17 rank and file, 4 lascars, 13 horses, wounded.

3rd Troop, 2nd Brigade—1 syce, 7 horses, killed; 4 rank and file wounded; 1 syce missing.

4th Troop, 2nd Brigade—1 rank and file wounded; 1 horse, missing.

1st Troop, 3rd Brigade—1 trumpeter, 2 rank and file, wounded; 1 horse missing.

2nd Troop, 3rd Brigade—1 rank and file, 7 horses, killed; 2 serjeants, 3 rank and file, 1 syce, 1 horse, wounded; 2 horses missing.

4th Troop, 3rd Brigade—1 European officer, 1 serjeant, 6 rank and file, 1 lascar, 16 horses, killed; 1 serjeant, 4 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 syce, 6 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

Foot Artillery.

1st Company, 1st Battalion (No. 10 Battery)—1 European officer, 1 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 2 rank and file, 2 syce-drivers, 3 horses, wounded; 1 horse missing.

3rd Company, 1st Battalion (No. 17 Battery)—10 horses killed; 4 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded.

3rd Company, 3rd Battalion—2 rank and file, 5 bullocks, killed; 2 syce-drivers wounded.

4th Company, 3rd Battalion—5 bullocks killed; 2 rank and file, 1 lascar, 3 syce-drivers, wounded.

1st Company, 4th Battalion—1 European officer, 3 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

4th Company, 4th Battalion—1 rank and file wounded.

3rd Company, 7th Battalion (No. 5 Battery)—1 syce-driver, 1 syce, 3 horses, killed; 2 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 syce-driver, wounded.

Total—2 European officers, 1 serjeant, 20 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, 3 syces, 97 horses or bullocks, killed; 1 European officer, 1 native ditto, 4 serjeants, 2 trumpeters, 50 rank and file, 10 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, 7 syces, 37 horses or bullocks, wounded; 1 syce, 6 horses, missing.

Engineer Department and Sappers and Pioneers—1 European officer, 1 native ditto, 2 serjeants or havildars, 5 rank and file, wounded.

Cavalry Division. 1st Brigade.

H. M.'s 3rd Light Dragoons—1 horse killed; 1 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded; 2 horses missing.

H. M.'s 9th Lancers—4 horses missing.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 European officer, 4 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

8th Regiment Light Cavalry—1 syce, 1 horse killed; 1 native officer, wounded; 1 rank and file, 3 horses, missing.

2nd Brigade.

H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons—1 European officer, 3 horses killed; 2 European officers, 4 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

1st Regiment Light Cavalry—2 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded; 2 horses missing.

3rd Brigade.

11th Irregular Cavalry.—2 horses killed; 3 rank and file wounded.

14th Irregular Cavalry (1 squadron)—2 rank and file, 4 horses, wounded; 2 horses missing.

4th Brigade.

3rd Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, 2 horses, killed; 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 5 rank and file, 2 horses, wounded.

9th Irregular Cavalry—1 rank and file, 10 horses, killed; 1 havildar, 12 rank and file, 3 horses, wounded.

Total—1 European officer, 2 rank and file, 1 syce, 19 horses, killed; 3 European officers, 2 native ditto, 2 havildars, 33 rank and file, 18 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 13 horses, missing.

1st Infantry Division.

Divisional Staff—1 horse wounded.

1st Brigade.

H. M.'s 10th Foot—7 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 1 European officer, 53 rank and file, wounded.

8th Regiment Native Infantry—1 European officer, 1 native ditto, 3 rank and file, killed; 2 European officers, 3 native ditto, 4 havildars, 56 rank and file, wounded.

52nd Regiment Native Infantry—5 rank and file killed; 3 European officers, 1 havildar, 30 rank and file, wounded.

2nd Brigade.

H. M.'s 32nd Foot—1 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 4 rank and file, wounded.

51st Regiment Native Infantry—5 rank and file killed; 1 European officer, 1 native ditto, 1 havildar, 46 rank and file, wounded.

72nd Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed; 8 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 European officer, 1 native ditto, 22 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 8 European officers, 4 native ditto, 6 havildars, 197 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded.

2nd Infantry Division. 3rd Brigade.

2nd European Regiment—1 European officer, 2 serjeants, 6 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 5 European officers, 12 serjeants, 123 rank and file, 1 horse, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

31st Regiment Native Infantry—2 havildars, 9 rank and file, killed; 1 European officer, 4 native ditto, 7 havildars, 119 rank and file, 1 lascar, wounded.

70th Regiment N. I.—10 rank and file killed; 5 European officers, 1 native ditto, 4 havildars, 34 rank and file, wounded.

4th Brigade.

H. M.'s 29th Foot—2 rank and file killed; 6 rank and file wounded.

30th Regiment Native Infantry—3 rank and file wounded.

56th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file wounded.

Total—1 European officer, 4 serjeants or havildars, 27 rank and file, 1 horse, killed; 11 European officers, 5 native ditto, 23 serjeants or havildars, 286 rank and file, 1 lascar, 1 horse, wounded; 3 rank and file missing.

3rd Infantry Division. 5th Brigade.

25th Regiment Native Infantry—1 rank and file killed; 2 rank and file wounded.

7th Brigade.

H. M.'s 61st Foot—9 rank and file wounded.

36th Regiment Native Infantry—1 trumpeter, 3 rank and file, killed; 2 havildars, 7 rank and file, wounded.

Total—1 trumpeter, 4 rank and file, killed; 2 serjeants or havildars, 18 rank and file, wounded.

Bombay Division.

3rd Troop Horse Artillery—1 horse killed.

Scinde Irregular Horse—1 havildar, 1 rank and file, 24 horses, killed; 1 native officer, 1 havildar, 10 rank and file, 11 horses, wounded.

Total—1 serjeant or havildar, 1 rank and file, 25 horses, killed; 1 native officer, 1 serjeant or havildar, 10 rank and file, 11 horses, wounded.

Grand Total—5 European officers, 1 native ditto, 6 serjeants or havildars, 1 trumpeter, 76 rank and file, 2 lascars, 1 syce-driver, 4 syces, 143 horses or bullocks, killed; 24 European officers, 14 native ditto, 1 provost marshal, 40

serjeants or havildars, 2 trumpeters, 599 rank and file, 11 lascars, 8 syce-drivers, 7 syces or grass-cutters, 68 horses or bullocks, wounded; 4 rank and file, 1 syce, 19 horses or bullocks, missing.

NOMINAL LIST OF EUROPEAN OFFICERS.

General Staff—Wounded, Provost-Marshal S. Budd, severely.

Artillery Division.

4th Troop, 3rd Brigade Horse Artillery—Killed, Captain J. Anderson.

1st Company, 1st Battalion Artillery—Killed, Second Lieutenant E. W. Day.

1st Company, 4th Battalion Artillery—Wounded, Captain and Brevet Major Sir R. C. Shakespear.

Corps of Engineers—Wounded, Second Lieutenant B. M. Hutchinson, very severely, leg amputated.

Cavalry Division.

H. M.'s 14th Light Dragoons—Killed, Lieutenant A. Lloyd; Wounded, Captain J. H. Goddard, severely; Captain A. Scudamore, dangerously.

5th Regiment Light Cavalry—Wounded, Lieutenant H. J. Stannus, severely.

1st Infantry Division.

H. M.'s 10th Foot—Wounded, Captain R. M. Best, slightly.

H. M.'s 32nd Foot—Wounded, Lieutenant G. Jeffrey, slightly.

8th Regiment Native Infantry—Killed, Lieutenant R. Cox; Wounded, Major G. Farquharson, dangerously; Ensign G. H. Griffiths, severely.

51st Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Lieutenant T. C. Darnell, severely.

52nd Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Captain J. W. H. Jamieson, severe contusion; Lieutenant W. H. Lowther, ditto; Lieutenant G. R. Smith, ditto.

2nd Infantry Division.

2nd European Regiment—Killed, Lieutenant G. H. Sprott;
Wounded, Captain A. Boyd, slightly; Lieutenant A.
Elderton, ditto; Ensign A. D. Toogood, ditto; Ensign
D. A. Sandford, ditto; Ensign J. G. S. Matheson, ditto.

31st Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Ensign F. J.
Gully, slightly.

70th Regiment Native Infantry—Wounded, Major J. K.
McCausland, severely; Brevet Captain C. L. Edwards,
slightly; Lieutenant A. Fytche, ditto; Ensign R. C.
Whiting, severely; Ensign C. Murray, slightly.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT, Lieut.-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

*List of Ordnance captured from the Enemy, in the Action at
Goojerat, on the 21st February, 1849.*

Camp Goojerat, February 22, 1849.

No.	Nature of Ordnance.	No.	Nature of Ordnance.
1..	Brass Gun .. 16-pounder	30..	Brass Gun .. 6-pounder
	„ 6-pounder		„ 6-pounder
	„ 9-pounder		„ 8-pounder
	„ 6-pounder	35..	„ 8-pounder
5..	„ 9-pounder		„ 8-pounder
	„ 8-pounder		„ 8-pounder
	„ 8-pounder		„ 8-pounder
	„ 3-pounder		„ 8-pounder
	„ 8-pounder	40..	„ 8-pounder
10..	„ 12-pounder		„ 7½-pounder
	„ 9-pounder	42..	„ 7½-pounder
	„ 18-pounder	1..	Brass Howitzer
	„ 8-pounder		„
	„ 9-pounder		„
15..	„ 8-pounder		„
	„ 2-pounder	5..	„
	„ 7-pounder		„
	„ 8-pounder		„
	„ 8-pounder	8..	„

20 ..	„	2-pounder	1 .. Brass Mortar
	„	8-pounder	„
	„	16-pounder	3 .. „
	„	8-pounder	—
	„	9-pounder	53 Total pieces of ordnance
25 ..	„	8-pounder	— captured.
	„	6-pounder	17 Ammunition tumbrils
	„	6-pounder	unserviceable.
	„	8-pounder	
	„	7-pounder	A considerable number of tum-
30 ..	„	6-pounder	brils were also blown up and
	„	7-pounder	otherwise destroyed.

(Signed) J. ABERCROMBIE, Captain,
Deputy-Assistant Adj.-Gen., Artillery.

(Signed) J. TENNANT, Brigadier-Gen.,
Commanding Artillery Division.

NOTIFICATION.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
March 10, 1849.

In the General Order, dated 1st March, publishing the details of the action at Goojerat, the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Birch (Judge-Advocate-General) having been inadvertently omitted, the Right Hon. the Governor-General is pleased to direct that, in that part of the General Order in which the Officers of the General Staff of the Army are thanked, the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Birch be inserted immediately after the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Garden, C.B.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

J. STUART, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India, Military
Department, with the Governor-General.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
March 17, 1849.

The Governor-General has the utmost satisfaction in directing that the despatches which he has this day received from his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and from Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, K.C.B., be published for the information of the army and of the people of India.

The British subjects, who were prisoners in the hands of the enemy, have all returned in safety.

On the 14th instant, Sirdar Chutter Sing, Rajah Shere Sing, and the principal Sikh Sirdars and Chiefs, delivered their swords into the hand of Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert.

Forty-one pieces of artillery were at the same time surrendered; and the remains of the Sikh army, to the number of 16,000 men, laid down their arms in the presence of the British troops.

The Governor-General offers to his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to Major-General Gilbert, and to the whole army, his heartfelt congratulations on this glorious result of the battle of Goojerat, and of the operations subsequent to it, so admirably conducted by the Major-General, in fulfilment of his Excellency's instructions.

But the war is not yet concluded; nor can there be any cessation of hostilities until Dost Mahomed Khan and the Affghan army are either driven from the province of Peshawar, or destroyed within it.

The British army has already resumed its march upon Attok; and the Governor-General confidently hopes, that the entire success which, with God's blessing, will attend it, may enable him soon to announce the restoration of peace.

The Governor-General directs that, in honour of the important events which have now been notified, a salute of 21 guns be fired from every principal station of the army in India.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
With the Governor-General.

*From the Rt. Hon. the Commander-in-Chief to the Rt. Hon.
the Governor-General of India, &c., &c.*

Dated Head-Quarters, Camp Kuttala,
March 16, 1849.

My Lord,—I have the greatest gratification in reporting to your Lordship the further happy results of the decisive victory obtained at Goojerat on the 21st ultimo.

Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, with that energy and judgment which induced me to select him to conduct the ulterior operations subsequent to that action, has well fulfilled the trust reposed in him, by rapidly pressing the routed enemy, which has led to their unqualified submission, the surrender of their remaining guns, and about 16,000 stand of arms, all of which are now in our possession; and I rejoice to add, that this fortunate consummation has been obtained without a single shot being fired.

The whole of the Sikh force, with their Sirdars, have now come in, with the exception of Bhae Maharaj and Colonel Richpaul Sing, who have absconded, but without followers.

We have now in our possession 56 guns taken at Goojerat and abandoned by the enemy in his retreat on the 21st February; 40 surrendered to Major General Sir Walter Gilbert since that event; 12 captured at Chillianwallah, and 50 at Mooltan, making a total of 158 pieces of ordnance which have fallen into our hands during the present campaign.

Again heartily congratulating your Lordship at this most satisfactory termination of the Sikh war,

I have, &c.
(Signed) GOUGH, General.

No. 282.

From Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B., Commanding Field Force, on Special Service, to H. M. Elliot, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, with the Governor-General.

Dated Camp Rawul Pindee, March 14, 1849.

Sir,—Since I addressed you on the 11th instant, from Hoormuck, I have advanced to Rawul Pindee, which place I reached to-day. I have now the high gratification of reporting for the information of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, that the disarmament of the Sikh army, commenced at Manikyalla, has been this day completed by the surrender of their swords, by the Sikh Sirdars, in presence of the commanding Officers of divisions and brigades and their Staff.

The total number of guns surrendered is 41, of which a return shall be forwarded hereafter; and the number of stands of arms laid down before the force under my command is about 16,000.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. R. GILBERT, Major-Gen.
Commanding Field Force, on Special Service.

(True Copies.)

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

(Signed) J. STUART, Colonel,
Secretary to the Government of India, Military
Department, with the Governor-General.

GENERAL ORDER BY THE RIGHT HON. THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL OF INDIA.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore,
April 2, 1849.

The Governor-General has the gratification of publishing for general information, despatches which have been received from His Excellency the Commander-in-chief and from Major-General Sir Walter Gilbert, K.C.B., announcing the termination of hostilities in the Punjaub.

The Governor-General declared that before the war could cease, every enemy, whether Sikh or Affghan, should be driven from before us ; and the British army has well and gallantly made good his words.

The Sikh Sirdars and the remnant of their army were pursued, have surrendered, and have been disarmed.

The Ameer of Cabul with his troops has fled before the British force, and has been chased ignominiously from the territories he invaded.

The war has thus been brought to an end, and the Punjaub has been declared a portion of the British Empire in India.

Once again the Governor-General offers to His Excellency the Commander-in-chief, to the general officers, the officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of the army, the assurance of his deep and unfeigned gratitude for the great services they have rendered to the country by the zeal and gallantry they displayed, and for the sustained and cheerful exertions they have made.

In anticipation of the wishes of the Honourable Court of Directors, the Governor-General will grant to every officer and soldier who has been employed within the Punjaub in this campaign, to the date of the occupation of Peshawur, a medal, bearing the word "Punjaub," in commemoration of the honourable service they have done.

The Governor-General is also pleased to direct that every corps which has been so employed shall bear the same word on their standards, colours, and appointments.

The Governor-General desires to take the opportunity of acknowledging his obligations to officers who have been serving in various positions connected with the army in the field.

The Governor-General is sensible of the zeal and activity of Major-General Sir D. Hill, K.C.B., commanding the reserve: and he would have looked with confidence to his services if the division under his command had been called into operation.

Brigadier-General Wheeler, C.B., has executed the several duties which have been committed to him with skill and success; and the Governor-General has been happy to convey to him his thanks.

The Governor-General is indebted to Brigadier Stalker, commanding at Mooltan, for the successful exertions which have been made under his directions, for placing the fort again in a condition of defence, and for maintaining the tranquillity of the country.

The Governor-General begs to acknowledge the service which has been rendered by Lieut.-Colonel McSherry, 1st N. I., commanding at Govindgurh. The energy, vigilance, and tact which he exhibited during his occupation of that important fortress, have been of much value to the Government of India.

From Sir F. Currie, Baronet, Resident at Lahore, previously to his return to his seat in Council, the Governor-General received at all times effective and most ready co-operation; and he has continued to receive from Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. Lawrence, K.C.B., the support which his known ability and experience enabled him to afford.

The meritorious conduct of the several assistants to the Resident has elicited the strong approbation of the Government. In addition to those whom he has before named, the Governor-General offers his especial thanks to Major George Lawrence, for the able management which so long enabled him to maintain his position at Peshawur, and to Captain

James Abbott for the gallant stand he has made in the hills at Huzara.

Lieut. Taylor has earned the full approbation of the Government by his judicious and persevering efforts which regained and have held the Province of Bunnoo.

The sustained defence of the Fort of Attock, which was made by Lieut. Herbert, under circumstances of great difficulty, has been viewed by the Government of India with admiration, and entitled him to their warmest praise.

Mr. John Lawrence, Commissioner of the Trans-Sutlej Province, has received the thanks of the Governor-General. Well seconded by his assistants in the district, he has greatly contributed by his promptitude, energy, and firmness to the maintenance of the general tranquillity which has prevailed in these newly acquired territories.

The Governor-General especially wishes to record his marked approbation of the manner in which Major Mackeson, C.B., as his agent with the army, has discharged the duties which were entrusted to him. In the important political matters in which he has been engaged, Major Mackeson's proceedings have been distinguished by ability, judgment, discretion and firmness; and the Governor-General begs to convey to him the expression of his unqualified satisfaction.

The Governor-General concludes by tendering to the officers of the Government in his camp, sincere thanks for the assistance he has at all times received from them.

He particularly desires to express his obligation to Mr. Henry Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India, for his very able, laborious, and most valuable aid in the important affairs which occupied the Governor-General's attention:—and to Colonel Stuart, C.B., Military Secretary to the Government of India, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Benson, C.B., Member of the Military Board with the Governor-General, for the great assistance he has derived from their

experience and judgment in the affairs of their respective departments.

While thus congratulating the army and British subjects in India on the triumphant success which has been achieved, the Governor-General desires humbly to acknowledge the Hand by which alone all victory is given.

He has accordingly intimated to the Lord Bishop his wish that, on the first Sunday in May, thanksgivings shall be offered to Almighty God, for the successful termination of the war in which we have been engaged, and for the restoration to the people of the blessings of peace.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

(Copies.)

From H. E. the Commander-in-Chief, to the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.

Head-Quarters, Camp, Army of the Punjaub,
Wuzeerabad, March 25, 1849.

My Lord,—I have sincere satisfaction in forwarding to your Lordship a copy of a despatch received this day from Major-General Sir Walter R. Gilbert, K.C.B., commanding the advanced force of this army, No. 291, of the 21st instant, announcing the occupation of Peshawur by the British troops, the precipitate retreat of the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan and his followers beyond the Khyber Pass, and the consequent dissolution of the Affghan confederacy. These brilliant results have been obtained, your Lordship will observe, without a single shot being fired by our troops since the victory of Goojerat on the 21st ultimo.

It is almost superfluous for me to repeat to your Lordship how very highly I estimate the unwearied and zealous exer-

tions in these subsequent movements of that most energetic and able officer Major-General Gilbert, and the excellent troops under his command.

In soliciting your Lordship's particular attention to Major-General Gilbert's commendation of Major F. Mackeson, C.B., your Lordship's agent with the force, I beg to repeat the high sense I entertain of that officer's merits and the excellent service he has rendered throughout the campaign.

The Sikh rebellion and Affghan confederacy having been now effectually put down and overthrown, I beg to be favoured with your Lordship's instructions for breaking up the army of the Punjaub, which has, I trust, merited the approbation of your Lordship and the country.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GOUGH, General,
Commander-in-chief in India.

No. 291.

From Major-General Sir W. R. Gilbert, K.C.B., Commanding Field Force on Special Service, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Camp Peshawur, March 21, 1849.

Sir,—I advanced this morning from Nowshyra to Peshawur with the Bengal division of my force, and have much satisfaction in reporting, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-chief, that I am in possession of the City of Peshawur and its Balla Hissar.

The Affghan army under command of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan retreated from Peshawur on the 19th instant, and is to-day reported to have reached Dakka, on the western side of the Khyber Pass. The city I found untouched by the Affghans, the Ameer having directed the gates to be closed against his troops; but most of the garden houses in its neighbourhood have been burnt or otherwise rendered uninhabitable, and the Sikh Cantonment at Alli Mardan Khan's Bagh, has been burnt to the ground; the fort of Jumrood is also reported to be destroyed.

By the expulsion from the province of Peshawur of the Ameer and his army, I have carried to a successful conclusion the whole of the instructions of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India, conveyed to me through his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, with your letter of the 3rd March instant.

The Sikhs have been humbled and their power crushed; the British prisoners released from an irksome captivity; and the rich province of Peshawur freed from its Mahomedan invaders. To my troops I am indebted, under Providence, for these glorious results. Since the 1st of the month they have marched from the Jhelum to the Indus and Peshawur, crossing both rivers under many disadvantages, and overcoming all the obstacles of the road, which are naturally great, and were much enhanced by our large train of stores and baggage—the necessary incumbrances of a force like this. To both officers and men I am deeply indebted for their cheerful endurance of the fatigues and privations to which all have been exposed.

I cannot permit myself to conclude this report of my arrival at Peshawur, without expressing to his Lordship my sense of the valuable services rendered me by Major F. Mackeson, C.B., who accompanies the force as agent of the Governor-General. I am particularly indebted to him for his ready assistance, and for the unwearied and unremitting zeal with which he has performed the important duties of his office. To his cool judgment and unswerving decision of purpose, I owe much of the success that has attended the progress of my force.

From my staff, generally, I have received every assistance.

(True Copy.)

(Signed) P. GRANT, Lieut.-Col.,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

(True Copies.)

H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

NOTIFICATION.

Foreign Department, Camp Ferozepore, March 30.

The Governor-General is pleased to direct that the accompanying proclamation, by which the Punjab is declared to be a portion of the British Empire in India, be published for general information, and that a royal salute be fired at every principal station of the army on the receipt thereof.

By order of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) P. MELVILL,
Under-Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

PROCLAMATION.

For many years in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation and the Sikhs.

When Runjeet Sing was dead, and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the state, the Sirdars and the Khalsa army without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated; they were driven with slaughter and in shame from the country they had invaded, and at the gates of Lahore the Maharajah Duleep Sing tendered to the Governor-General the submission of himself and his chiefs, and solicited the clemency of the British government.

The Governor-General extended the clemency of his government to the state of Lahore. He generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the Maharajah having been placed on the throne, treaties of friendship were formed between the states.

The British have faithfully kept their word, and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them.

But the Sikh people and their chiefs have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound.

Of their annual tribute no portion whatever has at any time been paid, and large loans advanced to them by the government of India have never been repaid.

The control of the British Government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, has been resisted by arms.

Peace has been cast aside. British officers have been murdered when acting for the State. Others engaged in the like employment have treacherously been thrown into captivity. Finally, the army of the State and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the Sirdars in the Punjaub who signed the treaties, and led by a member of the regency itself, have risen in arms against us, and have waged a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.

The Government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquest; and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions.

The Government of India has no desire for conquest now: but it is bound in its duty to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge.

To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the State from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the Governor-General is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people, whom their own Government has long been unable to control—and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace.

Wherefore, the Governor-General of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the Kingdom of the Punjaub is at an end: and that all the territories of Maharajah Duleep Sing are now and henceforth a portion of the British Empire in India.

His Highness the Maharajah, shall be treated with consideration and with honour.

The few Chiefs who have not engaged in hostilities against the British, shall retain their property and their rank.

The British Government will leave to all the people, whether Mussulmen, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religions: but it will not permit any man to interfere with others in the observance of such forms and customs as their respective religions may either enjoin or permit.

The Jagheers and all the property of Sirdars or others, who have been in arms against the British, shall be confiscated to the State.

The defences of every fortified place in the Punjaub which is not occupied by British troops shall be totally destroyed: and effectual measures shall be taken to deprive the people of the means of renewing either tumult or war.

The Governor-General calls upon all the inhabitants of the Punjaub—Sirdars and people—to submit themselves peaceably to the authority of the British Government which has hereby been proclaimed.

Over those who shall live as obedient and peaceful subjects of the State, the British Government will rule with mildness and beneficence.

But if resistance to constituted authority shall again be attempted; if violence and turbulence shall be renewed; the Governor-General warns the people of the Punjaub that the time for leniency will then have passed away, and that their offence will be punished with prompt and most rigorous severity.

By order of the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India.

(Signed) H. M. ELLIOT,
Secretary to the Government of India,
With the Governor-General.

Head-Quarters, Camp Ferozepore, March 29, 1849.

THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALLAH.

A List of Non-commissioned Officers and Privates killed in action at Chillianwallah, on 13th January, 1849, or who subsequently died of their wounds; also a list of those missing.

3rd Light Dragoons.

Killed.—Serj. D. Thompson; Privates, A. Barry, N. Brett, J. Collins, J. Coomber, W. D. Digges, R. Griffiths, J. Hart, J. S. Hamilton, H. Hale, J. Hunt, E. Johnston, W. Langston, J. Markey, E. Marshall, R. McEnermy, G. Milligan, E. Norton, W. Pilbeam, R. Reed, O. Regan, J. Slade, W. Swan, J. Thyer.

9th Lancers.

Killed.—Lance-Serj. R. Calcutt; Privates R. Dalton, J. J. Cunnam, A. Matthews.

14th Light Dragoons.

Killed.—Privates G. Atkins, D. Evans, G. Tookey.

24th Foot.

Killed.—Serj. Maj. J. Coffee, Colour-Serj. W. Davies, Serjs. T. Lear, J. Webster; Corps. G. Eames, J. Sherriff; Privates W. Allsworth, J. Amos, J. Bowman, J. Burgess, J. Butcher, T. Byrne, T. Carpenter, S. Carter, W. Cuthbert, G. Dean, P. Fowlk, G. George, G. Hardman, J. Henshaw, J. Horsfall, T. Hughes, J. Intin, T. Joblin, W. Lakin, C. Lander, P. McColey, J. McReary, T. Merchant, T. Pocock, R. Porter, W. Selby, J. Sharp, P. Westneat, D. Wheeler, W. Willis (1st), S. Andrews, J. Bailey, G. Bird, J. Byers, R. Campbell, D. Clifford, R. John Coates, R. Cockerton, W. Coult, T. J. O'Donoghue, G. Eagan, J. Fergusson, W. Fletcher, G. Harrison, W. Hebson, D. Houlston, E. Indle, T. Mackey, B. Magill, C. Mayo, C. Mitchell, J. O'Connor, N. Pulling, T. Regan, C. Rochford, W. Ryder, G. Saunders, J. Wakefield, J. Warren (2nd), W. Welton, J. Williams, R. Windle, J. Armett, W. H. Bailey, W. Barnett, E. Barr, C. Barnes, R. Burchett, W. Bone,

J. Brewer, H. Cork, E. Everest, M. Green, J. Hanlon, J. Haston, S. Smith, W. Sladen, J. Tebble, J. Slattery, W. Walsh, H. Wrightman; Corps. W. Pattenden, W. Runchey; Privates P. Dales, J. Delmage, T. Ellice, W. Giles, J. Goodchild, T. Grandy, R. Harding, W. Hopkins, J. Kelly, J. McMullin, J. Mohan, M. Moore, T. Morrish, J. Newman, W. Oakley, T. Osborne, T. Parker, P. Quirk, J. Roxberry, J. Saunders, W. Seirs, J. Somersgill, J. Townend, C. Whitehead, T. Biddle, S. Bingham, J. Connelly, J. Dudley, J. Kenning, O. Loyd, T. List, J. Walker, F. Battlestone, J. Eginton, J. Elliott, S. English, H. Farner, C. Green, W. Gardner, T. Hanscombe, C. Lawrence, W. Pearson, T. Priest, W. Rampling, T. Robinson, T. Savage, J. Morton, J. Lake, T. Rostert, E. Shea, G. Smith, J. Tyers; Corp. J. Wilkes; Drum. E. Doughty; Privates T. Atkinson, J. Burton, J. McCulloch, H. Meeds, J. Pratt, J. Terry, J. Tulley; Corp. H. Webb; Privates W. S. Duffan, J. Edwards, W. Francis, G. Harris, J. Hicks, W. Jervis, E. Johnson, T. Kelson, J. King, J. Pittman, D. Shea, C. Simson, J. Twigg, W. Smith, J. Welch, A. Whittell, W. Tobyn; Corp. F. Howell; Privates R. Edmonds, W. Ebeniely, J. Enright, J. Flinn, P. Flinn, G. Gibson, J. Hill, T. S. Hall, W. Hucker, B. Johnson, J. Lamb, J. Murphy, J. Overton, J. Patience, R. Pratt, J. Riddle, J. Shaw, W. Grover Simmonds, W. Thompson.

Died of Wounds.—Corp. W. Bugden; Privates J. Hawkins, J. Morris, J. Attwell.

Missing.—Privates G. Barrington, J. Barry, J. Bradbrook, G. Evans, E. Fry, C. Lancaster, W. H. Medlam, M. Whealan, R. Sandford, J. Wood, T. Chapple, W. Nevard, W. Nicols, J. Carrier, J. Clarke, W. Cross, B. Henry, F. Lang, R. Lang, E. Meade, J. Phillips, J. Sovatian, G. Worley, J. Bentley, M. Betson, T. Cleenen, P. Devaney, J. Killeen, P. Murphy, R. Smith, T. Cresswell, P. Managan, T. Murphy, A. Weldon, J. Hunter, T. Lancaster.

29th Regiment.

Killed.—Serj. P. Carey, R. Long, Privates T. Bunting, R.

Beech, C. Buckley, J. Campbell, E. Cooney, P. Cotter, P. Dempsey, B. Dailey, J. Donovan, J. Darmon, H. Dawkins, J. Fidler, J. Farnol, F. Guest, J. Gostiler, W. Giles, M. Hopkins, J. Hussey, G. Haggitt, W. Jenkins, T. Marriott, D. McDermott, C. McGlaughlin, T. Mullin, J. Mayo, W. Naylor, W. Pratt, J. Shenton, J. Twamblay, J. Taylor, T. Walsh, J. Wildbore, S. Walker.

Died of Wounds.—Corp. G. Taylor, Privates A. Brown, G. Cathey, A. Dunn, R. Hodder, J. Hooper, M. Hadfield, T. Kennell, H. Souter, H. Smart.

Missing.—Privates T. Taylor, T. Vornem.

61st Regiment.

Killed.—Corp. G. Handlon, Privates W. Foster, J. Mason, R. Sherwood, T. Tuckwell, J. White, J. Humes, W. Jones, W. Gray, D. Tuckley, H. Johnson.

Died of Wounds.—Private E. Egan.

LORD GOUGH'S "FAREWELL."

General Order of the Commander-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Camp Skahdera, near Lahore.

March 31, 1849.

The Commander-in-chief in India announces his farewell and adieu to the Army of the Punjaub.

The troops which, since October, have been in arms under his command, are dispersed to their respective cantonments, and on this, the last occasion of addressing them, Lord Gough desires to place on record his sense of the great services and exertions through which the sway of British India has been now extended over the broad plains and classic rivers and cities of this kingdom. The tide of conquest, which heretofore rolled on the Punjaub from the west, has at length reached and overcome it from the east; and that which Alexander attempted, the British Indian army has accomplished. It is with no common pride that the Commander-in-chief applauds the conduct and the valour which have led to so glorious a result.

The favour and approbation of the country and Government will, without doubt, mark enduringly the estimate entertained of its desert; and no time will efface from the memory of this army, and every true soldier in the field, the high sense of triumph and of the glory with which this campaign has terminated. Undismayed by stern opposition, untired by the procrastinations and delays which circumstances forcibly imposed, or by the great labours and exposure which have been borne so manfully, the army has emerged with a fame and a brightness only the more marked by the trying nature of its previous toils and endurances. The mere battle-day, when every glowing feeling of the soldier and the gentleman is called into action, will ever be encountered nobly where British arms are engaged; but it is in the privations, the difficulties, and endless toils of war that the trial of an army consists; and it is these which denote its metal and show of what material it is formed.

Since the day when at Ramnugger the too hasty ardour and enthusiasm of the troops first gave signal of the determined character of the war, and of the fierceness with which a mistaken but brave enemy were bent to oppose the progress of our arms, till now that a crushing and overwhelming victory has prostrated at the feet of our ruler and his govern-

ment an independent, a proud, and a warlike people, Lord Gough, relying upon British courage and endurance, has never for one moment entertained a doubt of the result, nor yielded, even to adverse chances and circumstances, a lurking fear of the successful issue, which true constancy and firmness never fail to attain. The rule which, despite the signal clemency and considerate mercy of the Government, it has nevertheless been found at length necessary to impose upon the Sikhs and their country, has not been thrust upon a defenceless or unresisting people; their valour, their numbers, their means, and preparation, and the desperate energy with which, in error and deceived, the Khalsa and Sikh nation mustered and rallied for the struggle, have been conspicuously apparent; and the army which, in virtue of a most persistive constancy, has reduced such a race and such troops to submission and obedience, merits well the highest eulogium which Lord Gough can bestow.

The Commander-in-chief lingers upon the severance of those ties which may have bound him to that army, the last which in the field it was his duty and his pride to command. Long practice and experience of war and its trying vicissitudes have enabled him to form a just estimate of the conduct and merit of the troops now being dispersed; and the ardour, the vigilance, the endurance, the closing and triumphant bravery and discipline, which have marked their path in the Punjaub, will often recur to him in that retirement he is about to seek; and in which the cares, the earnest exertions, and grave anxieties inseparable from the duties of high military command, will be richly recompensed and rewarded by the sense of duty performed, and the consciousness of unwearied and uncompromising devotion to that sovereign and country which, in common with the British Indian army, it will ever be his boast and his pride to have so successfully served.

To every general, to every individual officer and soldier, European and native, of the army of the Punjaub, Lord Gough finally repeats his cordial and affectionate farewell. Their persons and services are engraven in his heart and affections; and to those among them who may hereafter, within the brief span of life yet before him, revisit their native country, he tenders the unaffected renewal of that intercourse and friendship which mutual esteem and regard, and mutual dangers and exertions, have produced and established.

(Signed) PAT. GRANT, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Adjutant-General of the Army.

NOTE (A).

An amusing incident occurred before Goojramwallah. A large body of Irregular Horse was descried in the distance. Orders were hereupon instantly given to the cavalry to pursue. After a distressing chase, it was discovered that they were not Sikhs, but Nicholson's Horse. The poor terror-stricken allies seemed as intent on effecting their escape as the British cavalry were on capturing them.

NOTE (B).

It was bruited about in camp that Colonel Havepore had fallen a victim to the hatred of his own men. Allusion would not have been made to this painful report, (which we believe to be false,) had not a letter, received a few days ago, from one of the greatest heroes of the campaign, again adverted to it. It was a notorious fact that the gallant officer had become obnoxious to many members of the regiment, in consequence of his immoderate infliction of parades, drills, &c., but if he erred it was on the side of duty; and we have too high an opinion of the 14th Light Dragoons to believe that there was one man in the regiment capable of levelling his carbine at such a noble leader. We would give much to discover with whom this libellous accusation originated!

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p. 215

Letter to S. L. L. 140.

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